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GLOSSARY 
In the case study section of this thesis the following abbreviations 
are used:-
D.H.C. 
P.C.C. 
P.H.C. 
Derby Housing Committee Minutes 
Portsmouth City Council Minutes 
Portsmouth Housing Committee Minutes 
ABSTRACT 
The germ of this thesis was born when the author read 
"Implementation" by J.A. Pressman and A. Wildavsky. This book 
stimulated the author's interest in the interpretation of Central 
Government policy by local authorities of differing political 
complexions. 
This thesis reviews and researches the impact of the implementation 
of Central Government policy by local authorities and attempts to 
assess the reasons for divergence in policy between Conservative 
and Labour controlled authorities. The question posed is whether 
politics accounts largely or wholly for policy divergences, or 
whether it is other factors. 
From the research undertaken by the author, it would appear that 
political complexion is only one factor in a very complex network 
of influences upon policy implementation. The thesis covers factors 
such as the personality of the actors involved, inter and intra 
departmental relationships, and professional linkages as well as 
the more traditional elements of local and central government 
interactions. The focus is on the implementation of housing policy 
in Portsmouth, a predominantly Conservative controlled authority, 
and Derby, a predominantly Labour controlled authority, during the 
period 1945 to 1974. Both authorities were faced by similar problems 
in the period reviewed, and yet each adopted its own distinct policy, 
as the skylines of the two cities reflect today. 
CHAPTER ONE POLICY STUDIES 
i) Introduction 
ii) The British Tradition of Local Government Policy 
Studies 
iii) The American Tradition of State and Local Government 
Policy Studies 
iv) An Assessment of Expenditure Analysis 
v) An Assessment of the Time Dimension 
vi) An Assessment of Policy Styles 
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CHAPTER ONE POLICY STUDIES 
i) Introduction 
The purpose of this study is to look at the factors which determine 
the interpretation and implementation of Central Government policy 
by local authorities. An examination will be made of the implementa-
tion of housing policy in two major cities, one predominantly Labour 
controlled, Derby, and the other predominantly Conservative 
controlled, Portsmouth. The aim of the study is to account for the 
policy divergences between the two authorities. Can the divergences 
be accounted for by political factors or are other factors such as 
the personalities involved, ideologies, local "needs" and 
"resources", the relationship between senior members and officers 
of a similar, greater or lesser importance. 
ii) The British Tradition of Local Government Policy Studies 
Within the literature on British local government there have until 
recently been two main traditions, on the one hand the legal -
constitutional - institutional works and, on the other, historical 
accounts of particular local authorities. The former tradition has 
produced most of this century's local government textbooks; classics 
incude E.D. Simon (1926), W.E. and W.O. Hart (1934), R.M. Jackson 
(1975), P.G. Richards (1975). There is clearly a place for such 
books but they convey largely information. Some general surveys 
on local government of a more behavioural and analytical kind have, 
however, appeared. As explained below,- the field of central/local 
relationships has in particular produced several like J.A.G. Griffith 
(1966) and R.A.W. Rhodes (1979). 
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The latter tradition, the historical case studies, has also developed 
in new ways. Early examples of the genre, even when the authors 
were insiders like Simon (1926) were little more than municipal 
histories. Since the war such books, usually written by independent 
scholars, have tended to attempt community power analyses. With 
varying degrees of success they have sought to portray how towns 
or counties were run over a period of years - see for instance 
Bealey, Blondel and McCann (1965), J.M. Lee (1963), G.W. Jones 
(1969). Nevertheless they have said little about policy processes 
and less about policy outcomes. There are exceptions like W. Hampton 
(1970) on Sheffield and J. Dearlove (1973) on Kensington and Chelsea 
in which both pay much attention to policy. 
Work by social administrators as opposed to local government 
specialists are often concerned with policy inputs or outputs. 
J.B. Cullingworth's (1965) work is an excellent summary of research 
up to 1965 and likewise D.V. Donnison (1967) gives a clear overview 
of housing policy. Both of these writers take the standpoint of 
a social administrator. Clearly in the area of policy analysis 
within political science there is an overlap with the interests of 
other social scientists. In the comparable field of education for 
instance, there is the important work of M. Blaug (1965), an 
economist who undertook a study of the rate of return on investment 
in education in Britain. The only kind of British Local Government 
writing which has concentrated on policy outcomes has been the 
quantitative study. Such studies are undertaken by political 
scientists who have accepted the value of expenditure analysis as 
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a method of policy analysis learning no doubt from American studies 
reviewed in this chapter. Such work is illustrated by N. Boaden 
(1971), who studied the expenditure of eight services in County 
Boroughs, and examined the data for the effect of local needs , 
resources and party disposition. He concluded that the differences 
between local authorities mainly arise from three factors, namely:-
1. the social composition of the area 
2. the nature of party control 
3. the flexibility of finance 
Boaden (1971) says that variations in expenditure contradict 
traditional beliefs that central control imposes uniformity. Local 
authorities allocate resources on the grounds of their view of social 
justice and political feasibility and this is as important as central 
standardisation. Councillors and administrators have definite views 
about local needs. They are, Boaden claims, influenced by parties 
and pressure groups, by the relations between councillors and 
officers, and by the reaction of voters, the consumers and the 
general public. These influences vary from one service to another. 
Party policy plays a large part in education whereas the pressure of 
social needs appears as the main factor in housing. In health and 
welfare, councillors' views and officers' professional values are 
decisive. Social needs are equally pressing. The poorest authorites 
- those with the smallest tax yield in relation to need are the ones 
most likely to spend on expensive social services. This reflects 
the pressures their services have to meet. Boaden concludes that 
the main variations between authorities arise from party politics. 
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Labour spends more on the bigger services and those which appear to 
benefit their traditional supporters. Boaden's general conclusion 
indicates that social conditions and a council's views about them are 
clearly related and determine what level of service is provided. 
James Alt (1969) reaches similar conclusions in his researches in , 
which he considers the expenditure by 43 boroughs on housing, 
education and health services. However, Alt's work fails to take 
account of need, and therefore may be criticised on these grounds. 
His conclusions bear out the importance of party in policy 
determination in British Local Government particularly with regard to 
housing policy. 
Bleddyn Davies in his study of "Variations in Children Services among 
British Urban Authorities", (1972), a parallel to, but extension of 
his study of "Variations in Services for the Aged" (1969) asserts 
that patterns of provision of services that are partially substituted 
for one another at the margin in meeting the needs of a high 
proportion of the services' clients are interdependent. The pattern 
of interdependence is such that supply of other services tends to 
respond to pressures resulting from the supply of those services 
whose supply is least adjustable. The causal factors that influence 
the behaviour of these interdependent systems of services have their 
effect not only at the level of the spending department, but also 
at the highest level of the authority. Further, he believes that 
some of the factors of causal importance are to some degree 
determined by other causal factors which sometimes have a direct 
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as well as an indirect effect on the pattern of provision. Davies 
suggests that services are interdependent - that, for instance, the 
number of children boarded out responds to the number of places in 
homes. In the case study section of this work we shall see in both 
Derby and Portsmouth the level of building was determined not only by 
the level of need but also by the allocation of resources in terms of 
land and money, and by the level of political will or'ideological 
belief being carried out. Interdependent variables are of 
significant importance and as Davies points out, calibre of staff and 
competition for other needs influence the standards of provision. 
iii) The American Tradition of State and Local Government Policy Studies 
In the last 15 years or so in the United States there has been an 
increasing interest in Policy Analysis. This interest is expressed 
by such questions as - "How important are political factors as 
opposed to non-political factors in policy outputs and policy 
outcomes?" - "Do politics matter?" - "Do political factors make any 
difference to policy outputs and policy outcomes or are policies 
determined by environmental factors?" Much of the early work (in 
the 1960's) suggested that politics do not matter and that much of 
the output variation was to be explained by environmental factors. 
It is against this background that we need to view the American 
literature. Before this can be done it is necessary to define 
certain terms:-
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Policy Output/Programmes - The items in the statute book, the expen-
diture, the goods and services produced 
and consumed. 
Policy Outcome 
Feedback 
Spillover 
- The effect it has on schools built, houses 
built, the impact of the policy output 
on, say, homelessness. 
- Peoples' perceptions of the outcomes. 
- The unintended consequences of policy 
outcomes. 
The literature on the relative policy impact of "party", "needs" 
and "resources" is immense. 
Some scholars have applied this kind of analysis to state and local 
government. One of the pioneers was V.O. Key (1949), stressed the 
importance of two-party competition or bi-factiona1ism in one party 
states as a determinent of policy. Key saw the degree of party 
competition as crucial because it reflected the extent to which 
politics were organised or unorganised. Party competition, by 
producing some semblance of organised politics lessens the difficulty 
of lower status groups in sorting out political actors and issues, 
thereby enabling them to promote their own interests more 
effectively. Since the states welfare policies are in the interests 
of the "have-nots", state expenditure levels were used as a measure 
of the success that these groups had enjoyed. 
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Duane Lockard (1959) somewhat modified this notion, by arguing that 
states with complex economies would be more likely to have 
competitive parties since the diversity of economic interests would 
provide a context within which two partyism could flourish. He also 
noted that this diversity made it difficult for a few more powerful 
interests to dominate policy-making. 
The more recent literature however, rejects the developmental 
sequence predicted by the Key-Lockard observations. Work by such 
people as R.E. Dawson and J.A. Robinson (1963), and T R Dye (1965) 
utilise multiple and partial correlational analysis. This more 
recent literature found that when socio-economic factors are held 
constant, the impact of party competition largely disappeared; the 
effects of socio-economic development did not vanish when party 
competition was held constant. From these findings these researchers 
conclude that party competition does not serve as an intervening 
variable between socio-economic development and policy and they 
conclude that party competition and policy are both dependent on 
socio-economic development. Their model states that any association 
between competition and social welfare expenditures is spurious. 
There is no causal connection between competition and welfare, rather 
they are both dependent on socio-economic development. The model 
is surprising in that the theoretical formulations, if not the 
conclusions of the recent studies, are perfectly consistent with 
those of Key and Lockard. A problem arises nevertheless in 
determining which is the independent variable(s). The framework 
common to these studies is that of D. Easton's (1965) systems 
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analysis which employs the model of environment, inputs, throughput, 
outputs and feedback. Economic and social development are treated 
as aspects of the environment; party competition is categorised 
as an aspect of the political process, and governmental expenditure 
as the outputs of the system. Easton's notion that aspects of the 
political process are a consequence of the environment and serve 
to translate factors of that environment into policy output is also 
common to authors like Dye and Dawson. Their research designs like 
Lockard's began with the hypothesis that political factors such as 
party competition act as intervening variables between the socio-
economic environment and output measures. Since this hypothesis 
appears not to be confirmed, serious questions concerning the 
importance of political variables in explaining policy outcomes are 
raised. However, if the notions underlying the prediction from Key 
and Lockard are re-examined then it may be possible to find grounds 
upon which to re-assess the relevance of political variables. From 
Key's analysis one would expect that party competition, like other 
political variables, would serve as an important explanation for 
public policy outputs. Whilst this statement may seem trivially 
true, it leads to an important question "what kinds of policy would 
b . f ?" party competition e lmportant or. Key's answer depends on what 
he believed to be the politically significant questions - questions 
of the sort which appear to have been forgotten in recent literature 
- "Who benefits from political disorganisation?" "Who benefits 
from policy outcomes?" or perhaps more to the point "Who does not 
benefit?" These are questions which I will apply to the housing 
policies of Derby and Portsmouth the case-study chapters of this 
thesis. 
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Party competition may not have an appreciable impact on some types 
of policies, but Key's discussion would enable us to specify the 
conditions under which it would have its greatest effect - the "have-
not" orientated policies. If party competition serves to provide 
political organisation useful to the "have-nots" in their struggle 
with the "haves", then party competition would be most intimately 
related to those policies which are central to that struggle. Key's 
status conflict formulation enables us to discard the simplistic 
hypothesis that party competition is important for explaining policy 
in general. Moreover in the United States, but not necessarily in 
Britain, it suggests that party competition is not related to 
ideology. It could be hypothesised that party competition would 
differentially explain policies as a function of the centrality of 
the policy areas to the "have/have not" struggle. 
If we expect the explanatory strength of party competition to vary 
with the type of policy, it seems only a short step to expect similar 
variation in the importance of other characteristics of the political 
system. Indeed sometimes other variables such as need are more 
important than party competition, although ideology is likely to 
influence other variables. Here one would be thinking of the per-
ceptual and attitudinal distributions of the individuals who occupy 
the important political roles in state or local government systems. 
Hence, Lockard points out that competition may place rather rigid 
electoral restraints upon the kinds of policy appeals that can be 
made. However, he says, that where such external restraints do not 
exist, or are weakest, the greatest room would seem to exist for 
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individual variation in policy-making. In such situations the level 
of exploration would remain meagre (as long as a restriction on the 
measurement of non-individual based variables existed) where one 
cannot point to the influence of individuals. Such variables, 
however, may never be gathered systematically for any but a few 
states at anyone point in time. 
In Cnudde and McCrone's paper (1969) they raise a similar point in 
order that the importance of such variables should not be forgotten. 
They were trying to draw attention to the fact that very little 
effort has been given to looking at the measurement of the many 
political variables. From these additional theoretical 
considerations they derived a new model. The model states that there 
are an infinite number of political variables all of which serve 
to transform aspects of the environment into public policy. They 
did not know if the new model would fit any data. They claim however 
that it could be used to make predictions about what would happen 
if it was descriptive of the policy making process. It could be 
especially useful if only one or a few intervening variables were 
measured in a single study. Cnudde and McCrone therefore considered 
primary models which they believed had some kind of relevance to 
the issues of the literature. The first they called the Key-Lockard 
model because it was derived from their work and it called for a 
developmental sequence between three types of variables. The second 
they called the Dawson-Robinson model because those authors were 
the first of a series to postulate a spurious relationship between 
competition and social welfare policy. The third model set out by 
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Cnudde and McCrone was derived from a re-working of the theoretical 
strains of the other two and is really a hybrid of them both. This 
model predicts effects from both party competition and socio-
economic development with party competition's effect as part of a 
developmental sequence. Cnudde and McCrone concluded in their paper 
that the examination of the methodology utilised in previous research 
into the effects of political variables on state expenditure policies 
found that the spurious model predominant in state politics 
literature rests on two weak pillars - first shaky empirical 
formulations and secondly over reliance on correlational analysis 
which can lead to unwarranted causal inferences. Further, that only 
for two of the six policy areas (per pupil expenditure policies and 
old age assistance) was the spurious model the more appropriate 
inference. Per pupil expenditure policies they concluded seem to 
be virtually a pure case of spuriousness as a function of the wealth 
of a state. They did not find sufficient support for relatively 
simple models in the areas of aid to dependent children and 
unemployment compensation, and they recommended their hybrid model 
as an alternative. They concluded by saying that in their opinion 
different models appear to be required for different policies. 
iv) An Assessment of Expenditure Analysis 
As may be seen from the preceeding two sections, therefore, some 
of the most interesting writing by both British and American scholars 
on Local Government policy making has used quantitaive analysis. 
This methodology has however its drawbacks. It must be remembered 
that Government and Local Authorities do not just raise money. While 
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of course the ways in which the money is allocated is important, the 
statistical analysis of recent years leaves out policies which do not 
necessitate expenditure. Further, it does not attempt to see if the 
expenditures on the policies analysed are reaching the people for 
whom it is intended. If an examination of expenditure is carried 
out, then the examination may reveal those who benefitted, but 
those who do not claim or obtain the benefit may be discounted. For 
instance Child Benefit Allowance/Family Income Supplement is not 
claimed in Britain by all those who according to research carried out 
by the Child Poverty Action Group are eligible to claim. Neither 
does the statistical analysis show any indications as to whether, 
say, in education expenditure it is the children of rich parents who 
benefit most or the children of poor parents. Does such expenditure 
carry even further inequalities through maldistribution of resources? 
One cannot answer such questions merely by looking at expenditure 
figures. Further one might ask, does a larger expenditure level in 
one city than another mean that:-
a) the first city provides a shelter service for it inhabitants? 
b) that the second city is more efficient and not so wasteful? 
In any case 
c) what does an expenditure level indicate? How useful is the 
analysis of expenditure? Does it reflect a greater need in 
one city than another? 
Expenditure figures represent what has gone, therefore they are 
historical. What about the future policy outcomes? Are they to 
be ignored? Are steps being taken to eradicate any former faults? 
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Does the statistical analysis help the planners at all? Are new 
and changing needs being met at the present time? Answers to such 
questions cannot be gathered from expenditure figures alone. The 
research therefore does not appear to identify needs not being met 
because it is concerned with expenditure, nor does it reveal if the 
"right" people are benefitting. Of course the reply of the analyst 
may be that they are merely statisticians and that it is not up to 
them to determine who is not being covered by the figures they 
produce. Some economists such as C.D. Foster and M.E. Beasley (1963) 
claim that such methodological problems can be overcome by using 
cost benefit analysis techniques. Others such as P. Self (1970) 
challenge this view, believing that it probably creates as many 
problems as it solves - for instance has social cost a monetary 
value? 
v) An Assessment of the Time Dimension 
Policy Analyses which do not take account of the time dimension have 
been criticised by B. Guy Peters (1972). Peters drew upon the work 
of John Harasangi (1960) who similarly Peters cites as an example 
the work of Flanigan and Fogelmann (1969) who found different 
relationships between urbanisation and agricultural populations with 
the dependent variable of democratic government affected by the time 
period selected. Similar findings in a particular time period will 
tend to be affected by the levels of policy in preceeding time 
periods. Hence the relationship found at anyone point in time is 
in part a function of a developmental relationship across time. 
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Peters attempts to show that the relationship between socio-economic 
and political indicators and the dependent variable of social 
expenditure is a developmental relationship. Peters further attempts 
to show that the relationship between socio-economic variables , 
political variables and public expenditures are curvilinear where 
analysed across time. He divides the projection into three 
developmental stages - traditional, transitional and modern. In the 
traditional stage of policy formation, the levels of expenditure 
and policy are influenced largely by the ideas of the political 
decision-makers, and relatively little by socio-economic or political 
conditions of the society. The transitional period corresponds to 
the take-off in economic development theory. It is the period during 
which the policy area goes into sustained growth. During this 
period, the population becomes mobilised with respect to the policy 
in question, and presses demands on the political system for certain 
benefits. It is, claims Peters, in this period that the political 
system variables are of greatest importance. As the major lines 
of policy for the political system are established during the take-
off period, the modern stage is largely one of reaction to 
environmental conditions of resource availability or necessity. 
Thus, after the major lines of policy are established incremental 
changes will result from either the need for additional benefits 
or the availability of more resources. 
Peters says therefore that each policy has its own cycles of 
transition. - Although the system as a whole may appear modern, even 
in its public policies, some policy areas may be traditional or 
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transitional. Peters cites as examples environmental control in 
the social democracies of Western Europe and Health Care in the 
United States. He shows that socio-economic indicators are 
hypothesised to have some influence during the take-off period. 
This is largely a function of the necessity of adequate resources 
for the implementation of any government programme. Hence, although 
this will be a period of significant political system influence, 
socio-economic conditions are also of importance. The take-off 
period is expected to be a period of relatively large changes in 
the dependent variable. During the take-off, there are significant 
changes in policy outputs of the system as it responds to the new 
demands. After this period, however, the system will reach something 
of an equilibrium with mainly incremental and small changes during 
the modern period. During the modern period the influence of socio-
economic conditions would be expected to continue to be significant 
while the influence of the political variables declines. The 
relationship of the political system and the environment have been 
established with respect to the policy area before this period, and 
thus change in expenditures will be a function of changes in the 
availability of resources says Peters. 
The data which Peters used covers the period from 1850 to 1965 in 
the United Kingdom and from 1865 to 1965 in Sweden. The data is 
based on a five-year sample rather than a year-by-year sample. These 
periods cover the most significant changes in social expenditures 
for the two countries -as well as significant changes in the socio-
ecnomic and political systems. 
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The dependent variable is the total per capita expenditures for 
social purposes by the Central Government, converted to constant 
monetary units - and Peters decided to use a conglomerate of 
expenditures on health, education, welfare, pensions and unemployment 
benefit in order to reduce possible confusion or have large tables 
with a number of dependent variables. The major statistical device 
used was correlation analysis. 
The results obtained provided one interpretation of the consistent 
finding of the lack of relationship between the political climate 
and public policy outcomes. Especially in the context of the 
American states, it can be said that many of the significant 
decisions regarding policy outputs were made prior to the times at 
which cross-sectional analyses were carried out. In those policy 
areas, the states had already passed into the "modern" period during 
which policy decisions are primarily incremental and based on the 
availability of resources. Examination of the same policy areas 
in different time periods might produce quite different results to 
those described above. 
Any effective analysis of Housing Policy must include the time 
dimension. The main focus of this thesis is on the policy process 
in two housing authorities over a period of thirty years. 
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vi) An Assessment of Policy Styles 
J.J. Richardson (1979) believes that the style of policy making today 
has blurred the distinction between central administration and bodies 
outside that perimeter, including local authorities. He believes 
that the influence of such agencies on the policy process has reduced 
the power wielded solely by the centre. He also believes that 
account must be taken of the "government contract sector" and the 
influence companies specialising in supplying the public sector can 
have indirectly upon policy-making. He believes that such 
organisations in fact form a policy community. Evidence to 
substantiate his findings will be discussed in this thesis, notably 
with regard to the adoption of system building promoted by certain 
building companies specialising in public sector housing contracts. 
Richardson states that while there is still something recognisable 
as the centre of government - the main departments with ministerial 
representation in the Cabinet, other policy styles have evolved. 
In 1981 he undertook a study of such policy styles. He believes 
that there are two primary features of policy making systems in 
devising a typology of policy styles and defines policy style as 
the interaction between:-
a) the government's approach to problem solving 
b) the relationship between government and other actors in the 
policy process. 
From this definition, Richardson suggests, it is possible to 
categorise societies into four basic 'policy styles'. Some societies 
are located in a category which emphasises consensus and a reactive 
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attitude to problem solving. Others appear to be located in a 
category also stressing consensus but with a set of normative values 
which emphasise an anticipatory or active approach to problem 
solving. Others, he believes are less concerned with consensus, 
but see the role of the state as being rather active and being 
willing to impose policy change in the face of opposition from 
organised interests, whilst the fourth category, to which he believes 
most post-industrial societies are moving, is where governments are 
increasingly reactive rather than a n t i c i p ~ t o r y y in their approach 
to problem solving, yet, if any policy change is to be achieved, it 
has to be enforced against the resistance of at least some organised 
groups. 
J. Richardson's Four Cycles in the Process of Policy Analysis 
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vii) The Dunleavy Thesis 
Perhaps the most significant work on housing policy in the last 
decade has been that of Patrick Dunleavy, in particular his work 
"The Politics of Mass Housing in Britain 1945-1975". 
Dunleavy's research is confined to high rise developments and does 
not address the whole gamit of housing provision. The aim of 
Dunleavy was to analyse the political process involved in the 
changing character of public housing construction policy up to the 
1970's and to understand why public authorities produced forms of 
housing which were apparently at odds with majority preferences. He 
claims that the "public housing apparatus" at a national level exerts 
a considerable influence over the setting of housing construction 
policy. He believes that the two main production interests, the 
design professions and the construction industry operate in close 
contact with each other and Central Government in shaping production 
policy on public housing. Thus according to him public housing 
clients have had little or no direct say in the decision concerning 
their rehousing during the post-war period. 
Dunleavy states that in 1946 the basic framework of the expensive-
sites subsidy was left unchanged although subsidy scales were 
increased and a significant increment per flat was added for flats 
in blocks of at least 4 storeys with lifts. In 1956 there was a 
major policy reorientation. The old expensive site subsidy paid per 
, dwelling was replaced by a much smaller one paid per acre and the-
primary encouragement to redevelop inner city areas shifted onto a 
new progressive storey-height subsidy. Under this flats of 4, 5 and 
/ 
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6 storeys qualified for very large increments to the basic house 
subsidy, wherever they were built. Above six storeys the subsidy 
rose by a fixed increment for each additional storey in the block. A 
flat in a 6 storey block received 2.3 times the basic subsidy paid on 
a house, and this ratio rose to 3.0 at 15 storeys and 3.4 at 20 
storeys. Dunleavy argues that this encouragement to high building 
was justified primarily by reference to the running costs of high-
rise construction associated with the need to include lifts and shift 
r 
from brick construction to more expensive building materials. 
Dunleavy believes that the Labour government's 1965 subsidy change 
lead to a major change in the high-flat subsidy since the higher 
costs of high-rise were now reflected in the variable basic subsidy. 
The increments to the progressive storey-height subsidy above 6 
storeys were abolished but a substantial flat-rate addition at the 
1956 rate was retained. The new subsidy created a strong central-
government incentive to keep public housing costs down and led to a 
radical reappraisal of the methods of control previously used. Since 
high-rise was a particularly expensive building form the introduction 
of mandatory housing cost-yard sticks in 1967 bore especially heavily 
on high flats. Over and above this, Dunleavy believes that the 
government had clearly decided to discard high-rise building. New, 
restrictive density ceilings for public housing schemes were imposed 
and the yardsticks were calculated on the assumption that the most 
economical mix of building forms would be used at each density level, 
a mix which implied minimal high-rise use even at the density 
ceiling. Dunleavy asserts that these changes in Central Government 
subsidies and cost control methods had a direct impact on the housing 
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construction policies of local authorities. He believes that the 
period of high-rise building in Britain during the 1950's and 1960's 
bears the characteristic hallmarks of a "boom", a swiftly 
accelerating increase, followed by a dramatic downturn. The 
existence of strong national trends brings out the potential 
importance of an analysis of national policy-making on the issue, 
and the prima facie evidence of direct influence from central 
government subsidy changes was found to be impressive by Dunleavy. 
He says that the claims made for high-rise and industrial high-rise 
in particular in terms of technological or industrial progress 
strongly suggests that many of the supposed benefits were based upon 
arguments for industrial concentration. If the construction of 
public housing could be regularised and improved in the hands of 
a smaller number of larger firms then a variety of technological 
industrial benefits would follow, it was believed. Dunleavy says 
that it was widely argued that public authorities had an incentive 
to build high in order to create these benefits; it was very seldom 
argued that these benefits were already available. Dunleavy 
correctly asserts that once high-rise building had got underway the 
initial influences were supplemented by powerful feedback processes 
flowed from the output of high-rise by local authorities to the 
construction industry, producing an increased commitment to high 
building by firms which in turn resulted in increased pressure for 
high-flat contracts on local authorities and central government. 
Dunleavy believes that there are relatively few influences involved 
in national level policy formation and debate which affected local 
authorities directly. He believes that apart from industrial 
pressures and feedback via the national government system all other 
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influences were mediated to local authorities via the Ministry of 
Housing and Local Government. He believes the complexity of the 
processes influencing the Ministry and indeed operating within the 
Ministry itself made its influences on local authorities "odd". He 
further believes that the "filtering" process had a most significant 
affect on explaining how it was that the architectural profession 
had less influence on local authorities than the construction 
industry. He believes that the non-involvement of the professional 
associations in direct contact with local authorities meant that 
their influence was bound up in the evolution of central government 
policy although the profession did have some impact on the national 
local government system. 
In the concluding chapter of this thesis I will compare Dunleavy's 
findings with those of my own, and apply his findings to the evidence 
I have obtained in Derby and Portsmouth. 
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viii) An assessment of variables 
Political scientists have expanded great efforts in recent years 
trying to specify common variables which help one to analyse the 
ways by which different issues are raised, disputed, coped with and 
sometimes "solved". 
T. Lowi (1964) put forward a typology for discriminating among public 
policies. Lowi describes three major patterns of political conflict 
which he says are to be associated with three different types of 
public policies - distributive, regulative and redistributive. 
Distributive policies, which parcel out public benefits to interested 
parties, provoke a stable alliance of diverse groups that seek 
portions of the "pork barrel". Regulative policies, which constrain 
the relations between and among competing groups and persons provide 
incentives for shifting conditions, pluralistic competition and the 
standard forms of compromise. Redistributive policies, which re-
allocate benefits and burdens among broad socio-economic population 
groupings, foster polarised and enduring conflict in which large 
national pressure groups play central roles. Lowi characterised 
three patterns of conflict, but identified them by their cause -
the type of policy. It is clear that actual policies are never that 
distinct. All public programmes redistribute resources, but most 
are not primarily attempts to do so. Likewise, government programmes 
depend upon the ultimate capacity to regulate the conduct of 
citizens, but most do not make such regulation their prime objective. 
Most government programmes involve the unequal distribution of goods 
and services, though the question of which town or which county 
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should receive them is not equally salient. Whatever the cause of 
conflict, one can as hi h 
sess w c pattern individual policy conflicts 
illustrate. 
T. Marmor (1964) in his study applied Lowi's classifications to the 
implementation of Medicare in the United States. Marmor asserts 
that the conflict over Medicare identifies Lowi's redistributive 
policies. "The themes of that conflict - the threat of "big" 
government, the interests of the have-nots versus the haves _ 
illustrate the cluster of issues that arise when a policy question 
involves the issue of whether broad categories of persons are to 
be better or worse off" (Lowi). 
Marmor says that the debate over Medicare, was in fact cast in terms 
of class conflict, of socialised medicine versus the voluntary 
American way, of private enterprise and local control against the 
arms of the federal government. He says that Medicare politics 
differed from discrete, localised pursuit of pork barrel benefits 
or the shifting coalitions and compromise of regulatory politics. 
Many battles for social policy are fought in public but settled in 
private. The national pressure groups concerned make enormous and 
costly efforts to define disputes in acceptable ways to their 
members. Within the bureaucracy, there are continuing efforts to 
articulate within and balance these rival claims in the legislation 
which is proposed to government. Major compromises are built in 
social legislation - such as Medicare in the United States and the 
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1946 National Health Service Act in the United Kingdom. One may 
deduce therefore that one role of government in such policy areas as 
health is to ratify the agreement that arl·ses out of the bureaucracy 
and the class agents represented there. 
Graham Allison (1968), distinguished three conceptual models found 
in policy studies:-
The Rational Actor 
The Organisational Process 
The Bureaucratic Politics Model 
The Rational Actor model involves thinking about a government as 
if it were a single rational actor. This is perhaps the most common 
analytic orientation of political scientists. According to the 
rational actor model, the happenings of national politics are the 
"choices of domestic actors". Policy is understood as the action 
of the rational decision maker. The choices and actions of the 
nations are thus 'viewed as means calculated to achieve national 
goals and purposes'. 
According to the Organisational Process model, what the national 
policy analyst calls choices and acts are in fact outputs of 
organisations functioning according to standard patterns of 
behaviour. To explain a particular occurrence, one 'identifies the 
relevant organisation' (or organisations) and displays the pattern 
of procedures and conventions out of which the action emerged. The 
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basic unit of analysis is the organisation, and the focal concepts 
include routine behaviour, standard operating procedures, biased 
information, incremental change and organisational perspective. 
A central assumption is that organisations change slowly, that 
behaviour in time t+l will resemble that of time t. Predictions 
thus project from the 'structure, programmes, and past behaviour 
of relevant organisations'. 
The Bureaucratic Politics model consideridomestic policy to consist 
of "outcomes", of a series of overlapping bargaining games. Two 
fundamental assumptions are involved, that governments are made up 
of desperate, decentralised organisations headed by leaders with 
unequal power and that such leaders, in the course of policy making, 
engage in bargaining. These players, operating with different 
perspectives and with different priorities, struggle for preferred 
outcomes with the power at their disposal. Explanations in this 
third model, proceed from descriptions of the position and power 
of the principle players. What matters, in any event, is not simply 
the reasons which support a course of action, nor the routines of 
organisations which enact an alternative, but the power and skill 
of proponents and opponents, of the action, nor the routines of 
organisations which enact on alternative, but the power and skill 
of the action in question. Allison is concerned with the differences 
between organisations and organisational style. An extension to 
this line is the work of J.M. Lee (1974) whose concern is with the 
style of individuals and their influence on policy outcomes and their 
influence on the organisational structure. Lee studied the county 
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government of Cheshire, following the appointment of a new clerk 
to the Cheshire County Council. He observed the fact that the new 
clerk made a large number of changes in the internal structuring 
of the council and in approaches to policy. Lee concluded that there 
may be differences in policy outputs by councils of the same party 
due to the influence of chief officer's attitudes and opinions. 
Jeffrey L. Pressman and Aaron B. Wilsdavsky (1973) focussed their 
attention upon the formulation of policy, and looked at the complex 
communication linkages involved in implementing public policies, 
and they found it necessary to sub title their work 'How great 
expectations in Washington are dashed in Oakland'. Their work deals 
with the planning and building of Oakland Airport, to serve as a 
second airport to San Francisco. They contrast the roles seen by 
the Federal Government, the Federal Aviation Agency, the Oakland 
City Council and World Airways (a major charter airline in the United 
States who were seeking an operating base). 
In both Britain and the United States there is a well-developed body 
of literature on the relative policy impact of "party", "needs" and 
"resources", following in the mould of Key. This follows the 
predilection for consultation and the strong desire to avoid action 
that might challenge well-entrenched interests. Much of the 
literature is posing the question - what are the determinants of 
policy? Indeed this is the basic question behind this thesis. 
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It is wise when making cross national comparisons to take account 
of the differing national cultures and political systems since these 
will affect the policy making process. The relationship between 
Central and Local and/or State Government , the form and style of 
Central Government are going to affect how 1° d po lCY ecisions are made 
and implemented. In the U °t d SOd nl e tates, ln ividual states jealously 
guard their right to determine the level of welare policies. 
American research tends to indicate that it is competition between 
political parties which determines the level of welfare policy 
provided, rather than ideology. 
In Britain, the research has tended to follow the American pattern, 
some years in its wake. The indications are that party ideologies 
at both the Central and Local levels are the dominent factors; 
welfare policies being pursued in furtherance of political belief 
rather than as part of the competition between Conservative and 
Labour for office. This has been so with aspects of education policy 
and the introduction of comprehensive education and with the level 
of building and the sale of council houses. In the case study within 
this thesis, note will be taken of party, competition and need, and 
each will be related to the other. We shall see that in the 
immediate post war period, need was the determining factor, in both 
cities, but that as the housing programmes gathered momentum, so 
party ideology became more important. However, as we shall see in 
the case study, political ideologies such as selling council houses 
were evident in P o r t ~ m o u t h h in 1948, when need was arguably at its 
greatest. 
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Organisation behaviour and organisational style will also be 
examined since these f t 
, ac ors can have a great bearing on policy 
outcomes. Organisations, such as local authorities can as , 
Richardson has pointed out, act as pressure groups to the extent 
that they can influence the policy process and reduce the level of 
power at the centre. Likewise, professionalism can also deflect 
policy making, since professional groups tend to want to protect 
their own interest and safeguard the standing of their profession, 
and their own standing within the profession. 
One of the greatest difficulties faced by researchers analysing 
public policy is in trying to identify a predominant style. This 
is usually presented in the form of sectorisation of policy making, 
but policy making does not occur in water-tight compartments. There 
is interaction between the interested parties in a formal and 
informal sense; interest groups are formed by the consumers of the 
service and by the providers of the service; central and local 
politicians are involved. The water-tight compartment approach is 
invalid. It is therefore necessary to study a policy "network" and 
an examination of the "housing policy network" will be embodied into 
this work. 
Political Scientists usually adopt a case study method of evaluation; 
case studies inevitably mix the peculiar and the typical. By 
focussing on one decision, one set of governmental actions or one 
Ii i t he case analyst cannot "pursue" generalisations. po cy ssue, 
h omment upon generalisations about politics in at He can owever c 
least three useful ways:-
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1) Case studies can be evaluated as l'nstances f o particular 
analytic methods. 
2) Case studies can illustrate some of the problems and prospects 
of procedural generalisations about political behaviour. 
3) Case studies can offer important instances of "who gets what" 
within a political system. 
Case studies, in order to further thel'r d'b 1 cre 1 i ity, need to take 
account of "policy failures" and indeed one could contend that the 
study of policy failure would in itself ~ k e e an interesting area 
for research. 
By using conceptual frameworks - such as the ones put forward by 
Lowi and Allison - it is possible to structure the complex political 
universe for the analyst and in that sense they may be likened to 
glasses, since they are instruments which shape the field of vision, 
determine the level of detail, clear the objects viewed, and limit 
the range of consideration. 
Part of the purpose of this thesis is to cast light on the differing 
policy styles between local housing authorities. The divergence 
between intention and actuality is also a theme followed in this 
thesis. 
In this thesis I take account of the themes explored in this chapter. 
The thesis is not a traditional piece of local government writing. 
It focuses specifically on the policy process and the policy 
outcomes. 
Reference will be made to some of the literature covered 
and the models assessed in this introduction. 
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CHAPTER TWO THE GUIDING HAND 
In Britain of course there is a Unitary Constitution and 
Parliamentary Sovereignty. Nevertheless, there is also a strong 
tradition of local self government. This tradition flourished in 
particular in the second half of the 19th Century when the 
democratically elected councils were given enhanced power and status 
to develop numerous municipal initiatives. However, central 
restraint and regulation also became significant in the 19th Century 
and became even more dominant in the 20th Century. The tension 
between local discretion and central regulation is one of the most 
notable features of local/central relations in the last 50 years. 
The tension has been particularly acute since 1945. 
i) Traditional Models of Central/Local Relations 
Much of the current literature and knowledge of central/local 
relations is based on two mode1s:-
i) the principal/Agent Model 
ii) the Partnership Model (see Hartley 1969) 
Using these two models, much recent literature (eg. King 1975) 
. th t Local Government is moving from the situation ind1cates a 
'b d' the partnership model to that of the agent model, descr1 e 1n 
(1 983) sees this claim as oversimplified. although Regan 
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The centralising trend is attributed largely to the increasing 
dependence of Local Government upon Central Government finance, 
although on top of this, Central Government h as acquired more powers 
of detailed control. R.A.W. Rhodes (1979) states that there is now 
a "conventional critique" of the literature and says that although 
it is accepted that local authorities have received an increasing 
proportion of their total income from Central Government it is argued 
that the consequences of this trend are not entirely those predicted. 
There is still considerable variation between local authorities in 
their patterns of expenditure as is excellently illustrated by N. 
Boaden's work (1971) discussed in Chapter One. R.T. Alford (1969) 
suggests that there is limited standardisation within local authority 
budgets of the proportion of resources allocated to the various 
services. R.A.W. Rhodes, like Dearlove (1972), suggests that local 
authorities are more accurately viewed as political systems in their 
own right. They do not simply follow central direction" To a 
considerable extent they make their own decisions about their level 
and pattern of expenditure. He further suggests that central 
controls do not have the predicted consequences. Central Government 
does have many controls at its disposal but they constitute only a 
potential for control. Rhodes questions the extent to which Central 
Governments' use their powers and asks how the controls work in 
practice. Certainly central departments vary in their willingness to 
exercise control. J.A.G. Griffith (1966) in his classic study shows 
that government departments adopted laissez-faire, regulatory or 
1 1"n their dealings with Local Government. Moreover, promotional ro es 
vary 1"n the1"r willingness to accept control" local authorities 
Well 
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known examples of illi unw ngness include comprehensive education 
(Buckinghamshire Education Committee's refusal in 1978/79 to 
implement comprehensive education proposals), the sale of council 
houses (Norwich City Council's refusal / in 1981 2 to implement a 
policy for the sale of council houses) and the charging of "economic" 
or "fair" rents (Clay Cross Council's refusal to implement such a 
policy in 1972). Even when a local authority flouts central control 
to the extent of law breaking, as in the case of Clay Cross (1972), 
Central Government can have difficulty remedying the situation. 
ii) Doubts About Traditional Models 
In discussing models of central-local relations, there is a need 
to consider not just academic work, but also government reports such 
as the Layfield Report (1976). This report, on Local Government 
finance, suggests that a major problem in central-local relations 
is ambiguity and confusion in the allocation of financial 
responsibilities. The Committee's proposals emphasise the need for 
greater political accountability clarified through concentrating 
revenue raising and expenditure decisions at either the central or 
local level. 
The approach to central-local relations suggested by the Layfield 
Report is extended further by the report of the Central Policy Review 
Staff (1977). This report looks at the many channels of 
and the Variety of institutions involved in the communication 
relationship. Rhodes suggests that it adds complexity to the 
, themes of ambiguity and confusion and Rhodes Layfield Report s 
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suggests that this is a picture of central-local relations which 
is more realistic than the views represented either by the 
"conventional wisdom" or by the "conventional critique". 
R.A.W. Rhodes says that there is a need for a theory. However 
theorising about concepts such as "local discretion" and "local 
autonomy" is fraught with difficulty since data may be elusive and/or 
emotive. He further suggests that even if the narrower term "local 
discretion" is used, there remain inadequacies in the literature. 
Certainly, as we saw in Chapter One, much has been written on the 
.. " 
importance of financial resources for explaining variations in the 
degree of Local Government discretion (N. Boaden, B. Davies et al). 
The literature does note a number of other factors which can 
influence local discretion including administrative, political, 
constitutional and professional factors. Rhodes suggests that what 
is not defined with any degree of precision or discussed at any 
length is the relative importance of the various influences on local 
discretion and he cites as an example political influences and their 
ability to compensate for financial dependence. Clearly, as Rhodes 
suggests, there is a need to explore the range of factors which 
affect "local discretion" - that is the legal realm of policy 
possibilities as distinct from local autonomy - the real realm of 
policy possibilities. 
R.A.W. Rhodes says that the term "central-local relations" is 
frequently limited to the links between central departments and local 
authorities; he suggests however, that there are fine problems of 
defining the appropriate unit of analysis, but he says that for many 
purposes the sections of a given department will be more appropriate 
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and as D. Regan (1978) suggests, there can be marked differences in 
the attitudes and behaviour of different sections of the same central 
department towards local authorities. Further, many other public 
sector organisations besides Central Government departments interact 
with local authorities, in particular the regional offices of the 
central departments, and we shall see in subsequent chapters the 
influence that they and in particular the Regional Directors have, 
and their interaction with chief officers upon policy outcomes. 
Rhodes also suggests that there is a problem in describing the 
pattern of links between Central Government departments and local 
authorities, looking at the corporate element in the links, and the 
problem of measuring the alleged complexity of the relationships. He 
poses the question as to whether policies are not implemented because 
they require the agreement and cooperation of too great a number of 
public sector organisations. 
J.K. Friend et al (1974) studied the decision making process leading 
up to the expansion of Droitwich, Worcestershire. They looked at 
the influence of agencies upon Central Government and the necessity 
to bargain with Public Sector Organisations. They showed that whilst 
it was Central Government policy to combat inner urban slums with 
the creation of "overspill" towns such as Droitwich for Birmingham, 
largely through the provision of publicly rented housing, such 
migrations of population from inner cities to areas of planned 
overspill carried implications for the distribution of social and 
economic opportunities within regions. Migrant families became able 
to enjoy higher standards of housing and other physical amenities. 
These benefits were accompanied by widespread dislocation of 
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established patterns of social relationships, the effects of which 
are much more difficult to evalute. The trend towards dispersal 
from the conurbations has continued, accompanied by a general drift 
of the population to the South East. Some gradual, yet significant 
changes have taken place since the 1950's and 1960's in the nature 
of the controls available to government to exert influence over these 
trends. Most significantly as far as this thesis is concerned, there 
has been a gradual shift of emphasis from public towards private 
sector housing. This has left the government with less direct power 
to channel the movement of population. Additionally, the increase 
of car ownership has increased the mobility of a large sector of 
the working population, making it more difficult to integrate 
government controls over housing, employment, transportation and 
other services. J.K. Friend believes, therefore, that Central 
Government is no longer necessarily the dominant actor within the 
planning process, since the factors outlined above now have to be 
reckoned with. He further believes that changes in Local Government 
structure in 1974 allowed a trend to commence towards innovation 
and experiment at both the regional and local levels of their inter-
agency planning. Therefore the interaction in Droitwich was a 
reciprocal bargaining relationship. 
Owen Hartley (1969) in his thesis on Housing Policy in Four 
Lincolnshire Towns, attempted to deal with the twin problems of the 
relationship between Central and Local Government and who decides 
policy at the local level. He carried out his research through the 
medium of a study of a major local authority service, housing, as 
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provided in four Lincolnshire towns, Cleethorpes, Grimsby, Lincoln 
and Scunthorpe between 1919 and 1959. Hartley examined the 
traditional models of central-local relations of agent and 
partnership. He suggests that the formal system of Councils, 
Committees, Chairmen and Parties should be supplemented by 
considering other factors like outside pressures, the role of the 
individual councillor and of the official, which are often as 
significant or more significant in policy. In terms of who 
controlled local housing policy, Hartley concluded that in 
Cleethorpes, it was broadly the Committee, in Grimsby the Chairmen 
and Parties, in Lincoln and Scunthorpe a general consensus between 
Councils, Committees and Parties. 
In re-examining the problem of central-local relations in his 
conclusion to his study, he suggests that the method employed by 
Central Government in controlling local authorities played a critical 
part in reducing the visibility of conflict on policy matters, even 
when conflict was vigorous. Hartley suggests that control of policy 
is not achieved by the use of major weapons, like the power to act 
in default of a local authority (although this was used at Clay 
Cross), but by indirect approaches, threats and the use of powers 
to sanction particular projects. This avoids public conflict and 
obscures the battle in a fog of disrupted detail. Hartley suggests 
that such methods have their disadvantages. They are biased towards 
curtailing rather than stimulating a local authority even though the 
-latter is what national policy may require. It is a control of 
detail in order to control policy, which means that National 
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Government is naturally overstretched and local authorities are 
resentful, whilst failing to alter local attitudes in any way over 
a long period of time. Hartley recommends a housing inspectorate 
to overcome these disadvantages of the present system of control. 
However, such an inspectorate would be likely to sour relations 
between local housing authorities and Central Government. Hartley 
suggests that there are two models in the relationship of local 
authorities to Central Government. Firstly, an interdependence of 
local authorities on Central Government and vice versa, and secondly 
the relationship of agent and principal. 
J. Dearlove (1973) points out that the most frequently cited explan-
anation for the subservience of local authorities is their growing 
reliance upon central finance. Another possible factor he suggests 
is the desire to ensure nationwide uniformity of provision in the 
welfare state, so that people receive equal standards of service 
no matter where they live. Dearlove points out that there has been 
little attempt, for example, to relate the degree of effective 
control over local authorities to the extent of dependence on central 
finance. 
In their relations with local authorities, government departments 
may use differing combinations of advice, exhortation, promotion 
and inspection with a greater or lesser degree of effectiveness. 
The limitations to which some of these strategies are subject are 
explored by Dearlove in his case study of Kensington and Chelsea. 
He examined the reaction of the local authority to Ministerial advice 
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and direction on such issues as the appointment of an architect at 
chief officer level, the introduction of parking meters, the 
imposition of council house rent increases and the acquisition of 
land for public open space. His finding was that the actions of 
the borough in going contrary to Ministerial wishes on these issues 
showed that it was prepared to stand out against the advice and 
direction contained in government white papers, circulars" private 
meetings with Ministers and personal letters. He concluded from 
these cases that the impact of Central Government upon the day to 
day decisions of local authorities often depends on local 
responsiveness and the preparedness of local authorities to accept 
advice or guidance which in law the Central Government has no strict 
authority to give and no legal power to enforce. 
Just as Dearlove reveals the inadequacy of the principal/agent model, 
for describing the relationship between Kensington and Chelsea and 
Central Government, so J. Gyford (1976) cast doubt on the importance 
of national party linkages. What is apparent is that in both the 
Labour and Conservative parties there are neither constitutional 
mechanisms, nor the resources, nor the inclination to permit the 
effective control of councillors by their parties. The main thrust 
of central party involvement in Local Government, suggests Gyford, 
is in the fields of discussion and consultation on present and 
projected studies, in the provision of information and advice through 
study groups, publications and conferences, and in serving the party 
groups on the three national local authority associations which are 
increasingly recognised as important links between the local and 
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national party politicians. There is no attempt to lay down any 
single party line to be obeyed by party councillors everywhere 
regardless of local circumstances. 
If Boaden's studies are examined, as in Chapter One of this work, 
it becomes apparent that the actual performance of local authorities 
is by no means subject to rigid constraint and certainly lends little 
credence to the notion that Local Government is used effectively 
to secure a uniform provision of services nationwide. Various 
writers have pointed out for example the wide difference in 
expenditure per head on such services as education, social services, 
health, housing, libraries and fire and police protection. Similar 
conclusions have been drawn for individual services. For instance, 
the Seebohm Committee concluded that Local Authority personal social 
services were not fully meeting needs for which by statute, they 
were responsible. Comparative statistics indicate considerable 
differences in the quality of services provided in different areas. 
"Such uneveness does not bear any systematic relationship to 
differences in local need" (Seebohm Report Para 74). 
Radcliffe-Maud and Wood (1974) suggest that there seems to be in 
practice considerable scope for a local authority to make its own 
interpretation of the duties and opportunities bequeathed it by 
Central Government. They state that "Between the minimum of services 
which must be provided and the maximum which a council may not 
exceed, there is a wide area of d i s c ~ e t i o n " . . The provision of 
services certainly should not be seen merely in terms of spending 
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more or less on prescribed services. This would be to minimise the 
ability of local councils to make innovations in the range and format 
of services they offer. C. Cossey (1974) points out that local 
authorities have made individual innovations in such fields as 
establishing advice centres, free travel for pensioners, tenant 
management in housing and neighbourhood councils. As a last resort 
for the authority determined to go its own way there is always the 
possibility of simple (even if unlawful) evasion of Central 
Government requirements - ie. Clay Cross 1972, Norwich 1981. 
Clearly, politics exist at the local as well as the national level. 
A local council may well be an authoritative centre of decision 
making in those matters, remitted to its charge by Parliament. On 
other matters, there will be equally authoritative local decisions 
emanating from such sources as the local offices of Central 
Government departments, statutory undertakings and nationalised 
industries. 
Given the fact that parties operate in Local Government and that 
there is every likelihood of their continuing to do so, Gyford 
suggests that it is of some importance to establish the impact which 
they make on the work of Local Authorities. In particular the 
question arises as to how far the parties justify their local 
existence by pursuing distinctive policies when in control of a 
council. Boaden found that in terms of provision of particular 
services, Labour controlled authorities were likely to spend more 
on education than were other parties whatever the context of need, 
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were more likely to submit plans for secondary school reorganisation 
along comprehensive lines, and showed a distinct tendency to build 
more council houses and to pay higher rate subsidies on housing. 
Similarly, Davies (1972) identified a clear relationship between 
the extent of Labour representation and certain variables in the 
levels of welfare provision. Thus in terms of children's services, 
Davies comments on the link between Labour representation and a 
'protective' attitude to children in care. 
Gyford suggests that divisions between the parties, when they occur, 
which he says is not all the time, relates to some fundamental issue 
which cannot be brushed aside; issues of basic Local Government 
policy and also of the defence of the different interests for which 
parties stand out when they are sustained. Political parties 
represent genuine divergences of view, they give coherence to the 
work of local authorities, they function as a means of political 
recruitment and on electing organisation and they represent the 
demands and interests of differing social groups both organised and 
unorganised. 
From the above resume of literature, it is apparent that the 
traditional models of central/local relations are unsatisfactory. 
Rhodes suggests that even if the narrower term of "local discretion" 
is used, there remain inadequacies in the literature. As we have 
seen, the literature has moved away from the traditional theories 
towards new frameworks of analysis. 
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iii) New Approaches 
Rhodes believes that the existing models are not useful tools of 
analysis. Moreover, it is only possible to develop a framework for 
analysis and to relate the study of central-local relations to 
broader issues by exploring a far wider range of literature than 
is normally associated with the subject. 
Rhodes suggests instead a power-dependence model drawn from organisa-
tional sociology. He explains that the f,rameworks for the analysis 
of variations in central-local relations contain five propositions. 
Firstly he believes that any organisation occupies a complex environ-
ment which has manifold repercussions upon it because this environ-
ment is composed of other organisations which are sources of needed 
resources. Secondly, in order to achieve their goals, the organisa-
tions in this network of relationships have to exchange resources. 
He says thirdly that although decision-making within an organisation 
is constrained by other organisations the dominant coalition retains 
some discretion. The appreciative system of the dominant coalition 
influences which relationships are seen as a problem and which 
resources will be sought. The dominant coalition fourthly employs 
strategies within known rules of the game to regulate the process of 
exchange. Variations in the degree of discretion are a product of 
the goals and the relative power of potential of interacting 
organisations. Finally, this relative power potential is a product 
of the resources of each organisation of the rules of the game and 
the process of exchange between environments. 
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Rhodes has subsequently extended his 1979 S.S.R.C. work and in 1981 
published a full account, drawing heavily on the power-dependence 
model of J.D. Thompson (1967), an organisational sociologist. Later 
in this study, details will be presented of organisational 
interaction in the context of the power-dependence model. 
Apart from the Rhodes approach, another new model is to trace the 
impact at the local level of ideology. J. Gyford (1976) suggested 
that much of the literature relating to Local Government in England 
lacks political dimensions. He suggests that the question "who gets 
what?" can be asked of Local as well as Central Government, and he 
rejects the common belief that politics at the local level is 
improper. This too is explained later in this thesis. 
iv) Local Government Autonomy or Discretion or Inter-Personal Skills? 
The pertinent question to pose at this stage is whether or not 
English Local Government enjoys either Local Autonomy or Discretion. 
T.N. Clarke (1974) suggests that local autonomy is a product of a 
range of factors (eg. national factors, natural physical resources, 
social and economic resources, institutions supporting localism and 
loyal local elites). He further suggests that intergovernmental 
links are only one of a number of factors influencing the degree 
of local autonomy. He says that too frequently the term "local 
autonomy" is used loosely with little recognition of these problems. 
"Local discretion" should be reserved for the analysis of the extent 
to which the scope for Local Government discretion is limited by 
other sections of government. 
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Most observers of Local Government would concede that central 
decisions are sometimes based on personal or partisan factors, and 
that partisan, system and patronage politics do occur. Before 
J. Gyford and Mari Jones, little research had been carried out into 
political channels of influence between Central and Local Government. 
Such channels do exist particularly between local and national 
political hierarchies. There also exist other links such as 
delegations to ministers, joint committees, social contacts and 
conversations at conferences. What influence can such links have 
upon the implementation of policy? This is an aspect to be examined 
in subsequent chapters of this thesis. Added to this, there is a 
need to focus similar attention upon the attitudes of officers. 
Many opportunities exist for officers to exert influence on Central 
Government on behalf of their employing authority, the local 
authority associations and their professional associations. The 
chief officer will have contacts with his counterpart in Central 
Government and where appropriate, with the regional officers of the 
central department, and if necessary he can lobby such individuals. 
Since they are likely to be either policy formulators, or at least 
influential, such lobbying can be beneficial to an authority in 
favour with such individuals. Therefore, both the political and the 
professional channels of influence may provide the means for 
preserving or extending the discretion of local authorities. 
The influence of professionalism has been studied by R. Pahl (1970), 
who believes that professionalism has reduced Central Government 
powers, since he thinks that all experts and professionals are bound 
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by their ideologies. The apparent conflict between the planners 
and the planned may be nothing in comparison with the conflicts 
between experts or, indeed, between those for whom experts plan. 
He believes that when we begin to doubt the expert and ask 'whose 
wisdom?', we begin to realise that making the choice between 
alternative futures is perhaps too daunting for most people. Clear 
goals cannot always be set because that would imply a political 
consensus. Basic conflicts over the scarce resources of power, 
wealth and prestige are reflected in political struggles. Planning 
which is inevitably concerned with the allocation of scarce resources 
must be political. 
The subsequent chapters of this thesis take account of the comments 
of Rhodes, Clarke, Boaden, Dunleavy, Gyford, and Pahl. In the 
research which has been undertaken in Portsmouth and Derby account 
has been taken of the complex interactions which occur at both the 
political level and the executive level, between central and local 
authorities in both a formal and informal sense. The component parts 
clearly include the officials at both central and local levels, the 
councillors, members of parliament and the electorate. In terms of 
political practice, however, experience shows that the list must be 
extended to include political parties, pressure groups and the media, 
all of which at times seek some influence over Local Government and 
its working. It may be suggested, that if anything, Rhodes tends to 
underestimate the power of informal links in the governmental 
process. 
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v) The Financial Influence of Central Government 
Obviously finance is a crucial factor in Central/Local relations 
in Britain. It is particularly affected by the income over which 
Local Authorities have control themselves. In Britain, this is 
rates, fees and charges. Given the difficulty of raising fees and 
charges or levying them at all, rate income is the only significant 
local source. The relationship is also effected by the size and 
form of grant in aid and by borrowing controls. 
Specific grants tend to be a more effective form of control. They 
tend to be on a percentage or unit basis. Naturally a grant paid 
for a particular service or part service may be withheld by Central 
Government with potent effect. General grants are a much less 
effective means of control. These are paid to subsidise broad areas 
of policy and often allow wide discretion in usage. 
During the period covered by the thesis, the system was switched 
from a specific to a predominantly general basis in 1957. It was 
made even more general in 1966 with the introduction of the Rate 
Support Grant (R.S.G.). 
The White Paper which foreshadowed the changes brought about by the 
Local Government Act, 1929, suggests that a proper system of grants 
should:-
i) recognise that a fair contribution should be made from the 
Exchequer towards the cost of local services; 
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ii) ensure that local authorities have complete financial interest 
in their administration; 
iii) be adapted in its working to the needs of the areas· , 
iv) permit the greatest freedom of local administration and 
initiative; 
v) provide for sufficient general control and advice from the 
central department to ensure a reasonable standard of 
performance. 
The Institute of Municipal Treasurers and Accountants in 1954 
commissioned a research study to review the system of Exchequer 
grants in England and Wales. This study suggested that the ideal 
grant would have the following characteristics: it would be simple, 
intelligible and equitable, it would encourage local economy in the 
use of public funds, it would leave a wide area of local autonomy 
in the administration of local finances; and it would enable central 
departments to control, in at least a general way, the standards 
of the services for which they are ultimately responsible. These 
characteristics follow very closely those set out in the 1929 White 
Paper. 
Almost all grants to aid particular services in the period covered 
by this research were percentage grants. That is, they were grants 
distributed as a specific proportion of a local authority's approved 
expenditure on the whole or part of a service. The percentage grant 
has the advantage of being simple and intelligible, but its degree 
of equity is questionable. It is equitable in terms of time, since 
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it takes account of price increases and the expansion of a service 
automatically. It is not equitable however, between authorities 
since a poor authority does not have sufficient resources to spend 
as much - so percentage grants accrue to the richer authorities. 
(The resources element of the Rate Support Grant was designed to 
"even out" such deficiencies). Neither did percentage grants take 
account of the needs of the various local authorities. They also 
enabled and encouraged the more progressive local authorities to 
improve standards of service without undue imposition on local rates; 
however, they tend to attract detailed control of expenditure and 
this detracts from local responsibility. 
In comparison, a general grant may be simple or complex - it depends 
on the formula and whether it is intelligible depends upon the way 
in which the general grant system is intended to operate. Different 
areas have different costs for a variety of reasons. For a general 
grant to take into account all these variations it would need to 
be extremely complex. The more diverse the variations and the more 
complex and obscure the reasons for the variations, the less 
simple and intelligible the grant becomes. It could also be argued 
that if it does not take all these factors into account then it 
becomes less equitable. If appropriate formulae can be devised then 
the general type of grant meets many, though not all, of the concepts 
of the ideal grant. It encourages economy in the use of public 
funds; it leaves a wide area of local autonomy in the administration 
of local finances. It is more questionable whether it enables the 
Central Government to control the standards for which they were 
ultimately responsible; but in fact such control may be easily 
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exercised outside the grant system, ego by use of inspectors as in 
the education service. 
The 1954 I.M.T.A. study considered as an important limitation of 
general grants their impotence in starting a new service or new 
development within a service. During this period most housing grant 
in aid was in the form of unit grants. The reason is that in these 
circumstances, it is unlikely that the costs could be estimated or 
forecast with any degree of accuracy and the cost per unit of service 
performed or demanded is likely to vary very widely between 
authorities. The study also considered that, as long as local 
authorities are allowed discretion by central departments in a 
variety of ways the scope for the operation of unit grants will be 
small for there can be no uniformity of costs where there is no 
uniformity of method. N.P. Hepworth (1970) believes that the main 
weakness of unit grants is not that the concept itself is 
fundamentally wrong (in fact he believes the reverse to be the case) 
but rather that it is very often difficult, if not impossible, to 
find the right weights for the units, or even decide on the units 
themselves. 
The Rate Support Grant was introduced in 1966 and comprises three 
elements, a needs element, a resources element and a domestic 
element. The amount local authorities receive through this grant 
can have a major influence on their expenditure. In the financial 
year 1977-78, the percentage of planned Local Government expenditure 
to be financed by the grants was reduced from 65 per cent to 61 per 
cent. The 1979-83 government during its term of office reduced the 
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level of grant financing from 61% to 51.9% for 1984/85. The 
Department of Environment circular 120/76 stated that the government 
believed that a grant rate of 61% should be a strong influence in 
ensuring that expenditure is kept in line with the government's 
expenditure plans while avoiding widespread excessive rises in rates. 
This contrasts sharply with the present Government's policy of 
reducing the rate support grant and exhorting local authorities not 
to increase their rating levels beyond the level of inflation, and 
indeed of capping the disobedient. The exhortations of Mr Jenkin 
or Mr Heseltine are not unlike those expressed in circular 120/76 
quoted above, the sentiments of a Labour administration. 
Central Government now consults with representatives of Local 
Government in the Consultative Council on Local Government Finance. 
The council was formed in 1975 and it can give the local authorities 
the government's views on Local Government expenditure and take 
account of the comments of local authority representatives. After 
consultation the government can give "guidance" on the general level 
of expenditure and in the present economic climate that "guidance" 
is respected by most local authorities. John Taylor (1979) suggested 
that one reason for the creation of the Consultative Council on Local 
Government Finance was "the search for greater cont!:"ol of public 
expenditure in the mid 1970's". Improved consultation rather than 
a more "directive" alternative was preferrred by Central Government. 
The Local Authority Associations were unanimous in defending the 
"independence" of Local Government, manifested in the block grant 
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and their members' taxation powers, against increased central 
control. Improved consultation for the local associations could 
therefore enable them to defend the freedom of their members. 
Consultation also offered the prospect of inducing a more cohesive 
and co-ordinated set of central policies and programmes in respect 
of Local Government, in place of the contradictions at the centre 
with which local authorities had hitherto been faced. 
Taylor concludes that the Local Authority Associations clearly value 
the Rate Support Grant in its block form as a manifestation of 
freedom. Similarly, he says, on the capital expenditure side, the 
block allocation for the 'locally determined sector' is equally 
valued. He says that since the C.C.L.G.F. was formed in 1975, there 
has been a tendency for the Rate Support Grant to become a series 
of specific grants. 
The main problem in grant distribution is to measure the needs of 
an authority and the cost of meeting these needs. The calculations 
used to be made by using a "weighted multiple regression analysis" 
to identify a limited number of factors that together produce a 
formula which approximates to the expenditure of most authorities, 
even though it did not actually give the expenditure of anyone of 
them. 
The factors calculated by use of this statistical technique are 
rather different from the factors used in the rate support grant 
before the reorganisation of Local Government. As a result there 
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were major variations in the distribution of grant aid and when the 
1974/5 formula was announced adjustments were made to the 
statistically calculated formula to reduce changes from the previous 
year. The term "damping"was used to describe such adjustments. 
Attempts were made each year to improve the formula. These attempts 
have led in recent years to a relative switch of resources from the 
shire counties to the metroplitan areas - although within this 
general tendency there are significant exceptions. The effect on 
particular authorities has been very severe, leaving them with hard 
choices between a cut in services or a rate increase well above the 
national average, and this pattern will continue in the foreseeable 
future. This means that the increase in rates imposed by a 
particular authority may have more to do with changes in grants than 
with any change in expenditure by the local authority. 
Some local authorities and interest groups wish to see certain 
services removed from the rate support grant and a return to specific 
grants based on separate negotiations with Central Government 
departments. Others feel that this would be a retrograde step. 
The method of determining and distributing total grant resources 
did provide freedom for local authorities to establish priorities 
and develop policies related to the needs of their areas within the 
national framework established by the government. The then 
Environment Secretary, Mr Michael Heseltine announced proposals in 
mid-November 1980 to reform the Rate Support Grant system from 1982 
onwards and replace it with a "unitary grant" tailored to the needs 
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of each authority. A clear purpose of the new Unitary Grant was 
to give the government a way of identifying those councils (whether 
out of political dogma, extravagance or other factors) who spend 
too much and of penalising them by providing less money the following 
year. The introduction of Unitary Grants has therefore led the 
Secretary for the Environment into even more severe controls, for 
instance over the ability of local councils to levy increased rates. 
In August 1983 the re-elected Conservative Government decided to 
seek new powers to curb rate increases, despite strong opposition 
from their own back-benchers and some Conservative controlled local 
authorities. This legislation was eventually enacted as the Rates 
Act 1984 and gave the Secretary of State for the Environment specific 
legal power to limit the rates individual authorities can levy. This 
has been aimed at the twelve or so "big spenders" who will be subject 
to Whitehall instruction on what rates they can set. If they try to 
collect more, ratepayers will be entitled to refuse to pay - and the 
councillors will be liable for heavy personal fines. In addition, a 
general reserve power will be gained, to set a spending limit for 
each local authority, and then to ban each one from raising more in 
rates than is needed to pay for expenditure. The same penalties 
would fallon any council that sought to defy the government's 
instructions. 
The effect of these measures the local authority associations have 
claimed will be to turn English Local Government into an executive 
arm of Whitehall, and local politicians into no more than pressure 
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group activists. "The Economist" on November 24th 1979 suggested 
that "sooner or later, the increasing fusion of central and local 
policy-making and systems of financial control must be reflected in a 
reform of local political institutions". The influence of Central 
Government on Local Government finance may be illustrated by the 
practice of cash limits being set on government grants. The 
government has each year, placed an overall cash limit on the amount 
of grant payable to local authorities. The cash limit for additional 
grant is determined in advance on the Government's view of the 
estimated cost of future pay and price increases as they affect 
expenditure in the year - for 1984/85 3%. The cash limit will only 
be reviewed where changes in government policy lead to increased 
levels of local authority expenditure and where pay and price 
increases are substantially higher than those included when 
calculating the cash limit for the year. 
The view expressed in "The Economist" had earlier been expressed 
within the Layfield Report (1976). The Layfield Committee reported 
that there was a growing dependence of local authorities on Central 
Government. Over the period they were reviewing, they concluded that 
the system had only been made to work by removing the burden of Local 
Government expenditure from one tax clearly borne by the local 
electors, the domestic rate, and placing it on the national taxpayer. 
The committee argued that gradually local councils had come to look 
to government grant to meet the problems of local expenditure. There 
had been a decline in local accountability. The Committee posed a 
choice between a clear move towards central control or a reassert ion 
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of local accountability. They proposed a local i n ~ o m e e tax as a new 
source of Local Government revenue which would, in addition to rates, 
remove the dependence on grants. 
The Labour Government in the subsequent Green Paper, whilst accepting 
many of Layfield's detailed recommendations rejected the main 
conclusion that a choice was required. They asserted their belief 
in a middle way based on partnership between Local Government and 
Central Government ie. the existing system in effect. The Layfield 
Committee regarded a partnership in which the role of neither partner 
was defined as shared irresponsibility and concluded that this would 
do nothing to arrest the drift toward central control (or at least 
financing). The Green Paper did not produce anything to modify that 
conclusion. 
Both the Layfield Report and the Green Paper recommended a change 
in the basis of valuation for domestic property from rental value 
to capital value. There is no longer sufficient evidence on rental 
values to carry out a reliable valuation process. If rating is to 
continue, a change to capital valuation is required, where there is 
evidence on sale prices and where as a result the basis of valuation 
is easily understood and easily checked. Such a change will affect 
the relative value of different types of property. While no final 
conclusions can be drawn short of an actual valuation, the evidence 
before Layfield suggests that more expensive houses would be likely 
to have relatively higher assessments than at present. 
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One other proposal given support in the Green Paper was a proposal 
to replace the grant system by a new unitary grant - as discussed 
above, this was implemented. 
It may be suggested that at times of economic stress the confusion 
of central-local relations stands exposed. It may be that Layfield 
was correct in clarifying the choice and that the system is moving 
towards greater central control; this is a view held by many 
commentators. Only a clear decision to move to the other alternative 
of local accountability could prevent this, and that decision has 
been avoided. Indeed, if the Jenkins Bill is enacted it will lead 
to Central control. 
During the period under review within this thesis the general grant 
system prevailed. This system was much less complicated and 
restrictive. The general grants were not withheld and its 
distribution was based on a weighted regression formula. 
After the period covered by this thesis, developments took place 
which severely affected the independence of Local Government with the 
introduction of the new block grant form of Rate Support Grant in 
1982. This was introduced by the Land Planning No. 2 Act 1980 -
coming into effect in 1981. Under these arrangements, pushed through 
by a Conservative Government, dedicated to a strict control of public 
expenditure to assist their monitarist approach to macro-economic 
policy. A calculation is made of the appropriate expenditure level 
for each local authority. Exceeding the targets set can lead to 
grant penalties. 
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Many commentators see these developments as the most profound threat 
to local autonomy for many centuries. Tony Travers and 
Tyrell Burgess (1980) believe that the activities of successive 
governments have served to undermine the independent responsibilities 
of local authorities. They believe that the process has been 
gradual, but that it has now reached a critical point of balance, and 
that the Local Government Planning and Land Act has tipped the 
balance, since it marks the beginning of the wholly centralised 
state. 
vi) Paying the Price 
The role of the Local Government in the Housing Provision of this 
country as we will see in Chapter Three has gradually evolved, and 
local authorities have been required to accept increasing functions 
in housing provision. Their current role is possibly best 
illustrated by enumerating their main functions at the present time 
(1985):-
1. loans for the purchase of dwellings 
2. loans for the improvement and/or repair of dwellings 
3. loans to housing associations 
4. improvement grants to private occupiers 
5. slum clearance 
6. general improvement areas and housing action areas 
7. default works powers 
8. receivership powers 
9. rent allowances to private tenants 
10. provision of housing advice centres 
11. financial support to housing associations 
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12. purchase of individual owner/occupied dwellings 
13. purchase of rented accommodation from the private sector 
14. purchase of new private housing developments 
15. sale of council dwelling - and special arrangements with 
builders including building for sale schemes 
16. erection of new council properties 
17. management of existing estates 
18. rent rebates to council tenants 
19. improvement of council properties 
20. provision of temporary accommodation for homeless families 
The above outline has within it policies and schemes which different 
local authorities have implemented in different ways - one of the 
themes of this thesis! The divergences arise through divergent 
political ideologies and also because of different resources in terms 
of existing housing stock, financial and manpower resources, and 
also because of differing needs. The housing needs of an area with 
an ageing population are likely to be very different from the housing 
need of a "spillover" or new town. Compare for instance the age 
profiles and consequent needs of say, Stevenage with Ilfracombe. 
Only items 3 and 16 of the above analysis result in the provision 
of additional permanent accommodation. The remainder may result 
in an increase in the stock, or alternatively may present an actual 
loss of accommodation. Even the erection of new dwellings may result 
in some loss of dwellings where the new ~ u i l d i n g s s are erected on 
redevelopment sites. 
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N.P. Hepworth (1978) suggests that in recent years a system of 
housing finance has evolved which has led to there being three 
different ways of financing housing activity:-
a) Items 1-3 lending to the private sector, including housing 
associations - each local authority keeps a separate account 
recording its lending activities because it has to ensure that 
such activities are self-financing. In other words no subsidy 
from the rate is permitted on the actual loans. 
b) Items 4 to 11 and 20 - financial aid to the private sector, 
including housing associations. All of these activities are 
financed through the rate fund of local authorities, with any 
deficit falling upon the fund. Subsidies are received by local 
authorities from Central Government towards some of these 
activities. 
c) Items 12-19 - activities involving the extension or management 
of the authority's own housing stock. All of these activities 
are financed through what is known as the housing revenue 
account. The expenses associated with these activities are 
charged to that account, to which are credited rental income 
from charges for services, government subsidies, rate fund 
subsidies, and receipts from the sale of council dwellings. 
From 1923 onwards, basic subsidies were paid as an annual sum 
for a specified number of years, with payment starting when the 
building was completed ie. a specific, unit grant. There were 
numerous changes in successive Acts. But in all instances the 
changes in amounts payable applied only to houses completed after 
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the change had come into force; subsidies already in payment under 
earlier Acts continued unaltered, apart from being terminated if 
the house was sold. Supplementary subsidies for building on 
expensive sites and for high rise building were first provided in 
1930, and were changed from time to time, as were other special 
subsidies (ie. in the inter-war years for houses built in rural 
parishes, and in the post-war years for building for elderly people). 
In all instances the basic subsidy rate did not vary between 
authorities either with respect to costs of providing houses, or 
with respect to the capacity of tenants to payor rate resources. 
The supplementary subsidies dealt in part with high costs of 
provision. 
The 1961 Act broke new ground in seeking to relate the basic subsidy 
to local resources, both rent and rates; subsidy was provided in 
the form of a fixed sum per dwelling, payable for 60 years, after 
completion. The subsidy was provided in two parts: a basic amount 
within a range of £8 to £40 per dwelling; and supplementary amounts 
provided where costs were exceptionally high for special reasons. 
The first step in calculating the basic amount was to compare total 
housing revenue account (H.R.A.) costs with a notional H.R.A. rent 
income, which was defined as twice the rateable value of the dwelling 
stock (irrespective of the actual rents charged). If total notional 
rent income exceeded that expenditure, then a basic subsidy of £8 
per dwelling completion was paid. If total expenditure exceeded 
total notional rent income, then the basic subsidy was increased 
to £24. 
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For authorities with a notional H.R.A. deficit, the fixed sum of 
£24 was increased if the rate levy per £ of rateable value was higher 
than the average for England and Wales. Depending on the rate 
increase required to eliminate the notional H.R.A. deficit, the basic 
subsidy was increased to £28, £34 or £40 - the maximum provided. 
In addition to the basic amount, supplementary subsidies were 
provided: 
i) for expensive sites, based on land costs per acre; 
ii) for high rise development, based on the number of storeys in 
a block of flats; 
iii) for special development, including overspill building; building 
on poor substrata (ie. in old mining areas where subsidence 
occurred) and the use of expensive materials to preserve the 
local character of the area. 
Averaged over all dwelling completions, these supplementary subsidies 
were together worth about £10-£12 per dwelling, but they applied to 
less than half of the total building programme and were heavily 
concentrated in urban areas with land costs and a large proportion 
of high rise developments. 
The system had a number of anomalies. Rateable values are only a 
rough guide to notional rent resources, and no provision was made 
for annual adjustments. The 1963 revaluation increased rateable 
values and therefore raised notional rent income, but no adjustment 
was made to the subsidy system. So some authorities found their 
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basic subsidy reduced. On the other hand, as notional income was 
fixed between rating revaluations, while costs were rising, there 
was an offsetting trend towards higher notional H.R.A. deficits and 
therefore higher subsidy levels. It was also theoretically possible 
for increases in management and maintenance expenditure to raise 
total H.R.A. costs sufficiently to put an authority into a higher 
basic subsidy bracket, but there is no evidence of this happening 
on any significant scale. The extra basic subsidy payable to 
authorities with high rate levies per £ of rateable value assisted 
those authorities with low rate resources. But areas of pressing. 
housing need could receive low basic subsidies if they had high 
rateable values, although in urban areas they would be helped by 
the additional expensive site and high rise subsidies. 
The 1961 Act subsidies were all fixed in money terms per dwelling, 
with only the expensive site subsidy related to cost changes (in 
the price of land). By 1967, the real value of the fixed sums had 
fallen by over 20 per cent. Although construction costs were rising 
slightly faster than retail prices, the period was still one of 
relative stability in both prices and interest rates. Had the same 
subsidy system remained in operation, even the maximum fixed sum 
of £40 per dwelling, together with the maximum supplementary 
subsidies, would have covered only a fraction of the increase 
in construction costs and interest rates that drove annual loan 
charges per average new dwelling up to £1,700 or more by 1975/76. 
The 1961 subsidy system lasted only six years, however, and was 
replaced by a new system in 1967. 
68 
The 1967 Act introduced an entirely new basic subsidy, the difference 
between a loan charge at 4 per cent and that at the representative 
rate for local authorities' new borrowing. By this means, the 
subsidy was related both to the capital cost of providing new houses 
and to interest rates and would change automatically with them. 
The representative rate was determined by the Minister of Housing 
and Local Government (subsequently by the Secretary of State for 
the Environment) and the rate of subsidy as calculated applied one 
year in arrear ego the rate of subsidy payable on dwellings completed 
in 1970/71 was the difference between the 1969/70 representative 
rate and 4 per cent. 
Since the subsidy payable was proportionate to capital cost, a limit 
had to be placed on capital costs, otherwise the subsidy would have 
been open-ended. At the time the 1967 Act became law, the number 
of tender acceptances was controlled centrally. To prevent the 
subsidy per dwelling being open-ended, the amount eligible for 
subsidy was limited by reference to the housing cost yardstick. 
Land costs had to be within the District Valuer's Valuation, and 
the cost of site works was also subject to approval. In addition 
to the basic subsidy, the expensive site, high rise, and special 
development subsidies were retained, with only minor modifications. 
The immediate effect of the new system was to raise average basic 
subsidy from about £24 to about £67 per dwelling completed, with 
a further threefold increase to £187 per dwelling by 1971, as both 
construction costs and (up to 1970) interest rates rose. Neither 
the expensive site subsidy nor the high rise subsidy made any 
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provision for rises in construction costs (as opposed to land prices) 
or interest rates, and high rise supplement declined in importance 
as design trends moved away from high rise blocks of flats. Even 
in London, where expensive site and high rise subsidies were 
greatest, these supplementary subsidies became progressively less 
significant in relation to the steeply rising basic subsidy. 
Like all previous subsidies back to 1923, the 1967 Act subsidies 
were new building subsidies that in general became payable on 
completion of the house, in amounts that, once determined, remained 
unaltered in money terms. The loan charges generated by the holding 
of land and by payments for work done on houses under construction 
attracted no subsidy, nor did increases in loan charges caused by the 
application of rising pool rates to debt on houses already built. 
Local authorities' capital expenditure on the improvement of their 
houses received subsidy under arrangements totally separate from 
the new building subsidy (known as standard or improvement 
contributions). Exchequer subsidy was payable as an annual sum for 
20 years equal to three-eighths of the loan charges on costs up to 
a specified limit. 
The subsidy system provided under the 1972 Act was wholly different. 
Its central feature was the provision for determining the rents to 
be charged by local authorities for their houses by reference to 
the 'fair rents' concept provided for in the private sector by the 
1965 Rent Act, modified to the minimum extent necessary to apply 
it to the special circumstances of the local authority sector - in 
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particular, the assumption that , no person seeking to become such 
a tenant can expect any special preference'. The duty of drawing 
up provisional fair rents was placed on local authorities: but the 
actual determination of fair rents was the responsibility of Rent 
Scrutiny Boards, drawn from the Rent Assessment Panels from which 
were drawn the Rent Assessment Committees that adjudicated appeals 
against rents registered by Rent Officers for private unfurnished 
lettings. In the event, only a very small number of fair rents 
were determined by Rent Scrutiny Boards· before their work was brought 
to a stop in March 1974, following the election of a Labour 
Government. The rent increases brought about by the Act were 
therefore in practice the consequence of the provisions governing 
the progression to fair rents, not of the fair rent levels 
themselves. 
The provisions relating to the progression to fair rents required 
an increase of £26 in gross rent income per dwelling in 1972/73 
compared with 1971/72, with £26 more in each subsequent year until 
'fair rent' levels were reached. Much of the complexity rose from 
the fact that the Act did not become law until after the beginning 
of 1972/73. The principal exception applied when the general 
progression rules would have produced increases that would have 
brought rents of 2 per cent or more dwellings above the 'fair rent' 
level, in which case the Secretary of State was empowered to 
authorise a lower increase. 
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With rents determined in this way, a radically different subsidy 
system was needed. Although complex, its essential feature was that 
any difference between 'reckonable' housing revenue account 
expenditure and rent income should be funded by the Exchequer and 
Rate Fund contributions in prescribed proportions. At the time of 
the passage of the Act, the expectation was that the progression 
of rents prescribed would be sufficient, relative to the rise in 
costs, to bring rents up to equality with expenditure before long 
in many authorities, other than those with high costs and low rents, 
and those with large capital expenditure programmes. All subsidies 
payable under earlier Acts were terminated, and replaced by the new 
prOvisions - of which one, the residual subsidy, was in effect a 
tapering out of the subsidies payable under earlier Acts. As rent 
income rose relative to reckonable expenditure, the subsidies would 
be withdrawn, and when rent income exceeded expenditure by enough 
to have a surplus over and above a working balance not exceeding 
£30 per dwelling, the surplus would be paid to the Secretary of 
State. Where the amount so paid exceeded the rent allowance subsidy 
paid to the authority, the Secretary of State was to repay one half 
of the excess to the authority for the benefit of the general rate 
fund. 
With specified exceptions, all H.R.A. expenditure was regarded' as 
reckonable for _subsidy, including all loan charges on land (at market 
value), new building, and acquisition of houses; one-half of loan 
charges on improvement work; higher interest charges on old debt, 
and current expenditure on management and maintenance. The exceptions 
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were: new building costs in excess of the housing cost yardstick 
limits; improvement and acquisition costs in excess of the scheme 
limits approved by Central Government; and repair and maintenance 
expenditure in excess of the limits set by Central Government in 
1974/75. As rent levels were predetermined by the fair rent 
principle, any 'non-reckonable' expenditure fell on the rate fund. 
In practice, the housing cost yardstick limited reckonab1e loan 
charges, but the limits on reckonable management and maintenance 
expenditure were not severe. All expenditure on supervision and 
management was accepted for subsidy; and the only control on 
subsidisable repairs and maintenance expenditure was designed to 
contain it to a decelerating rate of increase in real terms compared 
with earlier years. 
Under the earlier Acts, subsidy was paid only after a dwelling had 
been completed. The 1972 Act changed this rule: costs incurred 
before dwelling completion - for example interest charges on land 
acquired but not developed or on building work in progress - also 
become eligible for subsidy. 
A new 'rising costs subsidy' applied to all new (reckonable) 
expenditure. Rising costs subsidy quickly became the dominant 
element. It was funded to the extent of.90% by the Exchequer and 
10% by mandatory rate fund contributions in the first year (1972/73), 
with the proportion met from the Rate Fund set to increase annually 
until it reached 25% (with 75% from the Exchequer) in the fourth 
year. As Rate Fund contributions were obligatory, however, they 
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were made relevant for Rate Support Grant; and so the proportion 
of the total subsidy effectively met by the Exchequer was greater. 
When the 1972 Act was introduced, it was envisaged that, as rents 
rose by stages to 'fair' rent levels, subsidy would be progressively 
withdrawn from authorities whose rent income was rising faster than 
their costs. This would leave the remaining general subsidy 
concentrated on high cost areas where rent income, even at fair rent 
levels, would fall below notional levels of cost a subsidy system. A 
basic element, consolidating all the subsidies was paid to each local 
authorities Housing Revenue Account and a new capital costs element 
on all new investment - in land, new building improvement and 
acquisition - paid at the rate of 66% of reckonable loan; loan 
charges comprising both interest charges and a supplementary 
financing element to cover any increase in loan charges. 
The 1972 subsidy system was certainly flexible enough to deal with 
the unexpected in a period of rapid inflation. It enabled the real 
level of investment in housing to be raised at a time when land 
prices, construction costs and interest rates were rising in 
combination, at an unprecedented rate. It effectively channelled 
an increasing proportion of Government support to the high cost 
areas, where housing needs were most pressing. Although high cost 
areas received more subsidy, they also had to make greater 
contributions from their own local resources; in terms of the net 
costs to be met locally, the divergence between areas, lessened by 
the earlier subsidy systems, became more marked. The public 
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expenditure burden of insulating local housing authorities from most 
of the adverse effects of inflation was very heavy. The burden of 
mandatory increases in Rate Fund contributions was lessened by 
allowing them to count for Rate Support Grant, but the net effect 
on the resources of some high cost authorities was still substantial. 
Had the 1972 system remained in operation in 1975/76 with rent 
increases still held down as a counter-inflationary measure, it 
would not have stopped subsidies from rising further - despite the 
down-turn in land prices and the slackening in the rate of increase 
in construction costs. The other aspect of the 1972 Act - the effect 
of a deficit subsidy system in withdrawing subsidy deficits was 
falling - was never tested in practice before the relevant parts of 
the Act was repealed. The rent rebate scheme, which became 
mandatory, provided for a personal income tested subsidy to help 
individual tenants. This feature of the Act though, as we shall see 
in Chapter Six of this thesis proved very unpopular with Derby 
Housing Committee who in fact refused to implement the Act until 
pressured by the Minister. 
Although beyond the terms of reference of the case study of this 
thesis, it is perhaps wise to briefly review more recent Central 
Government involvement in housing policy. 
With the return of the Labour Government in 1974, a change of policy 
again came about in the form of the 1975 Housing Rents and Subsidies 
Act. Its primary purpose was to discard the "fair rent" principle 
in the determination of local authority rents (although retaining 
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it in the private rented sector) and to restore to local authorities 
their earlier freedom to set "reasonable" rents and make rate fund 
contributions at their own discretion. At the same time, the Act 
made another major change in the subsidy system and provided the 
same proportionate assistance to all forms of housing investment. 
The 1975 Act provided no specific subsidy for management or 
maintenance but consolidated the "basic element". 
Wi th the change of government in 1979, a ~ _ ~ i n n a different approach 
was taken to local authority finance and to local authority housing 
policy. Subsidies for housing were reduced dramatically and Housing 
Revenue Accounts had to become "self balancing". Economic Rents 
became the order of the day and grants became available only for 
specific purposes ie. new housing for urban renewal and for the 
elderly being the more obvious purposes. The sale of council houses 
became actively encouraged at a time when local authority building 
programmes came to almost a standstill - 1981/82. 
Grants for housing have become much more specific, the finance of 
housing has changed with the political tides of Whitehall and this 
has made a coherent policy much more difficult to implement. Grants 
have also been used in order to further the aims of Central 
Government politicians and officials, as we shall see in the case 
study, to influence the post war housing patterns, to encourage 
"overspill" development of high rise dwellings and the use of non-
traditional building techniques - with some social consequences, 
economic consequences and some consequences possibly yet to come 
to light. 
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vii) Does the Piper's Paymaster Call the Tune? 
Hartley explains the difference in housing policies in his four 
chosen Lincolnshire towns as being "largely a matter of facts and 
politics". As the work of Rhodes has indicated, the difference in 
policy outputs is more complex than Hartley appears to suggest and 
it is this matter to which I wish to turn the emphasis of this 
thesis. 
Central-local relationships are important for government and the 
public. The Layfield Report on Local Government Finance identified 
confusion and ambiguity as the defects in the relationship between 
Central and Local Government and recommended that the prerequisite 
for establishing sound financial arrangements for local authorities 
was a clarification of the respective main responsibilities of 
Central and Local Government. 
Does the piper's paymaster call the tune? Clearly Central 
Government financial arrangements must have some bearing on policy 
outcomes, but it is simplistic to assume that, finance alone 
determines policy outcomes. It obviously played a part in the desire 
to build high rise flats in the 1950's and 1960's (Dunleavy 1980), 
since schemes incorporating such developments, particularly those 
adopting "approved" system building techniques appear to have 
recieved more _speedy consideration than those using traditional 
methods of construction. Likewise, until recently timber framed 
developments of low rise dwellings have received favourable 
consideration. In these areas, Central Government officials have 
been able on the one hand to satisfy their political masters' goals 
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and yet further their own professional goals. Some may have a desire 
to see a "pet" scheme pushed through such as high rise developments. 
The influence of Regional Officers, a sector often ignored, and yet 
as the case study following, illustrates, is a very important stage 
in the policy implementation process. 
Further, one has to consider the influence of local politicians and 
their negotiating skills, and the influence of Local Government chief 
officers. Pahl, as we saw earlier, belie.ves that the professionalism 
of officials has weakened the influence of Central Government. There 
are competing and yet complementary interests which combine to form 
the process by which housing policy has been determined and 
implemented. Each has exerted its own type of influence in order 
to pursue its own goals. 
It is this arena into which I will turn the case study, tracing 
housing policy in Portsmouth and Derby between 1945 and 1974 as a 
means of illustrating the interaction of policy making at its many 
levels within the two authorities and in its many facets. 
78 
CHAPTER TWO THE GUIDING HAND 
J.J. Richardson and A.G. Jordan "Governing Under Pressure" - "The 
policy process in a post-parliamentary democracy". Martin Robertson. 
Oxford 1979. 
R. Pahl and G. Winkler "Governing Under Pressure" - "The policy 
process in a post-parliamentary democracy". Longmans. London 1970. 
J.K. Friend, J.M. Power and C.J.L. Yew1ett "Public Planning: The 
Inter-Corporate Dimension". Tavistock Publication. London 1974. 
D. Regan "Teaching Politics". Volume 12. November 1, 1983. 
R.A.W. Rhodes: Report of the Social Service Research Council Panel 
to the Research Initiatives Board - "Central-Local Government 
Relationship". Published by S.S.R.C. London 1979. 
N. Boaden "Urban Policy Making: the influences on County Boroughs 
in England and Wales". Cambridge 1971. Pages 175-186. 
R.T. Alford "Sources of Diversity in English Local Government 
Decisions". Public Administration 47 (1969). Pages 203-224. 
A. King "Overload - Problem of Governing in the 1970's". Political 
Studies (23) 1975. Page 168. 
79 
Sir Frank Layfield (Chairman): Local Government Finance: Report 
of the Committee of Enquiry, Cmd. 6453 (1976). 
Central Policy Review Staffs study of relations between Central 
Government and Local Authorities (1977) H.M.S.O. 
T.N. Clarke: Community Autonomy in the National System, in 
T.N. Clarke (ed.) "Comparative Community Politics". New York. 
Holsted Press 1974. 
John Gyford "Local Politics in Britain". Croom Helm. London 1976. 
C. Cossey "Building Better Communities". Fabian Tract. London 1974. 
N.P. Hepworth "The Finance of Local Government". Allen and Unwin. 
London. 1970 1st Ed. 1978 4th Ed. 
John Taylor "The Consultative Council on Local Government Finance 
_ A Critical Analysis of its Origins and Development". Local 
Government Studies. May/June 1979. Page 30. 
Department of the Environment Circular 120/26. Para 23. 
Tyrell Burgess and Tony Travers "Ten Billion Pounds". 
by Grant McIntyre. London 1980. 
Published 
80 
Layfield Report 1976. 
Owen Hartley, D. Phil. Thesis, University of Oxford 1969. Housing 
Policy in Four Lincolnshire Towns 1919-1959. 
Owen Hartley. The Relationship Between Central and Local 
Authorities. Public Administration. Winter 1971. 
81 
CHAPTER THREE BACKGROUND OF PUBLIC HOUSING POLICY IN BRITAIN 
i) The Legacy of the Nineteenth Century 
ii) The Early Twentieth Century 
iii) The Nineteen-Twenties 
iv) Slum Clearance and Rebuilding 
v) Background to Housing Policy in Britain 
1945-1951 
vi) A Change of Party - A Change of Emphasis 
vii) Let's Get Repairing Again 
viii)Private Instead of Public 
ix) Cut Subsidies 
x) Remove Rent Controls 
xi) An Alternative Strategy 
xii) A Better Quality Product 
xiii)Back to Labour 
xiv) Grants for Conversions and Twilight Areas 
xv) Return of the Conservatives - Moves Towards 
Fair Rents 
xvi) Broader Horizons 
82 
CHAPTER THREE BACKGROUND OF PUBLIC HOUSING POLICY IN BRITAIN 
i) The Legacy of the Nineteenth Century 
The consequences of the increases in population in 19th century 
Britain and the effects of laissez-faire attitudes led in some areas 
to squalid conditions, poverty and ill health. There was at first a 
reluctance on the part of the authorities to undertake planning or 
housing. The evidence of this era is sti}l to be witnessed in many 
towns and cities in Britain, although slum clearance programmes have 
removed the worst examples. 
The impetus to Housing Policy in the 19th Century was from morality; 
after godliness, of course, comes cleanliness, and so it was the 
health and sanitary problems that attracted attention. The working 
class was held to be "demoralised" by the poor housing and insanitary 
conditions, and the remedy for this was seen to lie in legislation 
to prevent dangers to health. 
In the 1840's Liverpool led other local authorities in obtaining 
powers to prevent insanitary conditions and from then onward national 
legislation followed and made powers generally available for dealing 
with problems. The Public Health Act 1848 instituted local boards 
of health to secure the supply of clean water and to improve 
sanitation. This legislation was largely due to the appalling 
housing and sanitation conditions reported by Edwin Chadwick's 
83 
Report of the Sanitary Conditions of the Labouring Population of 
Great Britain published in 1842. In 1868, the Artisans' and 
Labourers' Dwellings Act was passed which, although still primarily 
concerned with the health aspects, was the first measure to enable 
intervention in the housing situation. Under this Act, houses could 
be declared unfit for human habitation by the medical officer of 
health for the authority and their owners required to make 
improvements or to demolish at their own expense. The Cross Acts 
1875-82 dealt with whole insanitary areas by improvement schemes. 
Rehousing was allowed to displaced inhabitants. The Public Health 
Act 1875 created health codes under which action could also be 
undertaken. 
When the Royal Commission on the Housing of the Poor 1884-1885 
considered the situation, its recommendations were mainly with 
sanitary matters, though other policies were mentioned. These were 
the helping of Housing Societies and the encouraging of owner-
occupation of houses. There was also support for proposals to halt 
the drift from the land by allowing the rural authorities to provide 
houses and allotments. The idea of local authorities providing 
accommodation was not new - Shaftbury's Labouring Classes' Lodging 
Houses Act 1851 allowed parishes to create a committee to provide 
accommodation. The Royal Commission sought to have this simplified 
and the Act given a chance to show its possibilities. 
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The Housing of the Working Classes Act 1890 was mainly a codifying 
Act. Part three of the Act allowed urban authorities to build for 
the needs of the working classes. The Act was permissive only; 
local authorities were not compelled to buy land and raise loans for 
housing the working classes who were the subject of the Act. 
a) Apart from the efforts of progressive authorities like 
Birmingham and Liverpool, progress was slow. 
b) The local authorities were reluctant to undertake building 
projects themselves, and were inclined to sell cleared sites 
to speculative builders. 
c) The local authorities provided only 5% of the working class 
houses built between 1890 and 1914. 
The 1909 Housing and Town Planning Act simplified the procedures 
for this, but was, especially in its town planning sections, 
envisaged as being a health measure. Building for letting was mainly 
restricted to activities of Liverpool and Birmingham City Councils 
and London County Council before 1914. The Government was very 
reluctant to encourage local authorities to build. The prevailing 
view was that of the responsible department, the L.G.B. Report for 
1912-13 which was repeated in the next 2 reports word for word that 
"private enterprisehas always been, and, so far as can be foreseen, 
will continue to be the main source of the provision of houses for 
the working classes and only when this failed should an authority act 
itself". The board added that it could "readily" understand fears 
that public building would kill private enterprise from the fact that 
local authorities had provided 15,000 of a housing stock of 
5,528,000. 
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Some modification of the position was allowed. The problems of the 
Irish rural poor led to the Irish Labourers' Cottage Acts, especially 
the 1906 act, and the granting of national and local subsidy for 
the provision of new cottages. The plight of the rural English 
received sympathy from committees in 1906 and 1913, but when the 
Conservatives in 1912-1913 took up housing as a political theme, 
Hartley suggests the Liberals were provoked into a proposal for 
120,000 rural houses for small holders, teachers, police and 
roadmen. 
Some beginnings in town planning by private enterprise emerged at 
the end of the 19th Century in the establishing of "garden cities" 
at Bournville (1879), Port Sunlight (1888) and Letchworth Garden 
City (1903). The Town Planning Act of 1909 had given local 
authorities powers to plan new and undeveloped areas - but it was not 
until 1932 that they were given powers to plan built up areas. The 
1875 Artisans' Dwellings Act had given powers to the local 
authorities to acquire and clear slum areas, but the problems of 
compensation and rehousing had deterred many authorities from 
proceeding with this work. 
The national policy before 1914 expected local authorities to 
concentrate on sanitary tasks; it was more a health than a housing 
policy. Private enterprise was seen as managing very well in 
building for letting and owner occupation and national policy was 
that it should not be offered the discouragement of local authority 
intervention. 
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ii) The Early Twentieth C e n t u r ~ ~
The war of 1914-1918 stopped the building of houses and by the end 
of the war J.B. Cullingworth (1966) believes that the housing 
shortage had become acute. Already in 1911, the census had shown 
that one-tenth of the population was living in overcrowded conditions 
ie. more than two to a room, and in some industrial towns conditions 
fell far below this standard. 
The Tudor Walters Committee Report (1918) recommended that working 
class houses should be built not more than twelve to an acre, each 
house with its own garden, in well-planned estates. However, the 
"land fit for heroes to live in" was far from being an actuality. 
Marian Bowley (1945) states that by 1919 there was a deficiency of 
600,000 houses. 
It was not until 1919 that treasury grants became available. Rent 
control had been instituted in 1915, rents being controlled at the 
level reached at the outbreak of war, the increases in prices of 
building materials and building costs generally in a dislocated 
industry were such that conditions after the war were unfavourable 
to investors in property. The ordinary working class people were 
not house buyers; before the war of 1914-1918 there was little house 
purchase by instalment buying through building societies; and low 
wages, unemployment and industrial unrest were to characterise the 
post-war period. It was against this background that the subsequent 
developments should be viewed. 
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In 1919, the Housing and Town Planning Act (more commonly known as 
'The Addison Act', after the President of the Local Government Board, 
Christopher Addison); the duty was imposed on local authorities 
of surveying the needs of their districts for houses and making and 
carrying out plans to satisfy this need, subject to approval of the 
plans by the Ministry of Health. The permissive powers given in 
the 1890 Act were made obligatory. There was now a broad State-
directed housing policy, as distinguished from a slum-clearance 
policy only. Moreover a treasury subsidy was to be paid to cover 
.' losses to local authorities in excess of a penny rate, government 
aid was however linked to the maintenance of minimum of standards 
of housing provision. The rents the local authorities could charge 
for the houses they built were to be of the level, generally, of 
the controlled rents of working class houses. J.B. Cullingworth 
(1966) believes that the high building costs however, showed that a 
boom period was not the time to engage in a housing campaign on these 
lines. Under the Act, about 214,000 houses were built by 1923, 
170,000 by local authorities, 39,000 by private enterprise, and about 
4,500 by public utility societies or associations, all as a result of 
the act. The treasury subsidy reached £12 million by 1921, and 
imposed an annual charge of £7 million. By the time the houses were 
actually built, a period of declining prices and wages was beginning, 
so that the contracts did not reflect current prices, and wages were 
getting out of relation to the rents charged. 
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iii) The Nineteen-Twenties 
In 1922 a Conservative Government took ffi d o ce an passed the Housing 
Act 1923. The previous housing scheme was abandoned on the grounds, 
generally, that it had proved too expensive in relation to the 
results. A new (but temporary) subsidy was to be given by the 
treasury at a maximum of £6 per house for twenty years to local 
authorities and to private enterprise. There was to be no charge 
on the rates, and it was announced tht the houses could be sold at 
any price or let at any rent, and encouragement was to be given to 
owner occupiers. Local authorities had to prove to the Minister of 
Health that they were better able to provide houses than private 
enterprise in terms of costs and specification. Thus the 1923 
Housing Act stated plainly the Conservative ideology which was to 
become a familiar pattern in Post World War Two politics. 
In 1924 the first Labour Government took office and they passed onto 
the statute book The Housing (Financial Provisions) Act 1924 
(Wheatley Act). Under this Act local authorities were given back 
their housing powers without having to prove that houses could be 
provided by them better than by private enterprise; this became 
a permanent feature of the role of local authorities in housing: 
they could now provide working class houses, and in fact the Housing 
Act of 1925 passed by the Conservatives confirmed the situation. A 
long period housing programme was introduced, subsidies increased and 
rate aid for building restored. Under the "Wheatley Act", up to 
1939, in excess of 500,000 houses were built by local authorities, 
half of these built in total by local authorities from 1918 to 1939. 
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The 1922 and 1924 Acts reflect the ideologies and the intentions 
of the Conservative and Labour politicians respectively and it is 
interesting to note that these respective ideologies have continued 
through to the present day with only minor modifications. 
iv) Slum Clearance and Rebuilding 
Up to 1930, about 11,000 slum houses had been demolished and 
replaced. The clearing of the slums became an issue in the General 
Election of 1929. A Labour Government to'ok office; it stayed until 
1931, when the Second National Government was formed, to last till 
1935. The Housing Act of 1930 introduced by Arthur Greenwood, 
provided for a subsidy to be paid by the treasury to the local 
authorities for slum clearance. This subsidy was not merely for 
slum clearance but also for re-housing the displaced persons. The 
size of the subsidy was in proportion to the size of the family re-
housed. There was therefore a combination of the Wheatley subsidy 
for ordinary working class houses, and the Greenwood subsidy for 
slum clearance. However, as the result of an economy campaign the 
Wheatley subsidy was repealed by the Housing (Financial Provisions) 
Act 1933, and the Greenwood scheme also suffered. The policy stated 
in the Report of the Departmental Committee on Housing, 1933, was 
a swing back to private enterprise in housing provision and a laying 
of the emphasis on slum clearance: 
"to concentrate public effort and money on the clearance and 
improvement of slum conditions, and to rely in the main on 
competitive private enterprise to provide a new supply of 
accommodation for the working classes - the provision by 
private enterprise to be supplemented where necessary by 
means of unsubsidised building by the Local Authorities". 
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The plan to clear the I h s um ouses in five years was not entirely 
successful; by March 1939, the original 250,000 was revised to 
472,000 and the actual houses closed or demolished to March 1939 , 
was 272,836. 
The General Election of 1935 gave the Conservatives a majority but 
the National Government was formed which lasted until the outbreak 
of the Second World War in 1939 and the formation of a Coalition 
Government. In 1935, the new government passed the Housing Act 1935, 
with the main object of abolishing overcrowding. It placed upon 
local authorities the responsibility to survey the state of 
overcrowding in their districts and to prepare schemes for providing 
sufficient accommodation. The Act made overcrowding a legal offence 
for both landlord and tenant. A census taken by the local 
authorities in 1936 showed that 4% of the total, nearly 341,000 
houses, were to be condemned; however the problems of inadequate 
housing accommodation in quality and numbers, must always be related 
to the living conditions of those living inside them. By 1939 only 
half the declared slums had been cleared. The efforts of local 
authorities varied considerably; what clearance was done, had been 
done by the more energetic authorities. However, by March 1937, 
the local authorities had built about one million houses. In the 
years 1934-39, the total output of houses exceeded 300,000 a year; 
over 30% of the population living in new houses which had been built 
since 1919. Unsubsidised private builders had built about two 
million houses, and subsidised private builders a further 400,000 
houses. There continued the existence of slum property, older houses 
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lacking amenities and overcrowded houses. This meant that there 
was still a housing problem, intensified by the destruction and decay 
inevitable in war-time. 
v) Background to Housing Policy in Britain 1945-1951 
D.V. Donnison (1967) believes that Britain emerged from World War 
II with approximately 200,000 houses destroyed and a further 250,000 
so badly damaged that they could not be lived in. The war had thus 
upset what had been a rough balance between the numbers of houses 
and families in 1939 - although as mentioned previously, the actual 
standard of such dwellings left much to be desired in many cities. 
The Labour Government returned in 1945 was determined to control 
not only the production of houses, but also their allocation. The 
great majority of houses were to be built for letting at a reasonable 
rent to families in the most urgent need. Thus as J.B. Cullingworth 
points out the criterion set was to be urgency of need, not ablity 
to pay, and the majority of houses were to be provided by local 
authorities. Private development was to be strictly controlled and 
playa subordinate role. 
The first priority was given to the repair of war damaged houses, 
and at first only emergency repairs could be undertaken. Attempts 
were made to utilise to the fullest extent all existing accommodation 
and householders with spare rooms were encouraged to let them. 
Powers given to local authorities to requisition empty houses as 
part of the war-time evacuation scheme were extended to meet the 
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needs of inadequately housed families. Service camps and war-time 
hostels were adapted for temporary housing and in London huts were 
erected as 'emergency accommodation' as they were in Derby and 
Portsmouth, as we shall see later in this thesis. Whilst most 
visible signs of these early post war measures have gone, many of 
the 'temporary houses' (as opposed to "huts") still remain - of 
the "prefabs", approximately 200 remain in Derby today (1985), even 
though they were initially intended to be in use for a maximum of 
ten years. One hundred and twenty four thousand of these factor 
built houses had been provided by December 1948 when the programme 
was brought to an end - basically because the "prefabs" were costing 
twice the amount budgeted per dwelling. The "prefab" programme 
allowed widespread use of industrial building methods to be 
demonstrated as a means of speed housing provision and the methods 
used were to have an impact in the 1960's - when the high rise 
programmes became the vogue. 
By the end of 1946 approximately a third of a million units of 
accommodation had been provided in one form or another - 80,000 in 
prefabs, 45,000 in conversions and adaptions, 107,000 in repaired 
unoccupied war-damaged houses; 3,000 in temporary huts, 9,000 in 
service camps; 25,000 in requisitioned houses; and 52,000 in new 
permanent houses, the majority of the provision being in the public 
sector. 
The 'permanent housing' programme, during the period of adjustment 
from the situation of a 'war-economy' to one which could operate 
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more effectively in peacetime, tended to take a subordinate role 
to the repairs and temporary building programme. However, during 
1946 steps were taken to begin a permanent housing programme. 
Housing subsidies were increased and were made available for a range 
of special needs. Also at this time it was decided to increase the 
size of a standard three bedroomed council house to 900 square feet 
plus 50 square feet for outbuildings - the pre-war standard having 
been 750 square feet. Viewed overall the provisions were bold and 
expensive by pre-war standards. The rush to start rebuilding was 
~ . .
such that Britain emerged well ahead of many other countries, 
starting her building programme with a target of 240,000 dwellings. 
However this target overloaded the building industry, which was 
already running short of building materials, and this was further 
complicated by a severe winter in 1947. Thus in England and Wales, 
127,541 houses were completed in 1947 and 206,559 in 1948. During 
the following three years house completions averaged around 170,000 
per annum. 
From this immediate post-war 'Housing Drive' emerged two issues which 
were to have a more than short-term effect - both these issues were 
embodied in the Housing Act of 1949, which among other things 
i) expanded the powers of local authorities to provide for all social 
classes, and ii) introduced a policy for the improvement of older 
houses. As J.B. Cullingworth points out, until that time, local 
authorities had legally been restricted to providing housing for 
.. The Housing Act 1949 did little to ease the the "working classes • 
problem of repairing privately owned rented accommodation, for whilst 
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the costs of repairs and maintenance had soared' , the rent for such 
accommodation was held at the 1939 level. Private rented property 
began to fall into disrepair, and indeed a survey carried out by 
the Association of County Sanitary Officers in 1950 reported that 
of a million houses inspected in rural areas, only 31% were 
completely "fit", 27% required minor repairs, 30% needed major works 
of reconstruction and 12% were unfit. Many houses had rentals of 
less than 30p per week and 'a great number' were less than 15p per 
week. 
Under the 1949 Act powers were introduced to enable local authorities 
to give improvement grants to private owners wishing to improve or 
convert their property. Critics of the Act however, have suggested 
that such provisions were merely a form of 'public assistance for 
landlords' necessitated by the Government's refusal to amend the 
Rent Restriction Acts. Proposals put forward by the Royal Insitution 
of Chartered Surveyors (1951), suggested 'an increase related to 
the higher cost of repairs' with the safeguard of an appeal to the 
local authority if repairs were not in fact carried out. P.E.P. 
(1949) suggested that 'increases of varying sizes, designed to 
eliminate the worst anomolies between houses of similar type' should 
be allowed through. However, all such proposals were ignored, for 
the housing policy was directed solely towards the provision of new 
houses. The Labour Government considered their task to be one of 
organising resources to meet a limited house building programme, 
and consequently private enterprise building was allowed only on 
Ii d 1 There was a clash of interest between the a very mite sca e. 
95 
local authorities, who were, irrespective of party affiliation, 
seeking to build as many houses as possible and the Central 
Government, which appeared to be restricting the level of the 
building to one agreeable to those concerned with the economy. The 
higher standards of the early post-war years were reduced, as 
building costs continued to rise. The minimum standard of 900 square 
feet for a three-bedroom five person household was similarly cut 
- on the grounds that architects had shown that it was "possible 
to maintain room standards within a smaller superficial area", a 
Government Report (1953) on standard stated. Thus local authorities 
were expected to cut down on the "trimmings" such as outhouses, 
halls, balconies, the size of landings and the number of cupboards 
fitted in each dwelling. During the last months of the post-war 
Labour Government the decision as to whether or not to reduce the 
standard of amenities to the new levels was left to the discretion 
of the local authorities. 
vi) A Change of Party - A Change of Emphasis 
With the change to a Conservative Government in October 1951, it 
was stressed that if the size of dwellings were reduced, then it 
would be possible to build more units of accommodation. Thus, whilst 
the Conservatives were not totally opposed to local authority 
were more Concerned with "roofs over heads", than housing, they 
higher living standards being introduced into this sector, a 
philosophy of quantity not quality, therefore a reduction in unit 
sizes helped enable them to pursue their election manifesto goal 
of 300,000 completions per annum in a more realistic context. The 
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Conservatives continued the policy of relaxing building controls, 
a policy initiated by the Labour government. Private builders were 
given greater freedom, the result of which was to allow an increase 
in the number of private development completions from 21,000 houses 
in 1951 to 88,000 in 1954. However, the most significant expansion 
came in the local authority sector. The administrative control of 
local authority building programmes by a system of allocation was 
replaced by an expansionist policy of "targets". Instead of a 
maximum programme, local authorities were given a target representing 
their minimum responsibility, which was an estimate based on local 
capacity, and which the authorities were expected to exceed if 
possible. The need for new housing was of course urgent; council 
waiting lists just seemed to lengthen and little was being done to 
remove the slums of the industrial cities. The task of achieving the 
housing targets was given to Harold Macmillan by Mr Churchill, the 
then Prime Minister, and indeed the 300,000 houses promised in the 
election manifesto in 1951, was more than exceeded in 1953 when some 
308,000 houses were completed in Britain, and the following year, 
1954 when 357,000 houses were completed. 
vii) Let's Get Repairing Again 
With the expansion of the house-building programme however, a 
campaign was being waged by the professional and property owners 
to try to bring about measures which would prevent the associations 
further deterioration of existing houses; weight was added to this 
b h blication of the Girdwood Report (1953) on 'The argument y t e pu , 
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Cost of House Maintenance'. The report indicated that the cost of 
maintaining a house in good repair had increased by 216% between 
1939 and 1953. Th j Ii e ma or po tical parties began to become more 
aware of the situation and the Labour Party stated that 'the tenant 
himself would benefit from some form of revision of the rent to be 
spent on the improvement and maintenance of the dwelling' • 
Proposals were made from 'the left' with regard to the municipali-
sation of privately-rented properties, notably in the Fabian pamphlet 
by D.L. Munby (1952). As the pressure for action grew Mr Harold 
MacMillan announced a "full enquiry" and it was not until November 
1953 that the long awaited reorientation of official housing policy 
was announced. It was felt that since the house building programme 
had been expanded by 50% since 1951, and since the completion rate 
was not in excess of 300,000 houses per annum, then attention could 
be turned to the problem of maintenance and improvement and to the 
resumption of a slum clearance programme. 
The White Paper, "Houses - The Next Step" (1953) gave a broader out-
line of the many aspects of the national housing problem and outlined 
the Government's "comprehensive plan" for dealing with them. At the 
same time there were some 1 3 ~ ~ dwellings in Great Britain. Of these 
6\m were owned either by their occupiers or by public authorities, 
-
the remaining 9\m being privately rented. Most of the privately 
rented accommodation was very old with some 2\m being over 65 years 
old. It is clear from these figures that the housing stock in t ~ e e
d h li Y which concentrated private rented sector was old an t at a po c 
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almost solely on building additional houses should not be pursued 
longer than necessary. The old properties were in varying states 
of repair, ranging from those which were in perfect order to those 
which required to be demolished. What was required then was a 
comprhensive plan of repair and maintenance, with the tenant 
responsible for the payment of the rates. The Institute's proposal 
was that the statutory deduction should be used as a basis for the 
arranging of rent increases. The cost of repairs had risen by 216% 
since 1939 (the date at which the statutory repairs deduction enabled 
landlords to repair and maintain houses to the standard they had 
adopted in 1939). The scheme was considered to be politically 
attractive for it gave landlords an increase only for that part of 
their rent income which was intended to cover repairs and 
maintenance; however the problem was to ensure that the increases 
were applied to maintain the property in a good state of repair. 
In an attempt to overcome this problem the Housing Repairs and Rents 
Act 1954 laid down a set of criteria for determining whether a house 
was 'unfit for human habitation'. If the house was 'fit' and in 
a good state of repair, then the conditions for justifying a rent 
increase had been fulfilled. The landlord was then required 'as 
a test of good faith' to show that repairs of an appropriate value 
had been undertaken, and once this procedure had been followed, the 
rent increase was allowed, and became permanent, unless the tenant 
could prove that the house was no longer in a good state of repair. 
At the other extreme from the essentially sound houses were the 
hundreds of thousands which were unfit for human habitation and which 
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could not be brought to a fit di' con tlon at a 'reasonable' expense. 
Thus, it was decided to lauch a slum clearance campaign immediately. 
However, the slums were not distributed evenly throughout the 
country; some areas had very few, whilst in other areas there were 
so many that it would take years to clear them. In such instances, a 
planned programme was to be introduced to cover a 20 year period, 
with the worst being removed within the first five years, and then 
those not quite so delapidated within ten years, with the better 
properties being patch repaired to extend their life to the second 
decade of the programme. Technically such properties were unfit 
for human habitation, but they could be made fit at a reasonable 
cost. 
A final category of house was the one which could give many years 
of- useful services if improved, and included in this category were 
the large mid 19th Century villas which were now considered to be 
too large and could be given a new life by conversion into flats . 
. Grants were already available, but J.B. Cullingworth (1966) believes 
the scheme had proved to be ineffective: between 1949 and 1953 
grants had been given for only 5,463 improvements and 624 
conversions. He believes that this was due to a lack of publicity 
and lack of materials. Very little information was collected by 
, 
the Government as to the effect of th 1954 Act on repairs and there 
are no figures as to the number of cases in which repairs were 
carried out. The general opinion, however, was that the provisions 
of the Act were too restrictive. Landlords had not taken advantage 
of the Act since there was little return to be gained for a large 
outlay of capital. By the end of 1956, 7,328 conversions and 82,593 
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improvements had been grant-aided, but few of these improvements 
were undertaken in privately-owned rented property, the majority 
had gone to owner-occupiers. E1·th th d· er e con 1tions were still too 
restrictive or renting houses was becoming an unviable proposition. 
viii) Private Instead of Public 
Another important measure at this time resulted from the desire to 
expand the private provision of housing; licensing control over 
private enterprise building was abolished in November 1954 and the 
number of private houses increased from 60,000 in 1953 to 110,000 
in 1955 representing 38% of those built in 1955. If the total house 
building programme was to be kept at 300,000(which was the target 
of the Conservative Government when it came to power in 1951 and 
was achieved in 1953 and 1954)then clearly in order to allow the 
private sector to expand, the public sector would need to be 
restrained and this was done by a system of allocations. The 
intention was to persuade local authorities to restrict their 
programme to the number of houses required for slum clearance 
purposes, except where it was clear that private enterprise was 
unable or unwilling to meet 'general needs'. Such a policy was not 
easy to implement without some means of persuasion; and this was 
found in the recosting of housing subsidies in October 1955. 
ix) Cut Subsidies 
The expansion of local authority housing programmes in the early 
1950's under the Conservative Government lead to the fact that by 
the end of 1955 local authorities owned some 2 ~ ~ houses and were 
receiving nearly £47m a year in Exchequer subsidies. The Government 
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felt that in general, council house rents were being subsidised to 
a greater extent than the financial circumstances of the individual 
tenants required. Further, they felt that the amount of subsidy 
which the Exchequer was paying out in respect of existing houses 
was unnecessarily large, and provided a margin which could properly 
be used for financing some part of the future house-building 
programme. The Government also considered it necessary for a greater 
effort to be made towards slum clearance, and whilst direct controls 
are contrary to Conservative Party ideology, an alternative route 
was found by providing financial incentives. The general needs 
subsidy was abolished - although it was retained for one-bedroom 
dwellings, this exception being made in order to try and encourage 
local authorities to provide more dwellings for elderly and single 
people. J.B. Cullingworth (1966) points out that 
'The 1956 Act constituted part of a general policy of 
substituting financial measures for administrative 
controls' • 
Under this Act the system of allocations was abolished and local 
authorities were now free to determine the size and scope of their 
own housing programmes, but they would only receive Exchequer 
subsidies for the special categories of need defined in the Act. 
The loan financing arrangements were altered so much that local 
authorities had in future to attempt to raise the money on the money 
hi the Public Works Loan Board for finance. market before approac ng 
If they borrowed from the P.W.L.B. they would be required to pay 
the same rate of interest as if the loan had been raised on the open 
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market. This resulted in a sharp rise in interest rates on local 
authority loans. These new policies had the effect of precipitating 
a rapid decline in house building by local authorities and by the 
end of 1956 local authority housing completions had fallen by about 
a third from the 1954 level and these trends continued for the 
remainder of the 1950's. D i hi ur ng t s period also, the slum clearance 
programmes of local authorities gathered momentum. The total number 
of houses demolished rose from under 20,000 in 1954 to 47,000 in 
1957 and 62,000 in 1961. Although these figures show a marked 
improvement, they are somewhat below the targets set by the local 
authorities themselves in the slum clearance programmes that they 
were required to submit to the Ministry in the autumn of 1955. 
x) Remove Rent Controls 
At the Conservative Party's annual conference in October 1956 the 
Minister of Housing (Mr Sandys) announced that the time had come 
to begin a progressive abolition of rent control. The Government's 
proposals were for the automatic decontrol of all dwellings with 
a rateable value of over £40 in London and over £30 elsewhere in 
England and Wales. It was estimated that there were 750,000 such 
dwellings, and it was also proposed that any dwelling below the 
'control limits' would become decontrolled when let to a new tenant. 
For the 4 ~ m m dwellings remaining under control a system of rent limits 
based on gross values was introduced, rents which were below these 
limits could be increased subject to the right of the tenant to 
challenge them on the grounds of disrepair. These proposals were 
incorporated in the 1957 Rent Act, which was undoubtedly one of the 
most controversial pieces of legislation of the 1950's. The 
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legislation was not preceded by an investigation of the problems 
it was designed to solve. The Government believed that increased 
freedom in rent determination would restore the market situation , 
and that also, the condition of rented property (caused by 
artificially low rents) would be released on to the housing market 
to be relet. The Government believed that since it would become 
profitable to let property, that the supply of privately-rented 
accommodation would increase, since it would become profitable to 
let property again. However, as many houses became vacant, the 
landlords decided to sell the property to owner-occupiers and thus 
the supply of privately rented accommodation contracted further. 
Those who could not enter property within the expanding sectors of 
the market were compiled to compete for a dwindling supply of poor 
quality houses - which led to the ripe conditions in a few areas for 
Rachmanism from 1960 onwards. The Rent Act of 1957 had done little 
therefore to ease the situation. D.V. Donnison (1967) believes that 
the economic opportunity conferred on landlords by the 1957 Act was 
largely illusory; and that the full effects were postponed by an 
Amending Act in 1958. This Act, together with other measures, 
strengthened the trend towards owner occupation in the very property 
which was intended for renting by decontrolling many tenancies. 
Donnison says that no other country in Western Europe had so 
consistently discouraged private investment in rented property. 
No other country had abandoned its rent controls in a manner that 
neither distinguished between the extent of the shortage in 
particular areas, nor offered allowances or subsidies to the families 
least capable of paying increased rents. 
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Little had been done b i h yet er the local authorities housing 
programmes or by the private building companies to cater for many of 
those for whom the private landlords had catered - the old, the 
single, the young and the poorer households in general. The housing 
programmes have concentrated on the provision of accommodation for 
families. As a result of the private rented accommodation 
diminishing, the problem of "homelessness" began to grow from the 
last quarter of 1957 onwards, until in the early 1960's scandals 
became rife and the Sunday newspapers had a field day. A Committee 
of Inquiry was set up in August 1963 chaired by Milner-Holland. 
xi) An Alternative Strategy 
It became clear that council housing and owner occupation could not 
between them provide new housing for all those in need of it, and 
clearly the private landlords would no longer build accommodation 
for the average person, but only cater for the luxury flat market 
in the large cities. In order to find a solution to this problem 
an attempt was made in 1961 to promote housing associations of a 
new kind, with the aid of Local Government loans. In 1964 the 
National Housing Corporation was established to provide technical 
advice for them, aided by an Exchequer loan of £50m, which was later 
increased after the change of government from Conservative to Labour 
to £IOOm. It was becoming increasingly recognised that many of the 
hardships in private rented housing were due to incorrect subdivision 
and poor management of such property. The 1961 Act therefore gave 
local authorities greater powers of compulsion in d e ~ l i n g g with such 
problems, and the 1964 Act extended these powers further enabling 
lOS 
local authorities to compel owners in d ' eS1gnated areas to improve 
their housing, to offer more generous i mprovement grants, and to 
take over the property of recalcitrant landlords under 'control 
orders' for a period of up to five years, paying nominal compensation 
to the owner and recouping from him the costs of necessary 
improvements that were not even covered by rents. 
Meantime, the Ministry of Public Buildings and Works was centralising 
a number of government building responsibilities outside the housing 
field and embarking on a systematic programme of architectural 
research and development work, one by-product of which was the 
creation of the National Building Agency whose task it was to promote 
more efficient industrialised building methods throughout the 
country, particularly in the housing sphere. Encouraged by the 
leadership given, local authorities in many parts of the country 
were beginning to organise themselves into "consortia" and other 
groupings, some of them employing the same development and design 
teams, building methods and contractors, in an attempt to maximise 
the effects of the economies of large scale production. Comparisons 
were frequently made with the success achieved by similar methods 
previously in improving the design and reducing the cost of schools. 
But the revolution in the school building programmes began at a 
i h t re hl.'gh, ·and existing designs were often wasteful. po nt w en cos s we 
The attempt t o ~ r e o r g a n i s e e the house building industry began after 
a sustained period of continuous economies and falling standards 
when more generous dimensions and equipment were urgently needed, 
xii) 
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A Better Quality Product 
In 1959, the Parker-Morris Commission was appointed. Their report 
in "Houses for Today and Tommorow" (1961) contained recommendations 
for the improvement of both the public and private housing sectors. 
The committee believed that the time was right for a general 
improvement in housing construction standards and in particular in 
the basic equipment installed. Kitchens should be large enough to 
dine in for some meals; there should be more storage space for 
domestic appliances, more power points, adequate heating equipment 
such as central heating. Even today, houses are built without 
central heating as a standard amenity, and in fact today some of the 
"cheaper" houses built in the private sector are of a lower quality 
and standard, than those in the public sector, but possibly with high 
mortgage interest rates people are not willing to pay the extra cost 
for such amenities. 
xiii) Back to Labour 
During the General Election in 1964, much of the debate centred on 
housing, rents, the rights of tenants, the rising price of land, 
the building of offices - many of them still standing empty - the 
needs of the homeless, and the decaying and depressed areas. It 
was believed by some that the outcome of the election - the return 
of a Labour Government - reflected the public's disquiet about 
issues. Whether this was so or not, government became more deeply 
involved in housing again. Much information had been gathered with 
regard to the immediate problems in the late 1950's and the early 
1960's from Regional studies, from the Milner-Holland Report (on 
housing in Greater London), the Buchanan Report (on traffic in towns) 
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and the Banwell Report (on the placing and management of contracts 
for Building and Civil Engineering Works). The most urgent 
priorities were considered to be the prevention of evictions and 
abuse in private property, the control of office building, the 
provision of additional help for housing associations and the 
establishments of a system of rent regulation. Much of the 
legislation required was enacted in the Rent Act 1965, which applied 
to every tenancy of a dwelling where the rent did not exceed £400 per 
annum in Greater London, and £200 per annum elsewhere. Amendments to 
the transfer of tenancy upon the death of the tenant were made, as 
were the conditions for the recovery of possession of an owner-
occupied house which had been let. The owner-occupier could apply to 
the court for possession only if he had occupied the house himself at 
sometime, and had not let the house after the coming into force of 
the Act. Provision was made for the registration of rents, and Rent 
Officers were to be appointed and paid for by local authorities 
throughout England and Wales. A 'Registered Rents Register' was to 
be introduced in which was recorded, in addition to the rent payable 
under a regulated tenancy, the "prescribed" paticulars with regard to 
the tenancy, and a specification of the dwelling house. The Act laid 
out the terms for defining a "Fair Rent", and stated that in 
determining for the purposes of the Act what is or would be a fair 
rent under a regulated tenancy, "regard shall be had to all the 
circumstances (other than personal circumstances) and in 
the age, character and locality of the dwelling and to particular to 
its state of repair". This clearly ignores demand, ~ n d d was a measure 
to control the price of housing in the private sector. Further, 
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measures were taken for the protection of tenants against harassment 
and eviction without due process of the law. Some less desirable 
property companies had acquired the habit of moving out tenants from 
properties in London (which when vacant, could either be sold for a 
huge price, or remodelled and let out on unregulated tenancies for 
high rent) by putting in either very noisey tenants or a tenant who 
kept alsation dogs as pets; such behaviour became an indictable 
offence. Likewise the demanding of money by tenants, in order to 
free such properties - which was also occurring - became an offence. 
These were therefore attempts to deal with Rachmanism in its more 
extreme form. Section 2 of the Landlord and Tenant Act (1949) -
which allowed for the payment of a premium upon the letting of 
accommodation was abolished. The purpose of this was to bring to an 
end the payment of "Key Money" but it only partially worked, for if 
agencies let flats now, then the agency charges for the piece of 
paper on which the address is written. In London, the shortage of 
accommodation was becoming so acute that it became common practice 
for people to pay quite high prices just for information about 
forthcoming flat vacancies. People were being paid to move, either 
in cash or kind, and others still demanded money to vacate 
accommodation - even though making such demands was an offence. In 
1968 a further Rent Act was introduced basically to consolidate 
previous l e g i ~ l a t i o n , , but also to deal with the problem, mentioned 
above. An interesting anomaly of the tenancy legislation, was that 
no protection was granted to a tenant of Crown Property. 
, 
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Grants for Conversions and Twilight Areas 
The Housing Act 1969 made a further provision for grants by local 
authorities and contributions out of money provided by Parliament 
towards the cost of providing dwellings by conversion (large houses 
to be divided into flats to be allowed up to £1,200 per dwelling 
provided). Further, the goal of improving the existing housing stock 
was set and the system of grants for standard amenities was improved 
and extended. To qualify for the grant aid, all the standard 
amenities had to be installed for the exclusive use of its occupants 
- the standard amenities being - a fixed bath, hot and cold water 
supply to the bath, washbasin and sink, and an indoor toilet. In 
conjunction with these provisions, the Act encouraged the creation 
of 'General Improvement Areas' - the aim being to improve both the 
amenities of the houses in specific areas and the general 
environment, thus trying to prevent the areas from becoming the slums 
or "blighted properties" as they are euphemistically called, of ten 
years hence. This legislation therefore led to "beautification" 
programmes in twilight areas. 
In order to encourage landlords of private tenancies to participate 
in improvement schemes a system of "qualification certificates" was 
introduced, the possession of which would be taken into account when 
assessing the rent of a property. However, if a house did not 
possess the basic amenities, then the work to install them could 
not be carried out unless the tenant agreed to such work in writing. 
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xv) Return of the Conservatives - Moves Towards Fair Rents 
With the return of the Conservatives to Government in 1970 
, concern 
was shown for the mounting exchequer housing subsidies, which in 
the year 1970/71 amounted to over £157m, and in addition local 
authorities paid a housing subsidy from the rates of about £65m. 
The new government claimed that 90% of these subsidies were used 
to reduce the general level of rent regardless of the need of the 
tenant and only 10% was used to grant rebates to poorer tenants, 
and as a result many in need received little or no help. The aim 
of the new legislation which they intended to introduce was to 
subsidise people and not property, and this was the underlying 
ideology of the "Fair Rents" legislation. 
In the private sector rent control was introduced to protect the 
tenant, but by 1970 most of the controlled rents were barely covering 
the cost of proper maintenance and insurance; tenants were therefore 
being subsidised by their landlords. The rent of private tenants 
subject to rent control had not changed since 1957 and was on average 
about 85 pence per week in the provinces and £1.50p per week in 
London (only controlled tenancies). Such low rent affected the 
condition of the housing stock of this sector of the housing market. 
If returns are low, then the standard of maintenance will be at a 
minimum. It was claimed therefore that if the then existing system 
continued, then the effort being devoted to the removal of the slums 
would be neutralised by the drift into slums of controlled dwellings. 
Tenants subject to rent regulation may have had their rents 
increased, but outside Birmingham, there was no help for those in 
111 
need if they were in full-time employment. I B" n lrmingham the 
Conservative controlled council under S" lr Frank Griffin introduced a 
scheme to subsidise private tenants. Clearly as long as there is a 
shortage of buildings to let, tenants will need to be protected by 
rent control and given security of tenure, yet both measures make 
landlords less willing to let property. The Rent Act of 1965 had, as 
briefly outlined above, attempted to create a system of "Fair Rents" 
for private rented accommodation, and the aim of the Conservative 
-Government was to introduce the p r i n c i p l ~ ~ of fair rents to local 
authority tenants. In consequence the two main sectors of the market 
for rented accommodation would for the first time be governed by one 
common principle - fair rents for all. 
Many council tenants did not consider the principle very 'fair' at 
all, and in places such as Derby, Clay Cross and Greenock opposition 
was mounted against the implementation of the 1972 Housing Finance 
Act. The principle adopted within the Housing Finance Act was one 
by which the rent of a council dwelling reflected its value by 
reference to its character, location, amenities and state of repair, 
but disregarding the value due to local shortage of similar 
accommodation. The idea was that council tenants would no longer 
be liable to increases resulting from the state of their authorities 
Housing Revenue Account (which was never supposed to show a debit 
balance; if it did, it had to be cleared from monies taken from the 
General Rate Fund). Of course the implementation of these proposals 
led to fierce debate in the local town halls and upset somewhat the 
council tenants most effected by the subsequent increases. 
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In the national context, the emphasis has moved 1°n post-war years 
from building houses mainly by local authorities - something like 
90% of houses built in 1949 were built by or for local authorities _ 
to one where in 1973 something like 35% of houses were built by or 
for local authorities. With Local Government reorganisation housing 
became the responsibility of the district councils and the natural 
"cut off" for this research appears to be with local government 
reorganisation. 
Broader Horizons 
In this chapter we have traced the emergence of public housing policy 
from its origins to Local Government reorganisation in 1974. 
National policy was originally concerned with environmental health 
problems, housing initially being an offshoot of sanitation and 
health policy. Private enterprise was seen as managing very well 
in building for letting and owner occupation. National policy was 
that private enterprise should not be offered the discouragement 
of local authority intervention. 
During the First World War, house building and house repairs were 
at a standstill. At this point, the great majority of houses were 
rented from private landlords. Few municipal dwellings were 
available: a proportion of houses were multi-occupied and sharing 
between parents and their married children was common. 
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At the end of the war the Coalition Government realised that changes 
had to be made and more local authority houses were built. Although 
the association between housing and public health remained, in that 
both were the responsibility of the Ministry of Health and would 
remain so until after the Second World War, housing was established 
as a need in its own right for which the government would take 
responsibility. During the inter-war years, the periodic increase 
and decrease in house construction partly reflected the ability and 
will of successive governments to provide. support to house 
construction in the 1930's to private homebuilding, by offering 
subsidies to private house builders to build low cost houses for 
sale. A variation on this idea was pursued between 1968 and 1972 
in Derby, when the Conservative Controlled Council, in conjunction 
with a local contractor, constructed houses for sale at cost price. 
The days of low-cost materials and labour which allowed a good return 
to the property investor, had passed with the First World War. There 
was a short period when these conditions reappeared briefly in the 
late 1930's. 
The end of the Second World War, like the end of the First, saw 
problems of housing need compounded by years in which no domestic 
building had taken place. By 1945, this had been aggravated by the 
loss of many houses through enemy action. Slum clearance once again, 
became a luxury which had to be postponed while all efforts were 
given to providing additional accommodation. During the immediate 
post-war years, a c o n s i d e r ~ b 1 e e amount of legislation affected all 
aspects of housing provision and environmental control and the 
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foundations were laid for many new developments in the ensuing 
years. 
Housing has become a major priority in its own right - the move from 
an environmental health issue to being a policy in its own right 
occurred in the inter-war years. During the period under review 
the demise of the private rented sector took place, and the emergence 
of the Local Government sector occurred. Local authorities 
subsequently became major providers of housing - providing 
approximately 32% of all dwellings by 1974. In the post war period 
they replaced the private landlord, much of whose property was 
cleared away in local authority sponsored slum clearance programmes. 
Thus, a relationship still exists between sanitory conditions, health 
and housing provision. This is possibly best illustrated today, 
through the policies relating to Rousing Action Areas (R.A.A.'s) and 
General Improvement Areas (G.I.A.'s). These policies concern 
.themselves with the rehabilitation and improvement of older 
properties. Recent concern has been shown over the use of resources 
and the debate has centred on slum clearance - new building or 
rehabilitation of existing properties. Inter-related to these 
policies are the problems of inner city decline and new developments 
on the periphery of cities leading to "urban sprawl". In an attempt 
to partially alleviate this problem, a new towns policy was adopted 
which became one of the main themes of Central Government housing 
policy in the 1950's and 1960's. Throughout the period there were 
changes in standards and levels of specification both for 
rehabilitation and for new housing, and also in the forms of 
assistance offered. 
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From the 1950's onwards the importance of the private owner 
occupation sector started to emerge. A number of factors encouraged 
this development including the abolition of schedule A taxation and 
the expansion of the building society movement thus increasing the 
availability of relatively low cost loans. Local authorities also 
made funds available for mortgages to house buyers, usually to those 
who either did not qualify for a building society loan either on 
account of personal circumstances or because of the type of property 
they were considering buying. The emphasis has moved between public 
and private sector as governments have changed, but the Labour party 
has come to accept owner occupation of homes as a policy which it 
is politically expedient to follow. Changes in housing tenure have 
resulted in owner occupation being the style of tenure occupied 
today by 56% of households, local authority housing by 32% with the 
remaining 12%, being catered for by the private rented sector and 
housing associations. 
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CHAPTER FOUR PICKING UP THE PIECES 1945-1951 
i) Background 
In this, and the following chapters, I wish to turn the emphasis 
from a national or "macro" context to the local or "micro" context , 
and examine the housing policies of two individual councils, namely 
Derby and Portsmouth, against the background of overall housing 
policy in Britain. Such a comparison is likely to be particularly 
enlightening since Derby has been predominantly Labour controlled 
in post-war years, whilst Portsmouth has been predominantly 
Conservative controlled. Their policies have as one might expect, 
diverged considerably over the years, and yet the two authorities 
were reacting to similar constraints and policy proposals from 
Central Government. By analysing the policies pursued by the two 
authorities I will attempt to assess the impact of both local 
political influences and also the emergence of local personalities 
upon policy outcomes. Both cities had been of strategic importance 
during World War II - Derby because of its Rolls Royce engine 
factories and aircraft assembly lines and Portsmouth because of its 
large naval dockyards. Both cities suffered from action by the enemy 
during the war and entered the post war years with acute housing 
problems. In addition, in Portsmouth, its geographical location 
served to put severe pressure on the available land - Portsmouth was 
still an island - Portsea Island - and clearly development would be 
limited to the island, unless land was made available on the 
mainland, beyond the council's domain. Portsmouth also faced a 
problem where men recruited by the Naval Authorities in other parts 
of Britain had married local girls and wished to remain in the city. 
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The cities are of similar populations today, as they were in 1945. 
(Derby 221,000, Portsmouth 230 000 , after Local Government 
reorganisation 1974). 
ii) Problems to Solve - Different Approaches 
At the end of World War Two Derby Town Council was controlled by the 
Labour Group and Portsmouth City Council by the Conservative Group. 
Both authorities faced acute housing problems, much of it as a result 
of aerial bombardment. Many of the houses were completely destroyed, 
and others severely damaged, leaving open spaces in built up areas. 
On 1st January 1945 there were 6,839 council houses in Derby and a 
waiting list of 2,814 applicants. (D.H.C. January 1945). In 
Portsmouth on the same date in excess of 7,000 houses had been 
destroyed by enemy action, there were 3,309 council houses and flats 
and in excess of 11,000 families on the council's housing list. 
(P.H.C. October 1945). 
In both authorities the respective housing committees were chaired by 
senior members of their parties. In Portsmouth the chairman of the 
Housing Committee was Councillor Clifton who was a builder by trade. 
He had been chairman during the war years when of course the 
committee had a less active role and he was to play an important role 
in post-war Local Government in Portsmouth. In Derby, Alderman 
Flint, who was a leading solicitor in the town was chairman of the 
Housing Committee. Indeed he held this position until 1968, when the 
ruling Labour group was defeated in the elections for a new town 
council, following the extension of the town's boundaries. Alderman 
Flint was therefore to play a highly significant role in the 
determination of post-war housing policy in Derby. 
121 
Both authorities recognised the need for comprehensive rehousing 
and house building programmes to cope with their acute problems. 
Initially their approaches were similar, namely the provision of 
temporary accommodation in requisitioned properties - usually large 
houses - and "hutments". This policy was the cause of much concern 
in later years, since both local authorities were slow to rehouse 
tenants in such accommodation, when permanent accommodation became 
more readily available. Fairly quickly, however, the two cities 
diverged. Derby Town Council gave priority to the housing of 
families in permanent accommodation as soon as possible, and plans 
were devised in the immediate post-war years for the building of 
large estates of traditional three bedroomed semis on the periphery 
of the town for rent to families. In portsmouth, on the other hand, 
as early as March 1948, the councillors were suggesting that houses 
should be built to a standard capable of being sold off. (P.H.C. 
March 1948). Here we see early signs of Conservative philosophy 
coming to the fore. Despite the acute housing problems in Portsmouth 
and the severe overcrowding being experienced by some families, some 
of the councillors were even then planning for the sale of houses. 
This might be considered either foresight or dogma depending upon 
the political stance taken. It was certainly not within the 
intentions of the Labour Central Government of the day. Further 
evidence of divergencies at this time can be cited. Whereas in 
Derby, the town council planned to build all the new dwellings with 
its own direct labour, the Portsmouth Planning and Reconstruction 
Committee had -discussed the allocation of a portion of the Paulsgrove 
Estate for development by private enterprise. (p.e.e. June 1945). A 
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resolution was passed after a suggestion by the City Planning 
Officer, that provision should be made for the building of 
approximately 850 dwellings by private e t . d n erprlse an approximately 
1,100 by the council, and that the shops on the estate should also be 
erected by private enterprise and not by the council. The council 
resolved that there was a need to move away from the "council house 
image" (P.C.C. June 1945). It is therefore possible to contrast the 
standpoints of the two authorities e v e n ~ i n n the early post-war years. 
In Derby, the council adopted an almost paternalistic standpoint of 
"providing" accommodation and planning the provision of 
accommodation. In Portsmouth, the council made a more limited 
provision, and placed a greater emphasis on the role of the private 
sector. 
A further objective identified by Portsmouth City Council in the 
early post-war years, was to strengthen the industrial base of the 
local economy, and to reduce the locality's dependence upon the Naval 
Dockyards for employment. Derby, on the other hand, has always had a 
relatively wide industrial base, although, in a similar way to 
Portsmouth, it had dominent employers - namely Rolls Royce Limited, 
London, Midland and Scottish Railways - later British Railways, 
British Celanese - later Coutaulds P.L.C. and a whole range of 
engineering and textile companies. Much of the local industry had 
benefitted from the "war effort"; aircraft were for instance 
manufactured in the railway workshops, literally across the road 
from the main Rolls Royce aero-engine factory. The local economy was 
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very buoyant, and so unlike Portsmouth, the town council did not 
see the need to broaden the employment base. Despite the shortage 
of land in Portsmouth, the city council allocated 1900 units of land 
for industrial use and 400 units for business premises. The city 
council was attempting to provide more than houses within the 
redevelopment programme, and indeed as we shall see later , 
incorporated a scheme for housing key workers in new industries. 
The key workers scheme became very unpopular with those on the 
housing waiting list since they saw outsiders "queue jumping", and 
because tenants housed under the scheme had to pay the "economic 
rent" irrespective of income. Thus the policy of Portsmouth City 
Council towards new industry could be seen as adding to the housing 
problems in the city by taking up scarce land, and by housing people 
who were moving into the area, whilst failing to re-house those 
already in the city living in overcrowded conditions. 
The problems of overcrowding and homelessness was very much to the 
fore in the minds of the national politicians when in 1948, the 
Government issued circular 171/48. This circular required local 
authorities to re-calculate and revise their housing waiting lists. 
In Derby the number of applicants had risen to 6,553 and the housing 
committee approved the recommendations that those whose names were 
also listed with other housing authorities should have their names 
removed. (D.H.C. January 1949). In Portsmouth the housing committee 
required all applicants to re-register. A total of 15,119 forms 
were sent out, of which 9630 were not returned, 1,060 applications 
were withdrawn, 125 returned "gone away" and 271 represented aged 
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persons on a separate list. Ultimately the new housing list was 
reduced to 5,964. (P.H.C. March 1948). 
By December 31st 1950 there were 6,977 applicants on the housing 
list in Derby and 9,274 dwellings were occupied (P.R.C. January 
1951). In Portsmouth, the housing situation was still acute and 
on the 19th October 1949 the City Treasurer reported that there were 
1,717 families registered on the housing list with 20 points or more. 
He pointed out to the committee that there were "thousands of 
families" with less than 20 points who warranted re-housing and the 
committee "would not be justified in thinking that there were less 
than 2,000 deserving cases". (P. R.C. October 1949). The shortage 
of suitable land for housing use was becoming a serious problem, 
and land allocated for use as allotments on the Paulsgrove Estate 
was returned to the Housing Committee for development use as was 
land reserved for open spaces at Paulsgrove. 
Recognition of the housing problem in Portsmouth by the newly elected 
Conservative Government is indicated by the fact that the Ministry 
of Housing and Local Government authorised not only the development 
of Leigh Park, but also an additional 450 homes. (P.R.C. November 
1951). Further recognition of Portsmouth's problem was made when 
Mr Harold MacMillan visited the city on 11th January 1952. 
Mr MacMillan said that blitzed cities had problems and that he 
considered housing to be a joint enterprise between Central and Local 
Government. He said that the problem was not one of money, but a 
shortage of materials; steel had to be "allocated"; demand far 
iii) 
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exceeded supply. The shortage of building materials emerged as a 
new problem in Portsmouth to hinder the house building programme, 
just as the land was becoming available. Similar problems faced 
most local authorities, although in varying degrees. Derby, with 
its more traditional building styles was not affected by the steel 
shortage, but by a shortage of timber; pre-cast concrete floors 
were used to overcome this problem and minimise delay • 
. --
The major problem facing all local authorities in 1945 was the one 
of knowing where and how to restart their authorities' house building 
and repair programmes, with an ever increasing housing waiting list. 
Portsmouth appears at first glance to have been better prepared than 
Derby, since it had established in 1940 a Reconstruction and 
Redevelopment Committee which had the task of devising a master plan 
when peace arrived. Derby Town Council did not have this foresight. 
No Easy Solutions 
In February 1945 Derby Town Council discussed the erection of 
temporary housing and in October 1945 an investigation was carried 
out into the use of "Trusteel" houses, which was one of many types 
of prefabricated buildings becoming available; 148 dwellings were 
ordered and erected the following May (D.H.C. October 1945). Derby 
were never, however, strong supporters of prefabs. 
In portsmouth, at this time temporary houses were also being 
discussed and sites were allocated at Alexandra Park, Bransbury Park, 
and Milton Park. Portsmouth moreover, drew up ambitious plans for 
126 
the use of prefabrication, deciding that 1900 houses on the 
Paulsgrove Estate should be of prefabricated construction, and 
that throughout the city:-
460 units should be constructed in 1946 by prefabrication 
1,440 units should be constructed in 1947 by prefabrication 
2,700 units should be constructed in 1948 by prefabrication. 
Temporary housing was seen as a stop gap solution by both 
authorities. However, the political stances of the two authorities 
came through even at this time of great need. As was stressed in 
Derby, the concern was with the long term housing of families in 
traditional semis; in Portsmouth it was with the maximisation of 
the use of land for both housing and commerce. 
The priorities for the allocation of accommodation in Portsmouth 
were determined after discussing a confidential report at the Housing 
Committee Meeting held on 19th June 1945. At this meeting the 
committee decided that the priorities for the allocation of 
accommodation should be:-
1) Bombed out families. 
2) Overcrowding; medical cases; including discharged unfit 
3) 
4) 
5) 
servicemen - 5/20 points. 
Requisitioned houses (owners returning) 
Evacuated families. 
Servicemen and newly married couples - those married since 
1939. 
6) Aged couples. 
7) General - no priority. 
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The immediate object of the list was to decide on the allocation 
of temporary houses when completed, but it clearly indicates the 
councils' priorities in housing those on its waiting list. 
Overcrowding was particularly acute in Portsmouth. When the council 
asked the owners of furniture - which they were storing since the 
owners had been affected by the war - to take it back, many replied 
saying they did not have accommodation in which to put the furniture 
(P.C.C. June 1945). In September 1945 ~ h e e Minister of Health stated 
that Portsmouth City Council could not use parks for temporary 
housing, although the city council had plans for 1400 temporary 
units of accommodation and was faced with an acute shortage of 
suitable sites. 
A private report was compiled for Portsmouth City Council by the 
Town Clerk, City Treasurer, City Engineer, City Architect, and City 
Planning Officer as a result of circular 182/45 which outlined views 
of the Minister of Health in relation to the provision of permanent 
prefabricated houses ie. early forms of system building (P.C.C. 
November 1945). The officers recommended that permanent house 
supplies could be expanded by the use of prefabrication since less 
on site labour was required. Portsmouth City Council also decided 
that in order to maximise the use of land available, private houses 
should be e r ~ c t e d d on sites from which bombed houses had been removed. 
(P.H.C. November 1945). This again reflects the council's political 
perspective since the decision was taken despite the council's 
shortage of building sites. 
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Derby's response to circular 182/45 resulted in a proposal being 
put forward by the Chief Architect that permanent prefabricated 
houses be constructed. But the proposal failed on the grounds that 
they were too expensive compared with houses being built using 
conventional methods of construction. (D.H.C. September 1946). 
On 17th December 1945, the City Treasurer - who was responsible for 
Housing Administration in Portsmouth presented a report to the 
Housing Committee reviewing the "Points" scheme in association with 
housing applications. The report indicated that in Portsmouth the 
residence qualification was applied more keenly than the Minister 
of Health wished. This had the effect reducing the waiting list 
to 8,329 applicants. However, additionally there were 1,511 families 
accommodated in requisitioned properties constituting a further 
potential demand for houses in the future. The City Treasurer stated 
the greatest demand was for 2 bedroomed properties (P.H.C. December 
1945) although this was contrary to the desires of Central Government 
who urged local authorities to construct 3 bedroomed family 
accommodation. The government's concern for this is reflected by 
the fact that a proposal to erect old peoples' bungalows on a new 
housing estate (Chaddesden Hall) on the outskirts of Derby, then 
in course of erection, was refused, whilst a plan to build 105 
"prefabs" was approved. The ambitious plans of both authorities 
were in fact curtailed by the national shortage of building material. 
This shortage is reflected in the fact that both Housing Committees 
received an "instruction" from the Ministry of Health stating that 
in future "solid floors" should be used in the construction of all 
ground floors. 
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An assessment of the respective speeds of development in the two 
cities can be made if a comparison is made of the dates on which 
the 1,OOOth unit of accommodation was completed. In Portsmouth this 
date was 21st March 1947 (P.H.C. March 1947) in Derby it was 15th 
January 1948 (D.H.C. January 1948),in both cities though accommoda-
tion consisting of houses, prefabs, and temporary accommodation. 
In Derby plans were well advanced for large housing estates to be 
constructed on the outskirts of the town .at Chaddesden Hall (North 
East of Derby) and at Mackworth (North West of Derby). These two 
projects were to become the two major housing schemes in the 1950's 
in the public sector, and the area north of Derby was destined to 
become the largest single housing project in the public sector in the 
area. 
Portsmouth's housing programme was certainly gathering momentum by 
11th November 1947. The approved programme was for 3,684 new housing 
units comprising the 1,400 temporary bungalows, 92 converted camp 
dwellings and 2,192 permanent dwellings. By 8th November 1947, 1,970 
new home units had been completed for occupation and 1,641 were under 
construction. The rate of construction can be seen in th following 
table. 
July - December 1945 98 houses Average 3 per week 
December 1946 740 houses Average 20 per week January -
- November 1947 1,132 houses Average 25 per week January 
1,970 
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During August, September and October of 1947, houses were completed 
at the rate of 8 per day or nearly 50 per week. Portsmouth had 
completed more new dwellings than any other town in the six counties I 
of the Southern Region. (P.H.C. November 1949). Out of the 1,469 
housing authorities in England and Wales, Portsmouth's construction 
rate made it eighth. 
Like Derby, Portsmouth had opted to develop virgin sites, namely 
Paulsgrove and Leigh Park, both sites being north of the city. The 
Leigh Park site was really an overspill of Portsmouth into the 
neighbouring urban district of Havant, and as we shall see in the 
next chapter, its completion led to a souring of the relationship 
between Havant, D.D.C., Hampshire County Council and Portsmouth 
City Council. However, Portsmouth Council was quite desperate for 
development land like Derby, had little alternative at that time 
- but to develop in areas negotiated with other local authorities, 
and designated by Hampshire County Council. In the 1950's and 1960's 
the only other alternative solution was to build high rise flats, 
but these presented their own problems. 
Within two years of taking over the Paulsgrove site of 358 acres, 
the roads and sewers were laid throughout the estate, 560 houses 
were completed and 1,244 were in various stages of construction. 
The problems of such rapid development are highlighted by the fact 
that in January 1948 it was reported that difficulties were being 
experienced in the educating of primary children moving to the 
Paulsgrove Estate, 175 junior pupils were being transported to 
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schools in other parts of the city and it was suggested that the 
number would increase over the following months. The education 
committee proposed to erect 10 temporary classrooms on land allocated 
for a community centre, since finance was not available for the 
community centre, and this proposal was agreed. (P.R.C. January 
1948). 
To meet the growing demand for houses, in Derby, the Mackworth Estate 
was started in May 1950. The construction was initially carried 
out by private contractors - notably George Wimpey & Company, in 
contrast to Derby's earlier practice of using direct labour. This 
would appear to be a little surprising for a Labour controlled 
authority, but the council had experienced difficulty in recruiting 
skilled labour to its direct labour force. The rate of development 
was quite rapid, for some 532 units were projected to be completed 
by the end of 1951. (D.R.C. September 1950). In March and April 
1951, additional contracts were awarded to Wimpeys to further the 
development. The gestation period for the Mackworth Estate had been 
quite lengthy, some three years, but the estate was destined to 
become one of the largest local authority housing schemes in the 
Midlands, housing some 20,000 people. During the planning stages, 
the complete road layout had been completed. Provision had been 
made for adequate infrastructure, shops, churches, schools, public 
houses, and for public transport network to be developed at the same 
time as the estate rather than after the estate. Clearly the 
f H lth had been considerate to Derby in allowing such a Ministry 0 ea 
large scheme to go ahead, but there were a number of reasons for 
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this. There was for instance a plentiful supply of land which could 
easily be developed. The workforce of Derby was in the main engaged 
in what were then classified as strategic industries - aero engines, 
railways, and munitions. Perhaps most important of all the chairman 
of the Housing Committee for the town was a highly articulate lawyer, 
a man who could argue a good case for his town. Possibly too the 
Central Government was sympathetic to a Labour controlled authority. 
In Portsmouth in June 1949 the City Architect reported to Portsmouth 
Housing Committee that he anticipated completions on the five main 
sites in the following manner:-
1949 
1950 
1951 
1952 
711 
389 
456 
380 
The City Architect concluded that the housing programme so far as 
the local authority was concerned was rapidly declining and that 
the years 1950, 1951 and 1952 would reflect the absence of new sites 
for development. 
In March 1950, the City Architect reported that 1,000 homes would 
be contracted for during 1950, but that the difficulty lay in the 
future programme especially with regard to the provision of suitable 
sites. It was pointed out that the problem would remain until the 
City's boundaries were extended, and that until then, the council 
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would have to rely upon the neighbouring urban district councils 
of Fareham and Ravant for the provision of sites. For instance, 
it was decided to acquire 40 dwellings from Pitassi and Son (32 
houses and 8 bungalows) at Waterlooville - outside the city boundary 
(P.R.C. March 1950). The council a few weeks later negotiated to 
purchase a further 252 homes from the same builder - the houses 
having been built as a speculative development. (P.R.C. May 1951). 
The council started to make use of the powers granted to them under 
circular 92/46 which allowed them to contract local builders to 
construct properties for sale to the local housing authority at a 
price inclusive of land and drainage provision. The intention of 
the circular was to allow local housing authorities to buy small 
numbers of dwellings to let to families on their housing list. 
Portsmouth however made extensive use of the powers and in September 
1950 agreed to the development of an estate of 400 houses under the 
terms of circular 92/46 by R.E. Collins Ltd. Despite the acute 
shortage of land in the city, the housing committee decided to 
proceed with the construction of 34 houses for Righer Income Groups -
18 - 4 bedroomed houses and 16 - 3 bedroomed houses on the Paulsgrove 
Estate. (P.R.C. July 1950). The council was also allocating a 
number of houses to key workers - ie. employees of companies 
operating locally, with skills which could not be recruited locally, 
or key workers in companies new to the area. The city council, as 
stressed earlier, used housing as a "bait" to new employers. Thus 
it can be seen that there were significant tensions in the housing 
policy pursued in Portsmouth. On the one hand there was a pressing 
need for housing accommodation; on the other a pursuit of a policy 
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granting houses to key workers in industry and building larger houses 
for higher income groups. The attraction of new industries and new 
employers to Portsmouth had considerable success. Today-
electronics and computers have been added to its industrial base 
to offset the reduction of employment in the Dockyards. Thus such 
a policy can be justified with hindsight, but at the time of 
implementation the authority was taking a calculated risk. The 
building of high income group properties is more difficult to defend, 
except that it should allow for a greater social mix and a breaking 
down of the "ghettoes" syndrome. One might however suggest that 
families in the higher income groups are likely to want to buy their 
own home and certainly they are likely to be in a position to be 
able to do so. In Portsmouth, in short, there was a move away from 
the Labour Government's overwhelming priority of housing families 
adequately. 
iv) A Change of Government - New Targets Set 
During 1951 a general election took place which resulted in the 
return of a Conservative Government. One of the principle election 
promises made by the Conservatives at the time of the general 
election campaign was that a minimum of 300,000 houses would be 
constructed per annum. It was mainly by a major effort by the public 
sector that this figure was achieved in 1953 when a total of 238,883 
were built by local authorities nationally. Of this total 858 were 
built in Derby and 1,113 in Portsmouth. (Housing Statistics for 1953 
I.M.T.A.). The peak construction year for public authority building 
in Derby was a year behind the national peak, coming in 1954, when 
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234,973 houses were built by all local authorities, and 934 were 
built in Derby, with 1,680 being built in Portsmouth. (Rousing 
Statistics 1954 I.M.T.A.). 
During the period 1951-1954 a rapid acceleration took place in the 
housing programme of Portsmouth City Council. Councillor Miles, 
a dairy farmer was guiding the housing policy, (as chairman of the 
housing committee). The housing committee continued to rely on 
private building contractors for the construction of their properties 
rather than the use of a direct labour force. The council was 
showing increasing interest in the development of accommodation units 
in flats - even for old aged pensioners - for instance 36 flats for 
O.A.P.s in Lancaster Street/ Duke Street development to be built by 
Jones & Co Ltd for £46,172 (P.R.C. July 1951). At this time 444 
units of accommodation were under construction. Further development 
of the Leigh Park estate was proposed and meetings took place with 
representatives of Rampshire County Council to discuss the Portsmouth 
overspill problem. Several Ministry of Local Government officials 
also attended the meeting including Dame Evelyn Sharp who chaired it 
(P.R.C. July 1951). Since it was becoming apparent to the City 
Architect that large areas of land were likely to become available 
for development in the near future, the City Architect made a 
comparison of the costs of traditional houses with the non-
traditional system built houses. Re reported that the average cost 
of a traditional house was £1,508 (29s/£1.45 per square foot) and 
non-traditional £1,586 (30/3d [£1.51p] per square foot) (P.R.C. 
September 1951). The committee was being prepared for a large 
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increase in the rate of development. At the same meeting it was 
agreed to construct a further 96 flats at Leigh Park for a total cost 
of £130,430 to be built by Faulkners Ltd (P.H.C. September 1951). 
The shortage of suitable land for development was now so acute that 
the Housing Committee decided to purchase a planned development of 
252 houses at Bedhampton, eight miles north east of Portsmouth. The 
city were able to do this under circular 92/46 even though the 
builder - Pitassi and Son was not willing to provide securities in 
connection with the contract. The company had however already 
completed satisfactorily two other contracts without securities. 
(P.H.C. September 1951). The City Planning Officer reported that 
there existed approximately 800 building plots in the city suitable 
for private development. (P.R.C. September 1951). In November 1951 
the City Housing Committee agreed to allocate sufficient land to the 
"Portsmouth and Southsea Self-Build Housing Society Ltd" for the 
erection of 34 council house type dwellings to be occupied by 34 
members. (P.H.C. November 1951). The authority still had tenants 
housed in temporary accommodation in various parts of the city, 
including Bedhampton Camp, which was a collection of former army 
huts. The tenants at Bedhampton Camp were extremely dissatisfied 
with their living conditions and the City Treasurer in a report on 
the camp, indicated difficulties in letting such accommodation. 
However, the Housing Committee instructed the City Treasurer that the 
huts should be let as early as possible, although rehousing of 
tenants from Bedhampton should be stepped up from one family per week 
to two per week; huts which the City Architect felt unfit for further 
habitation should be pulled down although he was authorised to spend 
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money on the maintenance of those with further useful life. The City 
Treasurer was instructed to notify the committee of any "undesirable 
family" which had reached the point when they were due for rehousing, 
the facts to be placed before the committee prior to any allocation 
of accommodation. (P.R.C. November 1951). 
Recognition of the housing problem in Portsmouth by the Government 
is indicated by the fact that the Ministry of Rousing and Local 
Government authorised not only the development of Leigh Park, but 
also an additional 450 houses. (P.R.C. November 1951). 
On January 11th 1952, Mr Raro1d MaCMillan, the then Minister of 
Rousing, visited Portsmouth as part of his programme of visits to 
assess housing redevelopment progress. The implications and impact 
of this visit are discussed later in this chapter. Following 
Mr MaCMillan's visit, he wrote to the Rousing Committee on 
30th January 1952 urging the authority to speed up their house 
building programme, expediting those under construction and tender 
and asking for the programme to be expanded over the next 2/3 years 
and to make the necessary plans. The letter was received without 
any formal reply being made. (P.R.C. January 1952). 
Two weeks later the allocation of houses was increased to 1,000 
houses for 1952 from 450, with a promise of further increases 
depending upon progress made. The Rousing Committee merely noted 
these facts. (P.R.C. February 1952). It can be seen therefore that 
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considerable pressure was being placed upon the Housing Committee 
by the Ministry of Housing and Local Government, to improve the rate 
of rehousing of people in Portsmouth. Such pressure met with little 
initial response, since the Committee members felt that they were 
progressing as quickly as circumstances permitted. 
In April 1952 though, the Principal Regional Officer, Major-General 
Coxwell-Rogers, addressed the Housing Committee and stated that there 
was a need to ensure continuity of work for contractors, since this 
would aid the speeding up of housing projects. The Regional Officer 
stated that there were a number of designs not known to the committee 
including 2, 3, and 4 bedroomed houses and there was at least one 
contractor prepared to take on schemes comprising a proportion of 
non-traditional and a proportion of traditional properties. This 
comment was for the benefit of the City Architect who was against 
the development of whole areas of non-traditional housing, and given 
the choice, preferred to have developments of traditional housing. 
Members of the Housing Committee made reference to the difficulty 
of supplies of building materials - particularly of cast iron pipes 
for public utilities. The Principal Regional Officer stated that he 
would contact the Regional Officer concerned and they would short 
circuit the problems. The Regional Architect also attended the 
meeting and he stated that he did not object to the principle of 
negotiated contracts, (another of the City Architects policies) as 
long as there was a satisfactory basis on which to judge the price. 
He said he would prefer to see the council employ one large 
contractor who could bring in outside labour and ensure continuity of 
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production. As a result of the discussions with the Principal 
Regional Officer and the Regional Architect, which took place during 
their visit on 17th April 1952, the Housing Committee decided to: 
1. draw up draft plans for the whole of Leigh Park 
2. invite tenders for the construction of non-traditional houses, 
including the installation of all services. 
In May 1952, a Special Sub-Committee was formed for non-traditional 
housing. Land was allocated at Barncroft Farm for 450 houses. 
(P.H.C. May 1952). In November 1952 George Wimpey & Co Ltd 
successfully tendered for the contract to develop the estate, to 
comprise 420 "No Fines" houses for £536,702 plus £91,165 for the 
roads. (P.H.C. November 1952). 
In April 1952 the City Architect for Portsmouth presented a housing 
plan to the Housing Committee for the years 1953-1973 - see appendix 
1. The report outlined the critical shortage of housing, indicated 
by a waiting list in excess of 12,500 families, by an anticipated 
natural increase in population, by the need for housing clearance 
and by the need for the replacing of temporary accommodatIon. The 
City Architect reported that a total of 18,000 units of accommodation 
would be required between 1953 and 1973. 
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A target was set for the period 1953-1958:-
1st April 1953 500 
1st April 1954 800 
1st April 1955 1,100 
1st April 1956 1,500 
1st April 1957 1,500 
1st April 1958 1,500 
6,900 
For the subsequent 15 year period the City Architect suggested an 
average development rate of 740 per annum ie. 11,100 dwellings for 
15 years - thus a shortfall of 400 units. (P.H.C. April 1953). 
In Derby, the Housing Committee were more willing to use methods 
of system building ie. non-traditional methods as a way of meeting 
their housing needs. The Chief Architect wrote a very favourable 
report on non-traditional housing methods of construction. (D.H.C. 
January 1949). As early as January 1950 the housing committee agreed 
to the building of 150 "No Fines" houses from George Wimpey and 
Company of a type similar to those adopted by Portsmouth some two 
years later. ("No Fines" construction used prefabricated sections 
as the external cladding, and did not require sand/cement mortar 
or "fines" - hence the term "No Fines".) Further contracts were 
placed with Wimpey's for such dwellings and large estates were 
developed at Chaddesden - North East of Derby, and Mackworth, North 
West of Derby, of Wimpey "No Fines" dwellings and by 31st December 
1951 532 "No Fires" dwellings had been completed on the two estates 
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(D.H.C. December 1951). In March 1952 a further 200 houses were 
contracted for the Mackworth Estate, although 100 of them were to 
be built by Wimpey, 100 were contracted from a rival company - Wates 
at £10 per house more, costing £128,000 compared with £127,000 
contract from Wimpeys, although Wimpeys reduced their price by 
£12,000 because of pressure put on them by Derby Town Council (D.H.C. 
March 1932). In November 1952 a further 100 "No Fines" houses were 
contracted from Wimpey's, as part of the additional development of 
1,200 houses on the Mackworth Estate; 300 of the remainder, were it 
was decided, to be built by direct labour, (D.H.C. November 1952) a 
type of development not undertaken in Portsmouth, and reflecting a 
difference in political ideals. The move to direct labour was 
followed with a further allocation of 200 houses to the authority's 
building department, again to be built on the Mackworth Estate, 
alongside 140 houses contracted to Vic Hallam Limited. (D.H.C. May 
1953). Thus it can be seen that the momentum in Derby's housing 
programme was gained by concentrating on the development of two large 
estates, estates so large, that they were ultimately to become 
suburbs of the town in their own right. The council in Derby refused 
to build houses to rent out to higher income groups. They had in 
Portsmouth from 1948, only to find such properties difficult to let. 
Again unlike Portsmouth Derby would not pursue a policy of levying 
economic rents, rather the reverse: the rents charged were 
relatively modest for the period and were subsidised on average by 
£7.35p per dwelling from the rates. (D.H.C. May 1953). These 
factors again reflect differences in political beliefs. Derby was 
fortunate compared with Portsmouth in having a sizeable "land bank" 
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which it could use for development relatively easily, for in addition 
to the Mackworth and Chaddesden estates, in June 1952 the council 
sought compulsory purchase orders for the purchase of land for far 
more schemes:-
1. 204 acres between Breadsall and Chaddesden. 
2. 56 acres between Alvaston and Bolton. 
3. 54 acres at Sunny Hill - Oaklands Avenue. 
4. 61 acres at Wilson Road, Littlover. 
Ministry approval was given for schemes 1 and 2, but refused for 
scheme 4 and deferred for scheme 3. (D.H.C. June 1953). Despite 
the approval of the first two schemes, in June 1953 the Ministry 
of Housing and Local Government refused to approve tenders for a 
further 200 houses at Alvaston because of the need to keep a balance 
in the supply of materials likely to be available both nationally 
and regionally. (D.H.C. June 1953). This contrasts sharply with 
the attitude being adopted towards Portsmouth City Council, who were 
being cajoled into building more houses. During the period 1st 
January 1953-30th June 1953, 455 houses were completed by the 
authority (D.H.C. June 1953), and 858 during the whole year - so 
clearly the effect of the Ministry's decision was to slow down the 
building programme in Derby, since there would normally have been 
more completions in the second half of the year than the first half, 
peaking around September. The committee started to concern itself 
with the infra-structure of the two large estates at Mackworth and 
Chaddesden, in order to ensure that adequate shopping, medical and 
social facilities were developed. The receipt of notification from 
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the Ministry of Housing and Local Government that as from 20th 
December 1953 controls would be removed from the selling of council 
houses was received with markedly less enthusiasm than it was in 
Portsmouth, to the extent that nothing was done about it. (D.H.C. 
December 1958). 
v) Cut the Costs 
The approved costs of new buildings in 1946 for Derby varied between 
£951 for a two bedroomed dwelling to £1,2.07 for a four bedroomed 
dwelling, compared with a negotiated price of £1,200 for three 
bedroomed dwellings. (D.H.C. December 1946). This price was re-
negotiated at the insistance of the Ministry of Health and reduced to 
a nationally agreed price with the contractor of £1,054 (D.H.C. 
December 1946). 
Contracts were let by Portsmouth City Council for 1,000 units of 
prefabricated permanent dwellings at £1,740 per unit - well above 
the Ministry of Health cost yardstick, and also well above the 
yardstick for traditionally built houses at costs ranging between 
£1,214 and £1,592. These contract figures were well in excess of 
the national guideline figures and could to a certain extent be 
accounted for by the acute local shortage of building operatives. 
Contractors had to bring in skilled workers and pay for their lodging 
expenses, a factor which did not arise in Derby on the same scale. 
In March 1949, at the suggestion of the Ministry of Health 
consideration was given to the construction of two bedroomed houses. 
Ministry officials visited the town and suggested that the most 
144 
economical way of providing two bedroomed accommodation was by the 
erection of small flatted types - four in a block, somewhat similar 
to pre-war masionettes. They claimed that such units could be erected 
for less than £1,000 per unit, compared with the £1,200 plus cost 
of the two bedroomed houses being built in Derby. The Ministry of 
Health was clearly becoming alarmed at the rising costs of houses 
as is shown by the correspondence between the officials at central 
and local levels. In addition, amendments were being made to 
proposals for developments before loan sanction was approved. The 
rising costs necessitated increased rents, but possibly there was 
more to the problem than the Ministry's concern - that of the 
Treasury also. No significant demand however had been identified 
for this particular type of accommodation, and indeed, as we shall 
see in subsequent chapters, there was considerable resistance to 
such accommodation from those on the waiting list. The local 
authority held the view that housing provision, when made should 
be of an acceptable standard. 
In Portsmouth, the demand for two bedroomed houses, had been 
identified, and was in fact increasing, although in the main, the 
provision was still being made via three bedroomed accommodation. 
In March 1948 Portsmouth City Council gave consideration to three 
bedroomed houses serving the needs of two families because the 
immediate need in the city was for two bedroomed accommodation and 
not the three bedroomed houses being constructed. The City Architect 
was not in favour of such conversions and stated that the properties 
were not suitable for such modifications. (P.H.C. March 1948). 
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It is clear that the cost of future schemes, and the outcomes of 
such schemes were beginning to be more carefully scrutinised by 
Central Government, and that this scrutiny was affecting the 
implementation of proposals. At a special meeting of the Portsmouth 
Housing Committee with the Regional Housing Officer, the Regional 
Officer told the members that housing costs could and should be 
reduced. The Regional Officer made a comparison between housing 
costs in Portsmouth and Havant (neighbouring authorities). The 
figures produced showed that it was approximately £300 per dwelling 
more expensive to make provision in Portsmouth than Havant. (P.C.C. 
October 1948). Mr Dye of the Federation of Masterbuilders claimed 
that delay was the main reason for higher costs, whilst the City 
Architect stated that interior fittings, inclusion of porches and 
reinforced concrete foundations were the cause, and he said that 
if costs were reduced, size would also have to be reduced. 
Councillor Schofield said that it was a question of how far 
specification could be reduced without reducing standards of 
habitable living space. Interestingly, he stated that they had to 
consider a house which would be able to be placed on the market 
should they desire to sell and which would produce the market value 
of houses at that particular time. (P.C.C. October 1948). His 
statement was quite interesting at a time of acute housing need, but 
reflects an underlying ideology. 
Portsmouth City Council was indeed reluctant to reduce the standards 
of the fittings in their properties and did not feel able to 
compromise themselves. One may question whether this was because 
of their desire to provide first class accommodation for their 
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tenants, or whether it was so as to pursue political ideals at some 
later stage - or possibly it was a combination of the two. 
The city council was again reminded of the need to be cost conscious 
in March 1949. (P.C.C. March 1949). The City Architect again 
repeated that "a reduction in standards is the key to reduced costs 
so long as present building costs are maintained". (P.C.C. March 
1949). The City Architect stated that non-traditional houses set a 
high standard of interior design and greatly influenced the design of 
traditional house types. This in turn led to increased costs. He 
stated that the council gained nothing from negotiated contracts, and 
was in fact very critical of the standard of work and practices of 
such schemes. In his general observations he said - Traditionally 
constructed brick houses are being dispersed in groups on the site in 
order to obtain some measure of variety amid a preponderance of 
standardisation. (P.C.C. March 1949). 
It is clear therefore, that before the Minister of Health took formal 
powers under circular 102/49 to require local authorities to cut 
costs, means of persuasion were used by the Ministry through the 
officials' working relationship with chief officers of local 
authorities. Circular 102/49 stated that the housing programme 
should be r e d u ~ e d d nationally by £35 million. The letter stated that 
the government would:-
, 
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'see that the reduction in the number of new authorities 
is made in accordance with a proper regard to priorities. 
By reducing the number of licences issued for the erection 
of houses by private persons, we shall secure that the local 
authority programme for the building of houses to let can 
proceed without any marked reduction'. 
(Circular 102/49. Ministry of Health, December 1949) 
The Labour Government of the day were therefore restricting the 
private sector of the housing industry to allow room for local 
authority housing programmes, however this assumption is questionable 
since in Portsmouth only 12 dwellings were constructed for private 
sale in 1949 and only 6 dwellings in Derby. However, 67 private 
dwellings had been granted final licenses in Derby, and in June 1949 
application had been made to the Ministry of Health for an additional 
300 private building licenses by Portsmouth City Council. (p.e.e. 
June 1949). It is interesting to note that both authorities no doubt 
partly because of consultations with the Ministry of Health, 
considered the erection of two bedroomed properties as a way of 
reducing development costs. The demand at the time was for such 
accommodation, but clearly as many couples started families, such 
accommodation would become inadequate, and since local authority 
properties are invariably incapable of extension, such a policy can 
be questioned. Likewise, the policy of all three bedroomed 
properties can be questioned. What was required was a proportional 
mix of properties, something which Portsmouth appears to have 
attempted, certainly until cost cutting was required, building 1 
bedroomed accommodation, 2, 3 and 4 bedroomed accommodation as well. 
In Derby, the local authority, followed much closer the policy of 
Central Government, providing "family accommodation" ie. 3 bedroomed 
semis. They decided to reduce costs by building 3 bedroomed 
accommodation in terraces instead of as semis. 
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vi Preparing for a Sale 
At the Portsmouth Housing Committee meeting held on 23rd April 1952 -
the one at which the City Architect presented his Report on Housing 
1953-1973 discussed above - an application was considered from a 
Mr R. Stray who wished to purchase his council house. The Chief 
Estates Officer submitted his observations that the value with vacant 
possession would be £1,200; if sold with a tenant in possession 
£600, and he suggested that it be offered the tenant for £750. It 
was decided to defer consideration until after the promised 
instructions from the Ministry of Housing and Local Government on the 
sale of local authority houses had been received. (P.R.C. April 
1952). 
On 15th September 1952 a special sub-committee was formed to deal 
with the sale of council houses. The sub-committee resolved:-
1. that in order not to restrict the number of homes for letting, 
sales would be made only to tenants or businesses of 
requisitioned property. 
2. that repayments should be based upon an annuity at the rate 
of interest appropriate to similar advances under the Small 
Dwellings Aquisitions Acts (at ~ % % above the rate at which the 
council could borrow from the Public Works Loan Board). 
3. the period of repayment to be a maximum of 30 years for homes 
completed before 8th May 1945 and 40 years for homes completed 
after 8th May 1945. 
4. no deposit to be required but purchaser to pay their own legal 
fees and stamp duty. 
5. Power to grant 99 year leases to be exercised. 
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6. Power in 1952 Act to dispose of houses to be delegated to the 
sub-committee. (P.R.C. September 1952). 
The proposal to sell houses proved to be extremely popular with the 
authorities' tenants, for 15 months later, 2,601 enquiries had been 
received, 551 valuations given and 286 sales made. However, during 
this time the City Treasurer proposed quite large rent increases 
for tenants of 10/= (50 pence) per week, 
"for all those tenants whose financial circumstances are 
such that a subsidised rent is not justified and who were 
housed prior to June 1948". 
(P.H.C. December 1953) 
Undoubtedly such a measure concentrated the tenants' minds in the 
direction of purchase. Portsmouth, had as previously mentioned, 
a relatively high rents policy and believed in charging economic 
rents and the council did not make up any deficiencies in rents from 
the rate fund. In such circumstances the decision to purchase would 
be likely to be made on economic rather than political grounds on 
the part of the tenant, although it could be suggested that it was 
both on the part of the council. It is not a policy a Labour 
controlled authority with a relatively long waiting list for 
accommodation is likely to have followed. The shortage of 
accommodation in Portsmouth was according to Admiral Coupt causing a 
shortage of skilled labour in Naval Dockyards. Clearly the policy of 
housing key workers was coming under increasing criticism, such that 
in August 1953, the Rousing Committee found it necessary to hold a 
special meeting to review the position. (P.R.C. August 1953). The 
policy was defended on two counts:-
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1. It encouraged new industries to come to the city. 
2. It encouraged those key workers already employed in the city 
to remain, and thus provided additional employment. 
The committee decided that they would continue to give favourable 
consideration to the housing of key workers if they were satisfied 
that such action would ensure fuller employment for unskilled 
workers. 
It can be seen from the above that the Housing Policy in Portsmouth 
in the early 1950's followed Conservative philosophy. Possibly the 
best example of this was the attitude to rents charged and to the 
sale of local authority properties to tenants whilst there was still 
an acute shortage of housing accommodation within the city. In 1948 
the Portsmouth city council decided that tenants paying an economic 
rent should be allowed to sub-let accommodation during the period 
of housing shortage. The city council had introduced a system of 
differential rents including rent rebates as well as the more 
familiar pooled rents - as adopted in Derby. 
The City Treasurer was given considerable powers by the council 
members in his terms of reference for assisting in determining the 
council rent policy. The policy was based upon a report he had 
written. It must be remembered that housing in Portsmouth at the 
time was still very much a function of the City Treasurer's 
Department, and not a separate department in its own right. The 
City Treasurer's report gave guidance on the implementation of the 
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rent rebate scheme and the economic rent principles. The Treasurer 
was authorised to deal with appeals against rents levied, and to 
decide whether a tenant should pay the pooled or economic rent. 
(P.R.C. June 1948). Within three weeks 453 tenants had appealed 
against their new rent and some were offered a deal whereby they 
would pay the pooled rent on condition that they moved to cheaper 
accommodation as and when available. 
By contrast, in Derby all tenants continued to pay pooled rents. 
In respect of both council house sales and rent policy, Portsmouth 
can be said to have been many years ahead of other local authorities 
and indeed Central Government thinking. The Economic Rent principle 
was very much the work of the City Treasurer, although his work no 
doubt reflected the views of the Conservative majority group. The 
issue of the sale of houses was very much the view of the majority 
group, and Councillor Schofield in particular, and this policy was 
opposed by the City Treasurer, his opposition earning him 
considerable disfavour amongst the majority group. The influence 
of the City Treasurer on rent policy should not, however, be 
underestimated. 
vii) Gaining Momentum 
In the immediate post-war years Britain had a newly elected Labour 
Government, Derby had a Labour controlled council and Portsmouth 
a Conservative controlled council. The Labour Government was anxious 
to make a rapid start on the building of new houses to replace the -
200,000 houses destroyed and 250,000 badly damaged. (D.V. Donnison, 
1967). The new government intended to provide the houses by allowing 
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local authorities to implement large housing programmes, but some 
authorities were to benefit more than others. 
Portsmouth's housing programmes had, as mentioned previously a much 
quicker start than Derby's. Portsmouth failed to maintain the 
initial momentum, partly because the initial units of accommodation 
were "temporary" in converted premises and former military bases, and 
partly because of the City Architect's wish to continue building 
traditional properties rather than the sistem built properties being 
erected by the large public works contractors. Portsmouth, 
admittedly, suffered from a lack of available land within its own 
boundaries and had to rely on the good offices of neighbouring 
authorities in order to secure sites suitable for large scale system 
building methods. Land was also a problem in Derby, since much of 
the Chaddesden development was located in a neighbouring authority's 
area, but Derby was fortunate in having a highly articulate chairman 
of its Housing Committee and so had a decided advantage over 
Portsmouth in terms of human resources. Derby had a unified team of 
local politicians and officers, whereas Portsmouth suffered from the 
lack of a Director of Housing - his function being performed by the 
City Treasurer, who as will be illustrated in a subsequent chapter, 
relied upon his Chief Administrative Assistant who was ultimately 
dismissed for not carrying out his duties correctly - and a Chief 
Architect who was initially not keen on new methods of construction -
with, again as will be illustrated later, some justification. 
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The policy of the post-war Labour Government was to patch repair 
properties so as to make them tolerable and allow local authorities 
in areas of specific need to build family sized accommodation for 
rental - which is indeed what both Derby and Portsmouth did. Very 
few properties built in the early post-war years were in the private 
sector. In order to make use of all the available resources, slum 
clearance schemes were halted in both cities, so that neither 
deviated from the national policy in this respect. This policy meant 
that many families were housed in totally inadequate conditions in 
both cities. The scarce national resources were allocated by Central 
Government to those areas of greatest need ie. those towns which 
had suffered most during the war, hence Portsmouth for a short time 
was one of the leading housing authorities in England; however the 
momentum was not sustained. The aspirations of the Labour Government 
were dashed by the onset of an economic crisis in 1948 and a 
shortage of building materials, and it was not until Harold 
MacMillian's housing drive of the early 1950's that local authorities 
were allowed or encouraged to push ahead with housing schemes. The 
local authority in Derby had been drawing up the detailed plans for 
two large housing estates utilising system methods of building, 
and when the time was opportune was in the ideal position to commence 
building. In Portsmouth however, the authority had not been so far 
sighted. When the time came to push ahead with new contracts, they 
were not in a position to be able to do so, to the extent that 
Mr Harold MacMillan felt it necessary to address the Housing 
Committee and have his visit followed up with visits from Regional 
Officers of his Ministry. 
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Mr MacMillan said that blitzed cities had problems and that he 
considered housing was a joint central-local enterprise. Local 
authorities on whom the whole or main burden had been placed could 
only function if they had confidence in the Government and the 
Government was helpless unless they commanded the confidence and 
goodwill of local authorities. He said that the essence of success 
was for the Ministry and the Local Authority to work in partnership 
and that it was his job to re-organise "the business of the production 
of building materials to produce a steady flow that would allow as 
rapid and efficient production as possible and that this could not 
be achieved without a good order book. 
In this chapter I have attempted to examine some of the problems 
of the early post war years faced by two local authorities. We have 
seen that faced by similar problems, they initially took similar 
paths, and then as their programmes gathered momentum, they diverged. 
Their policies were influenced by both external and internal 
factors. 
Externally however they have been influenced by Central Government 
policy, by Central Government Officials, by the views of Regional 
Housing Officers and also by the national economy. Internally they 
have been influenced by the views of local politicians and chief 
officers, and also affected by local circumstances - financial 
resources, land and local need. They all combine to determine and 
form what is frequently referred to as "Housing Policy" - but as 
we have seen "Housing Policy" is a compote of many factors. 
155 
CHAPTER FIVE TARGETS ARE SET 
i) Background 
ii) Keep on Building 
iii) Carrying On With Targets to Meet 
iv) Let's Go Up: The Advent of High Rise 
v) Urban Renewal Starts Here 
vi) Some Wait - Others Do Not 
vii) It Has To Be Paid For 
viii)Shall We Sell Some? 
ix) Carrying On 
156 
CHAPTER FIVE TARGETS ARE SET 
i) Background 
In this chapter I intend to look at the influences on housing policy 
processes in both Derby and Portsmouth during the period 1954 to 
1964. This period was a very important one in post-war housing 
policy since it was during this period that the Central Government 
achieved its 1951 election promise of completing 300,000 houses per 
annum and indeed this target was exceeded in the years 1954-1959. 
The target was to a great extent met by encouraging local authorities 
to set ambitious housing targets. Local authorities, irrespective 
of political colour were in the main, only too willing to strive 
to achieve the targets set by the Ministry of Housing, since housing 
deficiencies were present in many areas of the country. As we have 
already seen in the previous chapter, the housing problems of both 
Derby and Portsmouth in the immediate post-war years were acute and 
both authorities had by 1954 prepared ambitious plans for the 
development of large new estates on greenfield sites beyond their 
respective county borough boundaries, with quite optimistic plans 
for infra-structure on the new estates. Such policies represent 
the high point in post war local authority housing, and also reflect 
the view that improved housing presented a "social cure all". Both 
local authorities during the latter part of the period under review 
responded to the national slum clearance drives. 
The period then is of great significance since it is a period of 
intense activity and of political stability. Throughout the entire 
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period under review in this chapter, the Central Government was 
controlled by the Conservative Party, as was Portsmouth City Council. 
Derby Town Council was controlled by the Labour Party. 
ii) Keep on Building 
In June 1952 officials of Derby Town Council had estimated that a 
further 3,520 houses would be required to be constructed to complete 
the housing programme, including p r o v i s ~ o n n for the housing of those 
affected by slum clearance and for projected future registrations 
(D.H.C. June 1952). Some 204 acres were purchased at Chaddesden, 
56 acres at Alvaston (South of Derby) and 54 acres at Sunny Hill 
(also South of Derby). (D.H.C. June 1952). In 1953 it was decided 
to build 15 shops at Chaddesden Hall, and this was the first attempt 
at providing any infra-structure for the developments. Whilst 
another 340 houses were contracted for on the Mackworth Estate, 
bringing the total built to over 1,000 dwellings, no attempt had 
been made to provide the infra-structure required by such a community 
although space had been provided. In June 1954, plans were announced 
for a grandiose shopping complex on the Mackworth Estate, to consist 
of 26 shops, a supermarket, a health centre, a cinema and a public 
house. The cinema, health centre and public house were destined 
to be "failed proposals" and the land upon which they should have 
been situated was subsequently redesignated for housing. The 
proposals represented the ambition of the Housing Committee chairman 
and the plans were subject to a considerable number of amendments. 
The Derby Co-operative Society "assisted" in the planning of the 
Mackworth Estate Centre - as they were to the Sinfin Centre in the 
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late 1970's - thus reflecting the close links between the council 
membership and the local co-op board in the form of membership of 
both the council and the co-op board ie. W. Raynes and J. Dilks. 
The reason for the failure of these proposals was that housing people 
was regarded as a higher priority than providing amenities no matter 
how desirable. Further, neither of the large cinema companies (The 
Rank Organisation and Associated British Cinemas) were interested 
in taking the tenancy of the proposed cinema, and indeed at that 
time the town had seventeen cinemas, and the A.B.C. cinema group 
already had a very large cinema very close to the Mackworth Estate. 
Likewise, Derby has never been "deprived" of public houses. Today, 
there are three public houses on the Mackworth Estate, each built 
by one of the large breweries on land leased from the council, thus 
relieving the council of the cost of construction. A Health Centre 
has also subsequently been provided. Given these considerations 
the amenity proposals had insufficient priority to warrant 
implementation. Their failure was not due to party politics. The 
proposals originally made, were gradiose and represented the 
satisfying of individual ambition on the part of Alderman Flint the 
Housing Chairman and civic pride on the part of the Town Council. 
The objective of providing infra-structure was a noble one, even 
if it also satisfied the ego of individuals. Even when the shops 
and supermarket were developed in 1954/55 there was difficulty 
experienced in attracting suitable tenants to the shops, and it was 
realised that an over-provision of shops had been made. This 
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experience soured the idea of building large shopping and amenity 
centres on the other large housing estates in the town. 
In later years, small groups of two or three shops selling perishable 
goods have been constructed throughout the estates. This has been 
found to be more convenient for the tenants of the estates. On the 
Mackworth Estate some people may live 30 minutes walk away from the 
shops, and so since the estate is well ·served by buses, many 
housewives prefer to catch a bus into the town centre, for not only 
are there obviously more shops, but it is also quicker for those 
living some distance from the shopping centre of the estate. A 
comprehensive public transport system was developed on the Mackworth 
Estate, using mainly trolley buses, which linked the estate to the 
town centre in less than 10 minutes. The trolley buses were fast 
and quiet, but the system was abandoned in September 1967, when a 
new traffic management scheme was introduced in the town centre. 
The trolley buses were replaced by motor buses running at a lower 
frequency. 
In Portsmouth a large shopping complex including a supermarket was 
developed on the Paulsgrove estate. The shopping centre however 
was by no means as ambitious as the original intentions of the 
Mackworth scheme in Derby. Schemes subsequent to the Paulsgrove 
estate, such as the huge development at Leigh Park were designed 
to be serviced by small groups of community shops - 2 or 3 shops 
servicing a district within the estate, with one large estate 
shopping centre in addition. The city council's policy was to let 
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shops to local traders wherever possible, although the City Treasurer 
appears to have had more than a guiding hand in the housing policy 
and letting policy during this period, since he was not only City 
Treasurer, but Chief Housing Officer. Many of the recommendations 
he made were on financial rather than social grounds. In Portsmouth 
the shops were built after the houses, instead of alongside the 
houses. This led to severe criticism from the tenants, and to the 
formation of what were to become two extremely vocal tenants 
associations - one on the Paulsgrove estate, the other on Leigh Park. 
The development of the Leigh Park estate took place throughout the 
whole period reviewed in this chapter. Considerable difficulty was 
experienced by the authority in letting houses on the Leigh Park 
estate because of its remoteness from Portsmouth and its lack of 
infra-structure (shops, health facilities, education facilities and 
public transport). In many respects the Portsmouth policy appears 
to have been more in tune with the Central Government policy, since 
the Conservative Government measured success by the number of 
dwellings constructed, rather than by the quality of dwelling or 
the quality of the environment being created. This of course is 
understandable, since most major cities had severe housing problems, 
those cities which had solved the problems of overcrowding, still had 
the postponed problems of slum clearance to face. 
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iii) Carrying On With Targets To Meet 
Both the local authorities and the Central Government had a common 
aim of improving the standard of living accommodation for their 
citizens. The councils worked within a framework set out by Central 
Government. The needs of the two cities are reflected by the 
lengthening of waiting lists for accommodation, and what is more, 
the waiting lists did not reflect the true "needs" of the cities, 
since they did not include all those housed in properties soon to 
be declared slums. 
During this period, however, a shortage of suitable building land 
for future housing programmes was developing. In Portsmouth the 
problem was exaggerated by the local geography - Portsmouth 
originally being built on Portsea Island. In order to build new 
estates, it would be necessary to build well beyond the city limits 
in the areas administered by neighbouring authorities, notably Havant 
and Waterloo Urban District Council. This policy led to fraught 
relations between the two authorities. Ultimately tensions led to 
arbitration by the Minister of Housing and Local Government. This 
aspect will be discussed more fully in the next chapter. In 
addition, in order to optimise the use of land cleared under slum 
clearance orders, the building of high rise tower blocks of flats was 
carried out. This policy was advocated in particular by the City 
Architect Mr J. Mellor, who put some adventurous proposals to the 
City Housing Committee particularly in t ~ e e later part of the period 
under review in this chapter. There was considerable resistance to 
the high rise dwellings, particularly from the tenants, especially 
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the elderly ones. Constructional problems were encountered, and 
water problems were common in the high rise dwellings. Ten of the 
tower blocks constructed were erected on the same principles as the 
Rowan Point blocks at Newham, and this necessitated additional city 
council expenditure in August 1968. (P.R.C. September 1968). 
In Derby, similarly, a shortage of suitable land for housing 
development began to arise from 1955 onwards. The council decided 
to take over land which had previously been used for allotments, 
many of them having become disused. Whilst only an allocation of 
700 houses had been given for the year, 766 were constructed, which 
still represented a sharp fallon the 1934 constructed for the 
authority the previous year, although it followed the national trend 
of falling production in the public sector of housing. A sub-
committee was appointed to consider the use of open spaces on the 
new council estates, but many of them were to be built on a few years 
later because of the shortage of building land in the Derby area. 
With the major post war housing projects nearing completion, the 
Town Council decided in March 1957, to commence a further estate, 
this time, because of the acute shortage of building land within 
the town, over the county borough boundary at Breadsall, to the North 
East of the town. The relations between Derby Town Council and South 
East Derbyshire District Council were far more amicable over such 
a development, than was the case in Portsmouth, even though Derby 
was Labour controlled and South East-Derbyshire Conservative. A 
possible explanation for this might be that South East Derbyshire 
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Rural District was to a great extent dependent upon Derby as a source 
of employment and provider of major services and facilities whereas 
in the relationship between Havant and Waterloo Urban District and 
Portsmouth City Council, the ties were far less apparent. The land 
being developed was also more distant from Portsmouth - Leigh Park 
being ten miles from The Guildhall, Portsmouth and Paulsgrove 
approximately six miles - as opposed to Breadsall being only two 
and a half miles from Derby town c e n t r e - ~ ~ Havant and Waterlooville 
were both distinct commercial centres generating their own 
employment. This was not the case in South East Derbyshire, where 
the largest settlements were Melbourne and Chellaston. The initial 
contracts for development at Breadsall were let to George Wimpey 
Ltd for the construction of 650 dwellings in June 1957. (D.H.C. 
June 1957). It was decided by the housing committee to include only 
twenty one bedroomed dwellings in the new project, because of the 
abolition of subsidies for such dwellings by the Housing Subsidies 
Act 1956. 
When the Bank Rate was lowered in July 1958, the Ministers of Housing 
and Local Government in a letter dated 18th July 1958, advised Derby 
Town Council that it would then be possible to build more houses, and 
it was agreed to build a further 50 houses at Breadsall Priory in 
order to complete the estate. This was in marked contrast to 
circular 57/58 which had been issued in November 1958 by the Ministry 
of Housing and Local Government and ~ h i c h h had urged cuts to be made 
in housing expenditure. (Ministry of Housing and Local Government 
Circular 57/58). Thus we can see reflected through the housing 
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policy at the local level, the "stop-go" policy of Central 
Government, a familiar feature of economic policy in the late 1950's I 
and early 1960's. 
The Conservative Government's ideology with regard to who should 
construct public housing is reflected in a letter from the Minister 
of Housing and Local Government in which it was stated that 
'whilst no objection is raised to ~ h e e erection of houses 
built by direct labour, in the future the works department 
should compete with competitive tenders from private 
companies' 
(Letter from Minister of Housing and Local Government to 
Derby Town Council dated 11th February 1958) 
In Portsmouth such external pressure was not necessary since the 
council's programmes were all constructed by contracting companies, 
mainly on a negotiated tender basis, rather than on the basis of 
competitive tender. The negotiated contract was a method favoured 
in particular by the Regional Director. 
On 8th January 1958 Portsmouth City Council held a special meeting 
of the Health and Housing Committee. It was reported to the 
committee that the housing waiting list comprised 3,749 applicants 
of whom about 1,000 had indicated their willingness to be 
accommodated_at Leigh Park. In addition there were approximately 
1,100 applicants for accommodation suitable for aged persons, the 
majority of whom were seeking accommodation in the city. (P.C.C. 
September 1958). The City Treasurer - who was a considerable 
influence of Portsmouth Housing Policy at this time - stated that 
if the requirements of the waiting list and the aged persons were 
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excluded, the likely demand for accommodation in the two years 1958 
and 1959 would be likely to be as follows:-
a) Within the city - approximately 750 dwellings in respect of 
slum clearance, pre-fab displacements etc. 
b) At Leigh Park - approximately 350 dwellings in respect of 
housing for key workers and natural increase in population 
(P.C.C. September 1958). 
He suggested that if the housing programme was maintained and 
proceeded without modification and the level of properties 
becoming vacant remained at the level experienced during 1957, 
he anticipated that 1,463 properties would become vacant within 
the city. They would comprise of 663 new dwellings, of which 501 
were already contracted, including 150 one bedroomed - and bedsitter 
units. He also anticipated that 2,578 properties would be available 
for letting at Leigh Park; 1,678 of which would be new dwellings; 
1,342 already contracted. The City Treasurer stated in his report 
that it would be likely that accommodation could be provided in the 
city within the current programme for all those disturbed by slum 
clearance, whilst also rehousing about 700 applicants from the 
waiting lists. In addition, he estimated that accommodation would be 
available at Leigh Park for a minimum of 2,242 applicants and 
possibly 2,578 applicants if the programme was proceeded with and he 
stated that there were only 1,450 prospective tenants. (P.C.C. 
September 1958). As a result of the City Treasurer's report, the 
housing committee decided to postpone for three months the invitation 
for tenders at Leigh Park, whilst at the same time accelerating the 
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building programme within the city. (P.C.C. September 1958). The 
building programme within the city had become increasingly dependent 
upon the construction of high rise flats (see later in this chapter). 
An indication of the slow down in Portsmouth's housing programme 
comes from the fact that the contractors for the Parkhouse Farm No.9 
site were requested to agree to a reduction in pace of development so 
that the contract period would be spread over four financial years 
rather than 98 weeks. (P.R.C. February 1958). The Ministry of 
Rousing and Local Government allocated Portsmouth 625 dwellings 
within the national programme for 1959/60, which satisfied the City 
Treasurer. 
In November 1958 a review of the housing programme for Derby took 
place, following guidance from the Ministry of Rousing and Local 
Government that the Chancellor of the Exchequer desired to see a 
higher level of public expenditure, and that any capital projects 
which could be submitted within three months and be completed before 
the end of 1959 would be "considered favourably". The Ministry 
agreed to the construction of a further 250 houses provided that 
a start was made within three or four months. It will be remembered 
that 1959 was an election year, a year in which the Conservatives 
were returned to power with an increased majority. It was also the 
year of Mr MacMillan's famous phrase: 
'You've never had it so good'. 
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Portsmouth City Council Housing Committee were not so receptive to 
the idea of expansion of their housing programme in response to the 
easing of restrictions on Capital Expenditure. The City Treasurer 
expressed the view that very careful consideration should be given 
before resuming house building at Leigh Park as under the then 
current conditions, lettings on the estate were not always based 
on real housing need. The City Architect expressed the view that 
nothing could be done to speed up the programme, since the tenders 
then being sought would automatically receive loan sanction from 
1st January 1959. The change in government policy provoked an 
interesting reaction within the two local authorities. Derby, a 
Labour controlled authority welcomed with enthusiasm the opportunity 
to build further houses; Portsmouth, a Conservative controlled 
authority was not interested in the opportunity. The housing 
committee, and it would appear the senior officers also, believed 
that adequate provision was already being made. Their view may have 
been tempered more by the reluctance of people to move to Leigh Park, 
than by political considerations. 
The housing programme for Derby in 1961 was approved at 500. (D.H.C. 
September 1960). However, at that stage no sites were available 
for development in 1962; and a policy of transferring tenants to 
accommodation "more suitable for their needs" was introduced to try 
and maximise the usage of the housing stock. (D.H.C. June 1961). 
This resulted in single persons whose parents had died being moved 
from family houses to single person accommodation, and couples whose 
families had grown up being moved to smaller accommodation. This 
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policy was heavily criticised at the time of its introduction and 
was not abandoned until 1968 after the extension of the county 
borough boundary and after the subsequent change of political ruling 
groups on the council. 
iv) Let's Go Up: The Advent of High Rise 
Regional officials of the Ministry of Housing and Local Government 
suggested at a meeting in November 1961, that a solution to the 
problem of the shortage of building land would be the erection of 
high rise flats, and plans were made in 1962 for the first tower 
block to be built in Derby at the side of the River Derwent. This 
proved to be an unfortunate choice since the river tends to flood 
at this point, and the basement and groundfloor of the building 
completed in 1965, is sometimes flooded. In recent years 
considerable flood precautions have however been taken, including 
the reinforcing of the river banks both adjacent to the flats, and 
also down stream of them. Because of the history of flooding, living 
in these flats (appropriately named "Rivermead House") is not very 
popular and difficulty has been experienced in finding sufficient 
tenants to allocate all of the flats to despite generally long 
council waiting lists. As a result of the difficulties experienced 
within these flats, it was decided not to build any more such 
dwellings. Rivermead House was completed in May 1965, although its 
planning and construction took place during the latter part of the 
period covered by this chapter. (D.H.C. February 1965). Derby had 
in essence responded to a Central Government initiative - albeit 
not enthusiastically. The local authority planning committee, and 
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indeed the Planning Director have a reputation for having an aversion 
to high rise developments whether residential or commercial. 
Portsmouth's experience with high rise flats was initially far more 
satisfactory, although as we shall see in Chapter Six, Portsmouth 
also encountered problems with high rise dwellings towards the end 
of the period studied in this thesis. The problems have increased 
since 1974. Portsmouth City Housing Committee had always favoured 
high density development. Circumstances ie. the lack of suitable 
land had dictated such a policy. Portsmouth's high rise policy was 
ahead of and pre-empted the Central Government's initiatives of the 
early 1960's. Additionally the City Architect (Mr Mellor) had become 
an enthusiastic supporter of high rise developments. 
The council had previously developed a number of schemes involving 
low-rise flats and maisonettes. They had been incorporated in 
housing schemes such as Paulsgrove - for instance in March 1954, 51 
flats were contracted for at Paulsgrove (P.H.C. March 1954). At the 
same committee meeting 40 maisonettes were contracted for at Hanover 
Street on land which had been cleared of unfit housing. In October 
1955, the city housing committee asked the City Development Officer 
to investigate the demand for one bedroom and bedsitting room flats. 
(P.A.C. October 1955). He recommended that in addition to the 133 
one bedroom flats and 30 bedsitting room flats under construction, 
and the 143 one bedroom flats and 66 bedsitting room flats scheduled 
for 1956, further sites should be allocated for such developments 
because of the demand for such accommodation. (P.H.C. October 
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1955). In September 1956 the Ministry of Housing and Local 
Government expressed the view that the construction cost of 15 flats 
at Hornbrook Street was a "little high" and asked for a reduction in 
the level of specification; the committee agreed to this with the 
exception of a reduction in cupboard space in the kitchens. (P.H.C. 
September 1956). 
In January 1958 the Portsmouth City Architect reported to the housing 
committee on the Nelson Road development. (P.H.C. January 1958). 
He stated that the remainder of the land had been planned for a 
further 184 units in 6 blocks of multi-storey flats of similar 
heights to the existing development and stated that sketch plans 
of 122 units in 4 blocks had been submitted to the Ministry, each 
block having 4 flats per floor. He said that the Ministry were 
investigating the high cost of flats and that a number of important 
factors had emerged. Ministry officials (in particular the Regional 
Director) now considered 8/9 storey flats uneconomic when serviced 
by lifts and stairs if there were only four flats per floor. The 
Ministry officials suggested that such accommodation could be built 
with 8 flats per floor serviced by 2 stair cases and 2 lifts and 
being constructed to a height of 11/12 storeys, giving a saving of at 
least £166 per flat when compared with the original proposal. The 
City Architect recommended that in view of the Ministry's attitude, 
two 12 storey blocks, each with 8 flats per floor should be 
constructed, thus maximising the economies available, and also making 
room for the addition of some 4 storey maisonettes. The Ministry had 
stated that since large savings appeared to be possible, Portsmouth's 
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original proposal could not be considered until other schemes 
offering greater economy had been fully investigated. Rere we can 
see direct influence by Ministry Officials over the local officials 
who in turn influenced the housing committee. Portsmouth had started 
high rise developments early but were encouraged still further by 
this pressure. The Ministry, in their role of controlling the 
funding of schemes, were able to bring about a complete redesign of 
the Nelson Street development, although as we shall see later, the 
City Architect was an admirer of high rise developments in any case. 
In June 1961 a report on the maintenance of post war flats was 
produced by the Rousing Director. Criticism of the design of flats 
was made, particularly concerning dampness and condensation. Such 
problems had previously been fully investigated and remedial measures 
had successfully been taken after consultation with the Public 
Analyst and the Building Research Station. (P.R.C. June 1961). In 
June 1962 a contract was made with George Wimpey & Co. Ltd. for the 
construction of a 20 storey block of 76 flats to be constructed on an 
inner city site which had been cleared of unfit housing in Butcher 
Street. (P.R.C. June 1962). This decision was followed by a 
decision to build 272 flats in Church Street in an 18 storey 
development. (P.R.C. June 1962). At the same meeting consideration 
was also given to the development of a large site on Portsdown Rill, 
-
a project which became a focus of considerable attention in the late 
1960's and with which I will deal in more detail in the next chapter. 
(P.R.C. June 1962). On 6th November, 1962 the Rousing Committee 
Chairman, Vice-Chairman and Chief Officers accompanied a Mr Salter, 
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an architect of the Ministry of Housing and Local Government, and Mr 
Lightfoot of the Rousing Division of the Ministry, to the site which 
it was proposed to develop for municipal housing on Portsdown Hill. 
Mr Lightfoot subsequently stated that if the corporation were to 
develop the site then the Ministry would prefer to ensure that 
housing was erected which was attractive in design and reasonable in 
cost. It was essential that a reasonable high density was achieved 
at a cost which would not bear too heavily on the Housing Revenue 
Account, and at the same time the dwellings provided should be within 
the financial reach of prespective tenants. The economics of 
development should, in the first instance be dictated by the Ministry 
- it should be a question for the city council to decide in the light 
of the rent income that can be obtained. (P.H.C. December 1962). Mr 
Salter added that in his opinion it would be desirable to achieve a 
density of approximately 100 persons per acre, and that in order to 
avoid wasting the existing capital assets, wherever practicable the 
development should be designed to accord with the existing road 
pattern. (P.R.C. December 1962). The Committee Chairman commented 
that the dwellings provided by the corporation would have to be 
available for occupation by tenants who were earning £10 to £12 per 
week. It was the committee's duty to provide accommodation for 
persons displaced from clearance areas, and, generally speaking, 
multi-storey blocks provided one or two bedroomed accommodation which 
was not suitable for young families. In his view the development of 
part of the site should be carried out with the intention of redres-
sing the balance of dwellings in the city so that accommodation could 
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be provided for those tenants for whom the existing accommodation 
in the centre was unsuitable. The requirements of those with growing' 
families should not be overlooked when considering the provision 
of accommodation on the site (P.H.C. December 1962). Here again 
we can see the influence of Central Government officials over Local 
Government officials who in turn advise the local politicians. The 
Ministry officials were unwilling to suggest architects for such 
a scheme, but reminded the officials that Westminster City Council 
had the previous year successfully promoted a design competition, 
the cost of which was incorporated into the Central Government loans. 
This, as we shall see in the next chapter, was the method chosen, 
with amazing consequences for the city council. This advice though, 
is an excellent example of a Central Government department acting 
as a disseminator of information, and of informal control by Central 
Government, over local authority policy making. Indeed the whole 
pursuit of high rise accommodation in Portsmouth reflects largely 
the ideals of the Ministry officials. High rise flats came to 
reflect the policy of the time; a way of using inner city sites to 
their maximum, little thought being given to the social consequences 
of such accommodation. Portsmouth would have built high anyway, 
without the pressures from Central Government, but they were 
encouraged so to do by the Ministry of Housing and Local Government, 
and the pressures had the effect of encouraging them to build higher 
still. The particular schemes were heavily influenced by the 
Ministry of Housing and Local Government, rather than the 
philosophy. 
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When compared with Derby, Portsmouth's high rise policy appears far 
more enthusiastic. Derby Town Council had difficulty in letting 
its first tower block, and this difficulty combined with a desire not 
to create a skyline of high rise buildings prevented Derby from 
taking the same path. Derby did however have adjacent to it, land in 
a neighbouring authority's area, which that authority - South East 
Derbyshire Rural District Council - was happy to see developed. The 
working relationship between the two councils was considerably more 
harmonious than that between Portsmouth City Council and Waterloo and 
Harvant Urban District Council. Circumstances ie. lack of suitable 
building land, to a certain extent required the intensified use of 
available land, although we should not underestimate the influence on 
high rise policies of the City Architect or the Ministry Officials. 
v) Urban Renewal Starts Here 
Under the terms of the Housing Repairs and Rent Act 1954, the Medical 
Officers of Health of all local authorities were required to complete 
a survey of houses unfit for human habitation and in need of 
demolition, but because of a shortage of Housing Inspectors, delay 
was experienced by many authorities including Derby and Portsmouth. 
In April 1954 a modest start was made to the slum clearance programme 
in Portsmouth when the housing committee decided not to reinstate 
houses in Arthur Street, since it was decided that the whole area 
was likely to be cleared. (P.H.C. April 1954). The City Development 
Officer produced a report on slum clearance in November 1954 stating 
that the city's housing list had in excess of 15,000 applicants. 
Of this figure he estimated 1/3rd could be thought to be in real 
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need of housing, and that if it was desired to deal with this need 
over five years, then 1,000 houses a year just for this purpose would 
be required, leaving very little margin for rehousing families from 
slum areas. (P.H.C. November 1954). The City Architect estimated 
1,800 completions in 1954, 1,500 in 1955 and 1,200 per annum 
thereafter. He stated, that in addition to properties affected by 
slum clearance, there were still 159 hutments at Bedhampton, West 
Leigh and Southsea Common to be taken into account. (P.H.C. 
Novemner 1954). The City Development Officer stated that it would 
not be possible to embark upon a large scale slum clearance programme 
at that time unless the number of dwellings allocated to ?pplicants 
was reduced. He suggested a demolition rate of 100 during 1956, 
200 in 1957, 300 in 1958 and thereafter 400 a year, giving a target 
of 7,000 to be demolished by 1974. (P.H.C. November 1954). 
In Derby, a less ambitious target was set. In September 1955 the 
Medical Officer of Health for Derby (as opposed to the City 
Development Officer in Portsmouth) produced a slum clearance report. 
This report indicated that 1,500 houses were unfit for human 
habitation. (Report on Slum Clearance, Medical Officer of Health, 
D.H.C. September 1955). Under Section 9 of the 1954 Act, 150 
dwellings could be patch repaired, and retained for five years and 
750 were in areas still to be declared clearance areas. (D.H.C. 
September 1955). It was decided that 600 houses should be demolished 
over the next five years and the report was submitted to the Ministry 
of Housing and Local Government together with an application to 
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extend the housing programme for the year. In 1956 the Ministry 
requested that the slum clearance period should be reduced to five 
years in view of the ending of the system of housing allocations 
the previous November and this request was agreed by the housing 
committee. Derby Town Council in fact pre-empted the new legislation 
on slum clearance, by requesting the Medical Officer of Health to 
prepare a preliminary report, prior to the new legislation being 
enacted. To a certain extent this accounts for the faster 
implementation of the legislation in the case of Derby. However, 
lack of qualified staff and a much larger number of properties to 
be surveyed in Portsmouth, also accounted for the delay in 
implementation in that city. Subsequently, Portsmouth Housing 
Committee were advised by the Town Clerk that the 7,000 properties 
were "only an estimate which may have to be amended". (P.H.C. 
February 1956). He stated that the objects behind the publication 
were twofold:-
1. To comply with the Minister's report for an estimate of all 
unfit dwellings in the city. 
2. To give the public the fullest possible information at the 
earliest possible date for their own protection. 
The report, however, resulted in a public outcry for two main 
reasons:-
1. The wish of residents not to be turned out of a house which 
appeared to be suitable. 
2. Dissatisfaction with the compensation. 
The committee decided that the development plan and the slum 
clearance plan should be integrated, and that the programme should 
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be amended by the deletion of 2,477 houses considered to be fit for 
habitation within the terms of the 1954 Housing Repairs and Rent 
Act. Possibly either the committee or the officers had 
underestimated public reaction to areas of houses being declared 
slums, and the housing committee and the chief officers were 
subjected to pressure for a review of this policy. Portsmouth City 
Council experienced difficulty in synchronising it's slum clearance 
programme with its rebuilding and r e h o u ~ i n g g programme. In October 
1958, the housing committee asserted that it would not be possible 
to reserve specific houses for re-housing residents affected by slum 
clearance. The authority was suffering from an acute shortage of 
suitable sites for development. So acute was the problem, that the 
removal of prefabs was halted, unless the tenants had already been 
notified in writing. (P.H.C. October 1958). 
In January 1960, the Town Clerk reported to the housing committee 
that the Ministry of Housing and Local Government were prepared to 
revise their policy set out in the Housing Act 1957 regarding the 
acquisition of substandard properties and the carrying out of first-
aid repairs to make them temporarily habitable. He said that the 
Ministry would be prepared to consider carrying out such repairs 
to a limited number of houses in the city providing the number was 
in reasonable proportion to the number of persons who were to be 
displaced. The acquisition of properties which the council intended 
to be the subject of first aid repairs would involve the adoption 
of a special form of Compulsory Purchase Order; the purpose of this 
was to ensure that the owners knew in advance that the council 
178 
intended to acquire their properties and retain them after 
acquisition for housing purposes. It was pOinted out that the 
Minister had experienced the making of such orders by other local 
authorities and in practice it had been discovered that once the 
existing occupants knew of the local authority's intention to retain 
houses and carry out first aid repairs, they were extremely reluctant 
to leave and in consequence what in theory appeared to be excellent 
proposals had in practice, in some instances, been difficult to 
operate. 
However, the Ministry were sympathetic towards Portsmouth in this 
matter and had asked that a statement be furnished containing the 
number of persons which it was anticipated would be displaced during 
the remainder of the council's slum clearance programme, the number 
of properties which it was thought would be required in respect of 
such persons, and in particular how long such premises would be used 
before they themselves were demolished. (Report of Town Clerk, 
P.H.C. January 1960). 
Complaints were received from people who were rehoused in Portsmouth, 
since they felt that they should have similar accommodation to that 
vacated, irrespective of need. The newly appointed Housing Director 
(see below) Mr J.D. Dant, said that need should be the determinent 
of all allocations. Complaints were also made regarding houses 
standing empty, at a time when the accommodation waiting list was 
lengthening. (Report of Housing Director: A Rehousing Policy, 
P.H.C. April 1960). 
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Concern was expressed regarding the disparity of information placed 
before the Acquisition of Housing sub-committee as to the estimated 
cost of repairs, prepared in some cases by the City Architect and 
the actual cost of the work put in hand by the Director of Housing 
before re-letting. The City Architect commented that the estimates 
he had given to the committee were for the minimum repairs with a 
view to re-letting as soon as possible and he did envisage bringing 
the houses up to a higher standard than those of similar houses in 
private ownership. He stated that at the time it had been the policy 
of the committee to recognise a limit of £300 expenditure per 
dwelling above which authority would not have been given to 
purchase. 
The committee were informed by the Director of Housing that it had 
been necessary to do the work in the interests of getting properties 
re-let and maintaining the high standard expected of the council 
as landlords. It had sometimes been found on a thorough examination 
of a property following its acquisition, that considerable sums of 
money were required to be spent to remedy underlying defects not 
apparent when the superficial survey was made at the time of 
purchase. 
The report showed that the acquisition of many of the houses was not 
a sound business proposition but that the action taken might be 
justified in the interests of ensuring that the best use was made of 
the available accommodation in the city, and the principle of 
improving older-type houses as encouraged by the Minister and the 
council was being observed. The committee therefore decided:-
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1. Tenders to be invited on the basis of specifications prepared 
by the Director of Housing for all future work of this 
description. 
2. That the City Development Officer should report on the 
possibility of including more obsolescent houses in areas of 
comprehensive development on the line suggested in the report 
of the Director of Housing. 
3. That the appropriate officials should report on the possibility 
of dealing with "Improvement Areas" in the city similar to those 
in Leeds to which a favourable reference had been made by the 
Minister of Housing and Local Government. (Report on Repair 
and Improvement of Acquired Properties P.H.C. October 1961). 
From the point of view of this research, the above three points are 
important in two respects. Firstly they highlight a difference of 
professional opinion between the City Architect and the new Housing 
Director, as to what the level of modernisation and repair work 
should be. In the ensuing debate, the Housing Director's advice was 
followed, whereas it is more "normal" to consider the Architects 
advice as overriding. Secondly, here we see the start of a Housing 
Action Area (H.A.A.) by a Conservative controlled authority some nine 
years before such areas were officially designated in the Housing 
Act 1969 by i Labour Government. This is an example of an embryo 
policy being formulated locally with the guidance of officials of 
the Ministry of Housing and Local Government. It is possible to 
see here the interaction between Local Government officials and 
Central Government officials and the formulation of a policy which 
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ultimately became the national policy of the Labour Party, at a time 
when the Conservative Government under Mr MacMillan was still in 
office. 
In September 1962, the housing committee decided that those rehoused 
from slum clearance should whenever possible be rehoused within the 
city, whilst persons whose needs for accommodation arose for reasons 
other than slum clearance, except for m ~ d i c a l l and Rent Act cases 
for rehousing, should be rehoused at Leigh Park. (P.R.C. September 
1962). 
In April 1963, a report on the Redevelopment of Clearance Areas was 
presented to Portsmouth City Housing Committee (P.R.C. April 1963). 
Originally, the number for clearance had been 7,000, but this was 
reduced to 3,041 to be cleared at a rate of 450 per annum. From 
1959 onwards progress was boosted to recover "lost ground" - by 
extending areas as more comprehensive redevelopment became practical 
and it was anticipated in the report that the total number would 
eventually be increased to between 3,500-4,000 dwellings. The report 
stated that in 1963 1,004 houses would be removed, and that the sites 
vacated would be used for the construction of flats. It was a 
shortage of suitable land for building which was slowing down 
-
progress, since it made rehousing difficult. 
Meanwhile in Derby, in January 1962, a further slum clearance plan 
was developed in accordance with the Housing Act 1957. (D.R.C. 
January 1962). This report showed that the number of houses consi-
dered unfit for human habitation was 2,900 and that it would take 
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10 years to clear them all. It was proposed that over the following 
five years 1,350 houses in declared slum clearance areas would be 
removed and that a further 150 dwellings outside the designated 
clearance areas required clearing since they were not worth "patch 
repairing" in order to prolong their life. (D.H.C. January 1962). 
Since only 300 houses were allowed to be built by the local authority 
in Derby in 1962, it would indicate that although the council was 
still Labour controlled, it was implementing the Conservative 
Government's policy of only building local authority houses to 
replace those cleared under slum clearance programmes. 
It is interesting to contrast the two approaches to slum clearance 
targets. In Portsmouth an over optimistic estimate was made of 7,000 
which was later reduced in stages to 3,041 and then revised again 
to 3,500 to 4,000. In Derby a more realistic target was set of 2,900 
and achieved. However in Portsmouth the twilight properties were 
i m p r o v ~ d d and given an extension to their life at the expense of 
Central Government grants some nine years ahead of the statutory 
legislation - so was it such a mistake? - or were the City Architect 
and the City Development Officer for Portsmouth a little more 
farsighted than at first it might appear? 
vi) Some Wait - Others Do Not 
Throughout the period under review the waiting list for accommodation 
in Derby averaged approximately 4,800, peaking at 5,800 in 1958. 
(D.H.C. June 1958). Periodic reviews of the waiting list occurred 
so as to remove the names of those people who since registering had 
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found suitable alternative accommodation and who had used the housing 
register as an insurance policy. Applicants on the waiting list 
for accommodation were periodically required to re-register. In 
Portsmouth the re-registration policy was practiced more rigidly; 
re-registration being required every two years. Certainly the policy 
with regard to applicants for the waiting list and towards re-
registration appears to have been more authoritarian in Portsmouth. 
In Portsmouth, during the 1950's the waiting list rarely fell below 
5,000 applicants, and indeed prior to the December 1956 revision 
of the waiting list over 17,000 applicants were listed as in need 
of accommodation. (P.H.C.). The City Treasurer believed the figure 
to be inflated, and not to represent a true estimate of need. He 
stated that the figure was not of much consequence when continuous 
house building was occurring and satisfaction of demand was unlikely. 
He said that owing to the shortage of land, statistics on 
requirements needed to be updated. He believed that the number on 
the waiting list was likely to be affected by Improvement Grants, 
easier mortgages and private building. He proposed that all 
applicants should be required to re-register from an agreed date and 
that the applicant would be required to signify annually whether they 
wished to remain on the list. He recommended that the waiting period 
be increased from 6 months to 12 months and that applicants would not 
be granted a tenancy unless:-
1. They had lived/worked in Portsmouth for a minimum of 2 years. 
2. Were being rehoused under a slum clearance programme. 
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The City Treasurer also recommended that the points scheme should 
be reviewed, and that where applicants refuse accommodation at Leigh I 
Park, they should have their case reviewed by the Rousing Manager. 
(P.R.C. December 1956). Portsmouth City Council specifically 
excluded from their waiting list service personnel who had not lived 
in Portsmouth for at least 12 months prior to enlistment. This 
particular exclusion caused a good deal of hardship to service 
personnel upon leaving the services, and also ill feeling between 
the Admiralty and the City Council. 
As will be recalled, in 1948, at a time of acute housing shortage, 
Portsmouth embarked on an ambitious programme to attract new 
industries to the city, and thus reduce the city's dependence upon 
naval establishments for employment. A feature of this campaign, 
was that modern council houses were made available to "key workers" 
employed by companies attracted to the area by the scheme. Such 
personnel were usually skilled workers, capable of training a locally 
recruited unskilled workforce in semi-skilled trades. Usually the 
tenancies were offered for two years, at the full economic rent, 
the employer being required to guarantee rent payments for the first 
six months. If the key worker left his employer then he was usually 
required to vacate his house. The properties offered were usually 
brand new houses on the Leigh Park estate. The "key worker" policy 
created resentment among applicants on the waiting list, who saw 
the policy as one which allowed queue jumping by individuals, who 
because they were skilled, were in an economic position to be able 
to buy a place of their own on the open market. A somewhat different 
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view was taken in a letter from the Chamber of Commerce asking for 
the committee to continue to give support in the housing of key 
personnel. (Letter dated 9th March 1955 to P.R.C. from Portsmouth 
Chamber of Commerce). The Town Clerk was instructed to reply that 
in "suitable cases" support would be given to the housing of key 
personnel. (P.R.C. March 1955). In December 1956 the housing 
committee decided that each key worker application should be 
considered on its merits. (P.R.C. December 1951). In February 1957 
the City Treasurer reported to the Rousing Committee that he felt 
that the key worker policy was being abused and he said he believed 
that not all key workers nominated were in fact key workers. (Report 
of City Treasurer on Key Workers to P.R.C. dated 6th February 1957). 
The council decided that in future applicants circumstances would be 
investigated by Councillor Day in his capacity of chairman of the 
Development and Estates (Industrial Development) Sub-Committee 
(P.R.C. February 1957). Councillor Day was also a member of the 
Rousing Committee. 
In April 1957, Portsmouth City Council held a special meeting to 
discuss key worker policy. Councillor Day defined a key worker as 
"an employee who was necessary to establish an industry, who would 
stay with the firm for a number of years, and was in receipt of a 
reasonable salary". (P.C.C. April 1957). Just prior to the meeting, 
tenants classified as key workers had complained about the level 
of rents being charged to them. As a result of their lobbying, it 
was decided at the meeting their rents would not be increased apart 
from an increase in rates. The City Treasurer stated that letters 
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had been sent to all key workers who could not afford the standard 
rent. In such cases he said the rent would be reassessed having 
regard to income, and in certain cases a rebate would be granted. 
The following policy decisions were also taken at the meeting:-
1. Employers should notify the council of any key worker leaving 
their employment, together with reasons. 
2. Employers should consider making up any deficiency in the rent 
of employees absent through sickness. 
3. Employers should consider paying the rent on accommodation let 
to key workers for a period of 2 years, after which they would 
be classified as ordinary tenants (p.e.e. April 1957). 
In January 1958 a further review of key worker policy took place. 
At this meeting it was decided that employers should be asked to 
guarantee rents for six months and then the tenancy "should be 
treated as a normal one". (P.R.e. January 1958). This relaxation of 
policy, from that determined in April 1957 reflects the reluctance of 
employers to effectively stand as guarantor for their employees for 
two years. It was also decided though, that key worker accommodation 
should once again be offered at the maximum possible rent, and that 
the tenant be informed of this prior to taking up his tenancy. 
(P.R.e. January 1958). This policy was re-affirmed in April 1960 
when it was again decided that key workers should pay the economic 
rent, and such tenants should be excluded from the rent rebate 
scheme. Additionally it was confirmed that it would still be a 
requirement for employers to guarantee rents for six months. (P.R.e. 
April 1960). 
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The key worker policy was again reviewed by the Director of Housing 
in January 1961. In his report, he stated that 770 employees of 
30 firms had been housed as key workers since the inception of the 
scheme. During 1960, 260 applicants were housed under the scheme 
and the outstanding allocations at 1st January 1961 were 287, the 
majority of the allocations being at Leigh Park. (Report on Key 
Workers by Director of Housing for Portsmouth, dated 18 January 
1961). Mr Dant said that key workers tended to pay higher rents, 
"because they were higher income earners" (Housing Director's Report 
January 1961). This appears to be at variance with the protests made 
by key worker tenants but in tune with the thinking of the committee 
members. He said that the policy had been successful in attracting 
new industries to the city and that such a policy is encouraged by 
the government in development areas - Portsmouth of course was not 
and is not in a development area. The government gave local 
authorities in development areas £24p.a. to relieve the financial 
burden of key workers policies for which Portsmouth did not qualify. 
The Director also reiterated the benefits of key workers to the 
prosperity of the local economy and the need for new industries. The 
committee decided that in future accommodation should be allocated 
only to those companies willing to train apprentices. (P.H.C. 
January 1961). Mr Dant commented that many local residents were 
upset by the-key worker policy, particularly those who but for the 
fact they live in the area already, are key workers. However Mr Dant 
added, that key workers went to Leigh Park when it was unpopular, but 
with the lengthening of the waiting list, Leigh Park had become 
less unpopular, and the key workers were he felt being used as 
"scapegoats". (Housing Directors Report January 1961). 
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In October 1962 the Plessey Company wrote asking the committee to 
speed up the housing of key workers, since key workers had taken 
up appointments with the company and were now separated from their 
families. The company were informed that the whole of the key worker 
policy was once again under review. (P.R.C. October 1962). At the 
same meeting a letter from the A.U.E.W. was considered which stated 
that in their opinion the term key worker was inacurate and that 
such people should be more properly regarded as skilled workers whose 
remuneration was no more than the basic trade union rates. (P.R.C. 
October 1962). They stated quite clearly their opposition to the 
concept of key-workers. From 1st January 1963 the policy of making 
block allocations to companies of houses for key workers was 
discontinued, partly because of pressures from the A.U.E.W. and 
partly because such a policy was felt to be no longer necessary to 
attract new industry. Rousing units were from then on allocated 
key workers as a result of individual applications by firms on the 
recommendation of the Sub-Development and Estates (Industrial 
Development) Committee, the period of occupancy being restricted to 
two years. (P.R.C. November 1962). 
Derby Town Council did not pursue a policy of key worker housing. 
Possibly the local employment market was a little more stable, there 
being five main employers in a broader spread of industries ie. Rolls 
Royce (aero-engineering), British Rail (engineering), British 
Celanese, now Courtaulds - Chemicals and Textiles, Burmid Qualcast 
(engineering, motor components), International Combustion (generating 
equipment). The new technology industries had established themselves 
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in Derby in the inter-war years. In Portsmouth, the council decided 
to attract them to remove the dependence upon the naval dockyards. 
The key workers housing programme was part of the campaign. It was a 
purely local policy with no Ministry of Housing and Local Government 
pressure either way. The council's campaign was successful in 
attracting electronics and computer companies such as I.B.M. Ltd., 
G.E.C. Ltd., Marconi Ltd., and Plessey Ltd., all attracted by the 
naval presence and nearness to a major customer. Many other 
companies were also attracted though, such as John Wyeth & Co., (U.S. 
drugs company) and the Bell Punch Co., (manufacturer of ticket 
systems). 
vii) It Has To Be Paid For 
Throughout the period under review in this chapter Derby Town Council 
did not adopt any revised scheme for calculating the rents until 
it was obliged to implement the Housing Finance Act 1972, and then, 
as we shall see later, it was not until after a fierce political 
storm in the Council Chamber. In Derby the council have always 
believed in levying a low rent for their property, one which 
reflected the cost of construction and not the cost of replacement 
or the current market value. Consequently, there has always been 
a large discrepancy between the rentals of older dwellings and those 
of new dwellings. The Derby Town Council's aim of levying the lowest 
possible rents reflects in reality an ideal of the Labour Party and 
since the Labour Party remained in control of Derby Town Council 
throughout this period, it is hardly surprising to find such a policy 
being pursued. The policy was in marked contrast to the one being 
pursued in Portsmouth during the same period. In Portsmouth, the 
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Conservatives were in control throughout the period, and there the 
aim was to follow the Conservative ideal of charging economic rents 
wherever possible. As we have seen above this was the rent policy 
with key workers, but it was also the theme of successive rent 
reviews throughout the period. Additionally Portsmouth City Council 
has a policy of building houses for "higher income groups". These 
properties were larger, built to a better specification, and let 
at the full commercial rent. The City ~ o u n c i l l maintained a separate 
waiting list for such properties. The properties were built in small 
groups on the periphery of the large estates at Paulsgrove and Leigh 
Park and proved to be quite popular with professional people moving 
to the area, and in many respects could be viewed upon as an 
extension to the key worker housing policy, although they were not 
allocated exclusively for such use. 
In December 1956, the Portsmouth City Treasurer produced a report 
which recommended that rents should be fixed according to income. 
(P.R.C. December 1957). During September 1957 a special meeting 
was held in Portsmouth to consider the objections to the rental 
scheme suggested by the City Treasurer. (P.R.C. September 1957). 
General criticisms were made to the City Treasurer by tenants 
regarding the style of the income form. The City Treasurer said 
that the aim was to give a subsidy to those who needed it and not 
those who do not indiscriminately; he believed hardship could be 
avoided by using different rents. Criticism was also made of the 
way in which earnings were calculated, and the period used. Rents 
were based on past earnings, tenants being required to notify the 
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City Treasurer of any change, where it could be proved that a 
tenant's income had been reduced because of unemployment, cessation 
of overtime or any other cause, the tenant's rent would be reduced. 
The inclusion of overtime in the calculation was a major source of 
criticism; however the City Treasurer said that if a person was 
applying for a subsidy, then all income should be included 
irrespective of source. He added that the concept of disregarding 
. part of a wife's earnings was equitable, since additional expenses 
would be incurred in earning such income. The tenants were critical 
of the fact that the rents ignored any lack of modern conveniences. 
The City Treasurer's reply was that rent was based on rateable value, 
determined by the Inland Revenue. He believed that in the past many 
houses had been under-assessed, and that amenities were ignored 
because rent was based purely on income and the number of persons 
accommodated. The income scale was designed so that the tenant who 
was paying more than the minimum and less than the maximum would only 
have a slight increase. The City Treasurer believed many tenants had 
been required to pay sufficient rent in the past. Many tenants 
believed the scheme to be too complicated to understand. The City 
Treasurer took an almost unbelievably arrogant stance on this 
particular issue. He stated that any scheme which tries to introduce 
equity is likely to be complex. As far as the administration of the 
scheme was concerned, the complexities of the formula were avoided by 
the use of a ready reckoner, which gives exclusive rents for all 
ranges of income. He said that not all tenants would understand the 
formula even if it were disclosed to them, but this was largely a 
question of mental ability rather than complexity; some tenants 
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would have the greatest difficulty in understanding the most simple 
scheme. The formula was kept secret in order to avoid evasion. This 
was because children's earnings were not verified, and if tenants 
were told that only 1/3 of the children's earnings were taken into 
account, many of them would deliberately understate the earnings. 
The City Treasurer believed that if the differential rents scheme was 
abandoned and fixed rents related to gross or rateable value 
introduced instead, this would mean that those tenants on low 
incomes, who could least afford an increase in rent, would have their 
rent increased, and those with higher incomes would receive a 
reduction in rent. (P.R.C. September 1957). The City Treasurer's 
advice was ignored, for on 27th September 1957, under a scheme 
decided upon at a further special meeting, the Rousing Committee 
decided that there would be no rent rebates. The rents would in 
future be all-inclusive taking into account current economic trends. 
It was pointed out that rents would still be below the private rented 
sector, even with no rate fund subsidy. The committee hoped that 
council tenants occupying accommodation too large or expensive for 
their needs would be encouraged to move to smaller premises. It was 
felt that sufficient smaller type premises were being built to 
facilitate this movement; alternatively, tenants should be allowed to 
sublet with council permission. (Special meeting of P.R.C. September 
1957). Rere we can see the committee clearly overriding the advice 
of one of its chief officers ie. The City Treasurer. In fact this 
decision marked a water-shed in his influence over housing policy. 
As evidence of the changed attitude to him, he was asked to prepare a 
report on Rousing Administration. This report was requested as a 
result of pressure on the council relating to housing administration 
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and the treatment of tenants. As a result of the report, a Housing 
Director was appointed from 1st January 1959 and much of the City 
Treasurer's influence on housing policy diminished. A separate 
Department of Housing was created from the Housing Division of the 
City Treasurers. (Special Meeting of P.H.C. Sub-Committee 26 March 
1958). Such problems did not arise in Derby, since there had always 
been a separate Housing Department, headed initially by a Housing 
Manager, and from 1959 onwards a Director of Housing. 
It was not until July 1961 that Mr J. Dant, the person appointed 
to the position as Housing Director for Portsmouth produced a report 
on Rent Structure and Income. (Director of Housing's Report on Rent 
Structure and Income in Porstmouth). He suggested that there was 
a need for a general increase in rents. The reason for the large 
increases was the high cost of multi-storey flats. Also in his 
report he advocated the introduction of a 24 payment year for rents, 
as a way of economising on rent collection. The reduction in the 
number of payments became a favourite hobby horse of Mr Dant, as we 
shall see later in this research. (Director of Housings Report 5th 
July 1961). Mr Dant said that rents should remain linked to rateable 
values and that since rents in the private sector are determined by 
supply and demand, because city properties were more popular than 
properties at Leigh Park, the city properties should take the brunt 
of the increases. (Director of Housings Report 5th July 1961). It 
is interesting to note, that in the previous three years, rents had 
been charged on a "pool" basis and that no support had been 
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necessary from the rates. Mr Dant advocated that rent rebates should 
be reduced and the onus to be placed upon the tenants to claim 
benefit from the National Assistance Board (now D.H.S.S.) where 
eligible. (Director of Housing's Report 6th July 1961). The 
committee were clearly pursuing a high rents policy as opposed to a 
low rents policy followed in Derby, where annual deficits were made 
up from the Rate Fund. 
During the period under review we see in comparison between the two 
cities sharp contrasts in rents policy. In Derby, a steady policy 
of low rents and stable administration; in Portsmouth a policy which 
was quite "hard line" at times, of high rents and of no rate support 
to the Housing Revenue Account. 
viii) Shall We Sell Some? 
Throughout the period under review in this chapter it was the policy 
of Derby Town Council not to sell any local authority properties. 
This decision of course was completely in line with national Labour 
Party policy, but was against the policy of the Conservative Central 
Government. 
A somewhat different approach was taken in Portsmouth where despite 
lengthening waiting lists the council decided in 1953 to commence 
the sale of council houses. (P.H.C. June 1953). It will be recalled 
from Chapter 4 that as early as 1948, members of the city council 
has asked the housing committee to ensure that council house designs 
were such that they would be capable of being sold at some future 
date. (P.H.C. March 1948). 
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The basis of valuation for sales made by the City Estates Officer 
was that the minimum sale price was twenty times the 1952 Rent. 
(Housing Act 1952). In June 1957 the City Estates Officer requested 
the committee to reconsider the valuation process, but the committee 
voted 12 to nil to leave the valuations as they were. (P.H.C. June 
1957). The issue had been brought to a head since a number of 
applications had been received from tenants of houses completed 
before 8th May 1945 to purchase. Propo$als under the new rents 
structure would have in many cases had the effect of increasing the 
rent above the weekly repayment figures at which tenants would be 
able to buy. (P.H.C. June 1957). In February 1959, Mr Dant the 
Director of Housing produced a report on the sale of council houses. 
He stated that tenants were still able to buy at twenty times the 
1952 rent - 14/8d per week on average (73 pence) and he stated that 
the average 1959 rental was 34/= (£1.70p). If the tenant was to 
purchase on mortgage, the repayments would be 21/3d (£1.06p) or 12/9d 
(64p) less per week. (Report of Housing Director 18th February 
1958). The report made two recommendations:-
1. That sales should be restricted to post war properties and 
tenants in pre-war properties should transfer to post war 
properties if they wish to buy a council property. 
2. A deposit of £30 should be required. 
He commented that pre-war houses were being sold at the rate of 2 
or 3 per week. The committee decided to fix the desposit at £10 
and to restrict sales to houses built since 8th May 1945. (P.H.C. 
February 1958). 
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A reversal in policy came in June 1961 when the housing committee 
decided to halt the sale of council houses from 7th June 1961. A 
total of 643 houses had been disposed of. (P.H.C. June 1961). The 
Housing Director produced a report indicating that he was opposed 
to further sales of houses, since interest in purchase had waned 
and only the best houses were being sold. This is a very interesting 
decision since political control had not changed in Portsmouth and 
the Conservative controlled Central Government had become even more 
favourably inclined towards the sale of council houses. 
ix) Carrying On 
The period 1954-1964 did not witness any significant change in the 
political complexions of the administration of either city. Derby 
remained controlled by the Labour group; Portsmouth the Conservative 
group, whilst the Central Government was a Conservative one until 
October 1964. However, all three had the common aim of improving 
the standard of living accommodation for their citizens, and so the 
councils worked within the framework set out by Central Government. 
Derby Town Council appears to have been more ready to increase public 
expenditure in the mid 1950's and despite differences of political 
complexion, all the local politicians appear to have been more than 
willing to take advantage of increases in available funds. In 
Portsmouth by contrast they were far more reticent on such matters. 
The needs of the cities is reflected by the lengthening waiting lists 
for accommodation, and what is more, the waiting lists did not 
reflect the true "needs" of the cities, since they did not include 
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all those housed in properties soon to be declared slums. During 
the mid 1950's Central Government started to turn its head to 
tackling the slums of the large cities. The Second World War had 
delayed the clearing of squalid houses by upwards of 20 years, and 
this was the major problem to be tackled. People living in the areas 
needed to be re-housed. In Portsmouth the City Architect favoured 
the redevelopment of the sites with high rise blocks of flats and 
his forceful personality allowed such schemes to go ahead. In Derby, 
the experience of high rise blocks was a short and bitter one, and 
the cleared sites were used for commercial purposes and those 
displaced rehoused on greenfield sites on the periphery of the town. 
During the period under review, a shortage of building land developed 
in both cities and the solution to this contrasts markedly between 
the two authorities. Portsmouth went in for high rise blocks, Derby 
preferred greenfield sites in a neighbouring authority's area and 
extending estates already constructed. Also during this period the 
basic infra-structure was super-imposed upon the early post war 
housing estates in an attempt to provide new localities with the 
basic facilities of education, health and shops. Again divergence 
in policy between the two cities - at least initially - may be 
observed; Derby initially favoured large out of town shopping 
centres; one large shopping centre for each estate, but later 
favoured the scheme in Portsmouth from the outset, that of having 
small groups of shops dispersed throughout each estate. 
198 
When from 1957 the Central Government was encouraging a decline in 
the number of houses built by the public sector, it was encouraging 
the creation of a greater need by requiring slum clearance programmes, 
to be implemented. Derby Town Council appears to have responded 
in an almost apolitical way, with the exception of not selling any 
council houses and maintaining a low rental policy - not minor 
exceptions. Portsmouth in the main followed Conservative mainstream 
thought for the time, and had an excellent rapport with the ~ t l n i s t r y y
of Housing and Local Government officials and a City Architect who 
welded this relationship to the advantage of Portsmouth or at least 
what appeared to be to the advantage of Portsmouth. Mr Mellor, the 
City Architect was a great believer in high rise flats and his 
enthusiasm seems to have been the driving force behind their 
construction. During this period the City Treasurer of Portsmouth's 
influence over housing matters was somewhat eclipsed by the 
appointment of a Housing Director, which came about after many 
complaints relating to housing administration. Derby Town Council 
does not appear to have been subject to such pressures from the 
public. As we shall see in the next chapter, the impact on policy 
and personnel in Portsmouth of pressure groups became increasingly 
important. 
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CHAPTER SIX LET'S BUILD UP - THE SKY IS THE LIMIT 
i) Background 
In this chapter I shall examine the influences on housing policy 
processes in both Derby and Portsmouth during the period 1964 to 
1974. This period was an important one in post war housing policy 
since it was during this period that the Central Government turned 
its attention to the retention and improvement of the late 19th 
Century properties and away from mass clearance programmes. It was 
the period which witnessed the introduction of Housing Action Areas 
(H.A.A.'s) and General Improvement Areas (G.I.A.'s). It was also 
a time which witnessed the full impact of high rise developments; 
a time when the skylines of many of our cities were changed beyond 
recognition; a time when for instance the skyline of Portsmouth was 
dramatically altered through high rise development, whilst in Derby 
more traditional methods of rehousing were still being employed. 
The housing problems of both Derby and Portsmouth in the immediate 
post war years had been acute and both authorities had by 1954 
prepared ambitious plans for the development of large new estates 
on greenfield sites beyond their respective county borough 
boundaries, with quite optimistic plans for infra-structure on the 
new estates. These policies represent the high point in post war 
local authority housing, and also represent the view that improved 
housing presented a "social cure all". In the second half of the 
period reviewed in this chapter, a certain amount of disillusionment 
had set in with regard to housing being a "social cure all" and there 
was a slow realisation emerging that improved housing conditions 
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alone would not cure social problems. Concern was also shown at 
the social effects of high rise developments from the late 1960's 
onwards and this was possibly concentrated by the events 
at Ronan Point in Newham in June 1968, when a gas explosion led to 
the partial collapse of a block of system built flats. This single 
event possibly had more impact on rehousing policy and implementation 
than any other, either political or economic, since it caused local 
authorities - including as we shall see in this chapter - Portsmouth 
- to re-examine their housing programmes. 
In a political sense, the period 1964-1974 was one of change, since 
in October 1964 a General Election saw the return of Mr Harold Wilson 
as the Prime Minister of a Labour Government after 13 years of 
Conservative Government. The Labour Party remained in Government, 
until 1970 after winning the general election in 1966. In June 1970, 
Mr Edward Heath formed a Conservative Government until February 1974, 
when once again Mr Wilson was returned to power. 
At the local level, the politics of the two authorities were a little 
more stable. The Conservatives retained control of Portsmouth 
throughout the period and gained control in Derby in 1968 for the 
first time in 42 years. They retained power until 1972 when again 
the local Labour Party took control. The Conservative victory in 
1968 followed the alteration in the boundaries of the County Borough 
and the inclusion of some suburbs within the borough for the first 
time. 
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In an organisational sense, the period 1964-74 was also one of 
change, since in the latter part of the period local government 
reorganisation was an issue very much to the fore. Additionally, 
internal reorganisation within the local authorities was also set 
in train as a result of the Bains Report in 1972. 
The period then is one of great significance since it is a period 
of consolidation of programmes, and of political and organisational 
change. 
ii) Keep On Building - Delays and Clashes 
In January 1964, Portsmouth City Council's housing department took 
possession of their 15,OOOth property since the end of the Second 
World War. (P.R.C. January 1964). 
In Derby, it was not until May 1965, that a major landmark was 
reached in post war local authority housing development when the 
10,OOOth dwelling to be constructed for the council was completed, 
and this "happened" to be one of the flats in the Rivermead tower 
block referred to in Chapter 5. (D.R.C. February 1965). The ensuing 
publicity was used to announce a policy change in allocation of the 
flats. It was decided that the allocation should be:-
a) One bedroomed flats: 
i) for single persons occupying one of the authorities' 
houses following the death of their parents, 
ii) tenants of pre- and post-war houses which are considered 
to be underoccupied - childless couples, couples with 
grown up families etc. 
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b) Normal applicants for accommodation. (D.H.C. February 1965). 
Clearly those housed in flats under (a) above would release housing 
for the maximisation of its use, but the policy was criticised at 
the time as being inhuman. A 'policy gap' in the Derby Housing 
programme had been the failure to provide one bedroomed accommodation 
for single persons and for middle-aged couples whose families had 
grown up. The one bedroomed flats in Rivermead House were an attempt 
to remedy this failure, which had been precipitated by the policy of 
Central Government not to pay a housing s_ubsidy for one bedroomed 
accommodation. Government policy was to make provision for the 
accommodation of families. Also Derby Housing Committee under 
Alderman Flint had always followed a policy of "Grant Maximisation" 
as well as "House Usage Maximisation", 
Meanwhile, Portsmouth City Council maintained a modest flow of new 
traditional houses. For instance in July 1964, 559 traditional 
houses were contracted for, making a total of 1,842 dwellings of 
all kinds contracted for. (P.H.C. January 1964). The major problem 
facing Portsmouth City Housing Department in the summer of 1964 was a 
shortage of skilled building workers. The shortage of suitable land 
for development was being overcome to a certain extent by development 
sites cleared of slums. Following a policy of "urban renewal", flats 
and masionettes were built on such sites. (P.H.C. September 1964). 
The problems of rehousing problem families was raised in the 
'Portsmouth Evening News'. The Housing Authority was accused of 
following a ghetto policy. (Portsmouth Evening News dated 
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16th September 1964). The council denied this. The waiting list 
in Portsmouth had been reduced to less than 2,000 names on each of 
the 'A' and 'B' waiting lists, and the average period of waiting 
had been reduced to 6 months. The city council felt that this was 
a significant improvement and an indication of their vigorous housing 
policy. However, the waiting list had been carefully screened prior 
to the publication of the figures. Elderly people for instance were 
registered on a separate list, the figures for which were not 
published and it was here that the greatest potential need lay. 
Portsmouth like much of the rest of Britain had an ageing population, 
the housing needs for which were to become more pressing. (P.H.C. 
February 1965). Concern was expressed at the costs of housing 
provision in Portsmouth and a special report was prepared looking at 
a comparison of house building costs with neighbouring local 
authorities, particularly Southampton, a city of similar size and 
geological structure. (P.H.C. February 1965). Mr Mellor, the City 
Architect said that the increased costs were due to Parker-Morris 
standards being adhered to strictly. He believed nevertheless that 
if standards were reduced to save a few hundred pounds, it would be 
"at the expense of tomorrow". Several members of the committee 
though, rather pointedly asked the question as to whether or not the 
tenants could afford the properties being built. (P.H.C. February 
1965). In Southampton a 3 bedroomed semi-detached house of 965 
square feet cost £2,410, whereas in Portsmouth a similar property of 
1,154 square feet cost £3,088. The Portsmouth property however had 
larger rooms and was better equipped. It should be borne in mind 
though that the Parker-Morris Report recommended such properties 
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should have a minimum of 800 square feet (Parker-Morris Report 1961) 
and that many properties built in the private sector still do not 
comply with its recommendations. The City Architect however 
persuaded the council that high standards should be maintained. 
(P.R.C. February 1965). There was, however no reason for 
complacency. The Tenants Association's annual report for 1965 
claimed that only 1200 dwellings out of over 8,000 dwellings on the 
Leigh Park Estate had been built to Parker-Morris standards, and 
that the proportion on the Paulsgrove estate and within the city 
was similar. Of course many of these dwellings were constructed 
before the Parker-Morris Committee reported in 1961. Further they 
said that the council should build properties which could be afforded 
by the tenants. They claimed that their rents were based on the 
Parker-Morris standards, whereas the majority of dwellings were below 
that standard. (Report of Portsmouth Tenants Association, 
15th September 1965). There appears to be considerable variance 
between the views of the City Architect and that of the Tenants 
Association, and as we shall see later in this chapter, the Tenants 
Association in the late 1960's and during the 1970's under the 
chairmanship of the Reverend Todd, became a considerable pressure 
group in Portsmouth and a force to be reckoned with by the Portsmouth 
City Rousing Committee. 
In both cities during 1966 contracts were let for the building of 
dwellings using industrialised methods of construction. In Derby 
it was decided to build 340 three bedroomed maisonettes to 'Parker-
Morris' standards, complete with warm air central heating. (D.H.C. 
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February 1966). In Portsmouth a negotiated contract was agreed with 
George Wimpey & Co. for the construction of 136 flats (also to 
Parker-Morris standards) and a 2 deck car park. The flats were to 
be one and two bedroomed dwellings. Comments were made as to the 
high cost of the flats, but the City Architect stated that they were 
within the Government's cost yardstick. The high costs were due 
to:-
1. Lifts stopping at each floor. 
2. Use of double glazing. 
3. Use of gas warmrair central heating. 
4. High proportion of one bedroomed flats within the block. 
These two contracts bring out the difference in approach to 
satisfying housing needs in the two cities in the mid 1960's. In 
Derby the trend was for traditional 3 bed two storey houses, or 3 
bed two storey masionettes, in Portsmouth the trend was towards high-
rise flats of one or two bedrooms built on a negotiated contract 
basis as opposed to the open tender method of contracting used in 
Derby. The tendering procedure in Portsmouth was revised in April 
1966 for the Portsdown Hill project, which the City Housing Committee 
seemed to believe at that time, would be the envy of the South Coast. 
The site of the Portsdown development was at the foot of the South 
Down escarpment and overlooked the Solent and the Isle of Wight. 
But, as we shall see later, the geology of the area gave rise to 
many problems. 
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The City Rousing Committee decided to use selective tendering for 
this ambitious project, with either a fixed price for the whole 
contract, or a fixed price for the first two years (P.R.C. April 
1966). 
As a means of assessing the housing needs of Portsmouth, the Rousing 
Director suggested that the City's Rousing Register should be 
redrawn. Re made the following recommendations:-
1. Applicants over the age of 60 years should re-register 
annually. 
2. Applications from engaged couples should be accepted for a 
reserve list for one year. 
3. Applications should not be accepted from applicants who have 
adequate self-contained accommodation, except from those over 
60 years and those recommended for rehousing by the Medical 
Officer of Realth. (P.R.C. February 1967). 
The house building programme on sites 4, 5 and 6 at Leigh Park was 
extended to include 459 dwellings instead of the originally planned 
417 dwellings. (P.R.C. March 1967). It was reported, however, that 
181 dwellings on site 1 at Leigh Park would not qualify for a subsidy 
since the proposals did not comply with Ministerial policy in terms 
of size. (P.R.C. March 1967). The authority decided to proceed 
with the development without financial aid from Central Government. 
The Town Clerk stated that there was still a need to provide more 
small units of accommodation and he suggested that the proposed 
housing developments at Crookhorn Rouse and Wecock Farm should be:-
1 bedroomed units 
2 bedroomed units 
3 bedroomed units 
5 bedroomed units 
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50% 
15% 
27% 
8% 
A further proposition was made that on the proposed Buckland 
Redevelopment scheme, no 1 bedroomed accommodation should be provided 
and that 60% of the total accommodation should be 2 bedroomed units. 
(P.R.C. June 1967). 
In his report to the housing committee, the Town Clerk stated that 
between 1951 and 1961 the population of Portsmouth fell by some 
18,500 people, and that in the same period the number under 45, 
decreased by 23,500, and the number under 15 fell by 6,000. A fall 
in Education needs had adversely effected the needs element of the 
Rate Support Grant. Although there had been an increase in the level 
of employment within the city, many people worked in the city but 
lived beyond the city boundaries. The needs of the elderly have 
to be catered for; out of 2,250 applications for accommodation, 900 
were from Old Age Pensioners. The Town Clerk emphasised that 
circular 21/65 stated the need to develop houses generally and not 
just special categories. By re-housing retired people, larger units 
would become available for younger people. (P.C.C. June 1967). 
Thus we can see that Portsmouth City Rousing Committee was being 
advised to follow a similar policy ie. rehousing ageing people so 
as to release larger units of accommodation, rather than continuing 
to build larger units. The city council was faced with the problems 
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of housing a declining, ageing population. This rehousing policy 
had already been adopted in Derby as we have seen above. It is also 
interesting to note here the increasing influence of the Town Clerk 
on the determining of housing policy in Portsmouth together with 
the City Architect, at the expense of the Housing Director and more 
particularly the City Treasurer. The shortfall in housing provision 
in the late 1960's can be seen in the following figures for 
Portsmouth:-
Year Estimated Need A.nticipated Construction 
--
1968 1654 927 
1969 2008 1019 
1970 2407 1000 
1971 2167 1000 
1972 1974 1000 
1973 1988 1000 
The above figures include a provision for 100 Essential Workers 
houses in 1971. 
Source: Report to Portsmouth City Housing Committee dated 
13th December 1967 
The collapse of the Ronan Point flats at Newham in June 1968 did 
not dissuade Portsmouth City Council from continuing to build high 
rise blocks, some up to 18 storeys, although by the time of Ronan 
Point, the city council had over 2,000 such units of accommodation. 
In excess of 1,000 flats were built to the Ronan Point design ie. 
they were known as "System Built" flats. In these towers blocks 
it was felt necessary to turn off the gas supplies (a primary cause 
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of the Ronan Point collapse). This proved difficult since they had 
gas central heating and gas cooking facilities (P.R.C. September 
1968). The contractors for each block were contacted and the plans 
of each block examined by the City Architect and City Engineer. 
Other problems were being experienced with the high rise flats, the 
main ones being water penetration and condensation. These problems 
gave rise for serious concern and it was felt adviseable that an 
independent architect should be appointed to seek a solution to the 
problem. (P.R.C. September 1968). 
Drainage problems were also being encountered with the development of 
Crookhorn Farm which was situated within the Ravant Vrban District 
Council's jurisdiction. These problems were holding up the provision 
of traditional houses for letting. In November 1965 a local inquiry 
was held into the city council's application to develop 95 acres 
of land east and west of Crookhorn Lane for housing and other 
purposes. The inquiry was held because Ravant V.D.C. objected, 
claiming that the development would be a major departure from the 
development plan for the area. Ravant V.D.C. also claimed that there 
were drainage problems associated with the site. Portsmouth City 
Council disputed this but they were subsequently proved wrong. The 
Minister of Rousing and Local Government agreed to the site being 
developed on three conditions:-
1. That the Local Authority - Ravant V.D.C. - should agree to 
the siting, design and external appearance, or in default of 
agreement, the M1nister should determine these features. 
2. 
3. 
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That the site should be landscaped as required by the Local 
Authority. 
That the space to be provided for the parking of vehicles should 
be agreed with the Local Authority. 
The Havant Engineer however stated that the site could not be 
developed due to the absence of suitable run-off for surface water; 
this would cause flooding if surface water was heavy. Havant U.D.C. 
stated that this would mean there would be a delay of at least 2 
years in the development of the site. The Town Clerk of Portsmouth 
advised the Housing Committee that they could successfully sue 
Havant U.D.C. for negligence and he advised the council to take 
counsel's opinion as to the success of such action. The Town Clerk 
said that the delay at Crookhorn would "upset" the housing programme 
for 1969 and 1970 - 850 houses had been planned. He suggested that 
there were in fact very few alternatives open to the council and 
the following course of action was decided upon:-
1. Not to build an impounding lake because of the risk of flooding. 
2. The Town Clerk to obtain counsel's opinion on the question of 
liability for costs. 
3. The City Architect should make minor modification to layout 
plans in consultation with the Havant U.D.C. planners. 
4. That none of the land reserved for private development should 
be re-allocated for municipal housing. (Report of Town Clerk 
on Crookhorn Lane Development dated 14th November 1968). 
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In May 1969 Mr Geoffrey Howe Q.C. (now Sir Geoffrey Howe) suggested 
that instead of court action, the city council should first consider 
referring the matter to the Minister, under section 110 of the 
Housing Act 1957. This enables the Minister to settle differences 
between two local authorities where one provides houses in the area 
of the other. This section though was designed primarily to deal 
with disputes that might arise about strictly practical difficulties 
but Mr Howe said that he did not regard this as conclusive that the 
Minister would decline jurisdiction. (P.H.C. 21st May 1969). 
The Town Clerk suggested that the first step should be an informal 
approach to Havant U.D.C. by letter in which he would indicate that 
Portsmouth City Council had been advised that there was legal 
liability, emphasising no wish to go to litigation or take any action 
which would damage the spirit of co-operation that existed between 
,Havant and the city council. The Town Clerk said he believed it 
was only reasonable to ask Havant to make a contribution of 50%. 
However, he was overruled by the council which insisted that he 
sought 100% compensation - £60,800. In the event Havant offered 
50% and this was accepted by Portsmouth City Council. (P.H.C. July 
1969). When the site was developed, Havant's Engineer was proved 
correct; the land was subject to flooding. Portsmouth City Council 
was fortunate in having in its ownership land at Wecock Farm and 
Hilsea and it was decided to commence development on these sites 
immediately, despite the fact that the types and sizes of properties 
were not identical to those planned for Crookhorn Lane. (P.H.C. 
July 1969). The development of Wecock Farm was not however smooth 
going, since the requirements of the Ministry of Housing and Local 
213 
Government under cricular 82/69 - Housing Standards and Costs 
referred specifically to the provision for the elderly and the design 
of such accommodation. The Housing Director said that one person 
flats would have to be built with bed-sitting rooms and he emphasised 
that this would considerably increase his difficulties in persuading 
persons to move out to Wecock Farm. It was decided to make 
representations to the Ministry to ask for an exception to be made. 
Wecock Farm was situated in Havant and Waterloo Urban District, and 
the council there felt that Portsmouth wished to build to too high a 
density and refused to approve the detailed plans without quite major 
alteration, this included the omission of all 8 person 4 bedroomed 
dwellings and Part II Old Aged Persons Dwellings (the bed sit flats 
referred to above). In addition, they asked for land to be used for 
their own use for aged persons dwellings. (P.H.C. May 1970). again 
then, there were problems between Portsmouth City Council and Havant 
and Waterloo U.D.C. with regard to overspill development. 
The relationship between the authorities contrasts sharply with the 
one in Derby, where as we saw in Chapter 5, both South East 
Derbyshire R.D.C. and Belper R.D.C. positively welcomed Derby's 
housing into their areas. Derby Town Council's approach was somewhat 
different in that they asked the authorities if they could identify 
suitable areas for development, and they also offered to take some 
tenants of the host council's waiting list. The difference of 
approach may account for some of the differences - but not all. 
The pressure for land is far greater in the Solent area than in the 
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East Midlands. Havant and Waterlooville were at that time 
independent communities and probably felt threatened by their 
neighbouring city's plans to build 3,000 plus houses in their area 
in a short period of time. Derby Town Council's overspill estate 
were never planned to be in excess of 250 dwellings per development -
these are in the process of being exended, but they are within the 
city boundaries now. Clearly Portsmouth's housing programme suffered 
severe setbacks in the late 1960's because of their acrimonious 
relations with Havant U.D.C. They also s.uffered severe delays to 
their rehousing programme because of delays on the Portsdown site, 
a development of 523 dwellings in "mixed rise" units. The problems 
on the Portsdown site compounded when the contractors Y.S. Lowells 
(Sussex) Ltd. went into liquidation. (P.H.C. December 1970). The 
liquidation followed the council's refusal to seek arbitration on 
the building contract. A scheme which had started out as a prize 
winning development was rapidly becoming an acute embarrassment. 
The council decided to have an independent investigation carried 
out into the whole of the Portsdown contract, and into the affairs of 
the consultants and the officers concerned. 
In December 1971 the Housing Director, in a report indicated that 
there was an estimated demand for 3,750 units of accommodation. This 
figure included a need for 1,000 one bedroomed flats on Portsea 
Island to house old people. Since there was an increase in the 
numbers approaching the marrying age, the Director's forecast was 
substantiated by demographic trends. He estimated that the 
deficiency in housing supply for 1971/72 would be 424 units. 
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The approach of the two authorities to housing development in the 
period 1964-1974 is rather akin to the tortoise and the hare. Derby 
Town Council plodded along with only an average performance, but 
maintaining good working relationships with its neighbouring 
authorities, and developing estates with their full co-operation. 
Portsmouth in contrast bought land and made plans and tried to 
present the neighbouring authorities with a fait accompli and was 
faced with strong reaction from its neighbours. Likewise Derby only 
had a short spell with high rise development. Portsmouth decided 
to build many tower blocks and indeed proceeded to develop the 
Portsdown site for high rise use and ran a competition for the design 
layout of the site. Despite such a glorious start, the City Council 
had tremendous problems with the local geology and also the 
contractors. It is of course easy to criticise events in Portsmouth, 
their schemes were clearly over ambitious. But their need was also 
pressing and the supply of land they had was limited by the sea and 
poor relations with Havant. In Derby a more cautious approach was 
adopted, the need was not so pressing. 
iii) Help Yourself 
In order to try and meet the housing needs of sections of the 
community not being satisfied by local authority programmes, Central 
Government had in the 1957 Housing Act allowed that assistance should 
be given to Housing Associations. (Housing Act 1957). As we saw 
in Chapter Four, as early as 1948, Portsmouth City Council had given 
assistance to self-help groups forming themselves into Housing 
Associations. The City Council believed that encouragement should 
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be given to those wanting self-building groups, where the members 
of the group actually built their own dwellings. (P.H.C. March 
1964). The intention of the 1957 legislation though was for the 
formation of professionally managed Housing Associations rather than 
self-build groups, the building work being undertaken by building 
companies rather than members of the housing association. In more 
recent years national housing associations have emerged usually with 
a specific aim ie. The Hanover Housing Association and its aim of 
housing the elderly in purpose built accommodation. The 1964 Housing 
Act reinforced the obligation to assist Housing Societies/ 
Associations in the provision of new properties, moreover this Act 
extended the obligation to assist such Associations in the renovation 
of existing properties (Housing Act 1964). 
In July 1965 Portsmouth City Council allocated land at Leigh Nursery 
to three self-build housing groups. The majority of the members of 
each society were in fact building trade workers who were at that 
time council tenants. (P.R.C. July 1965). It was also resolved 
that Rousing Associations should be charged £1,000 per plot. (P.R.C. 
July 1965). 
It was not until 1966 that Derby started to encourage the development 
of Housing Associations. The housing committee had tended to look 
upon Rousing Associations as a form of competition with itself rather 
than as a partner in satisfying the housing needs of their town. 
In March 1966 the Rotary Club formed a Housing Association and the 
housing committee agreed to make "a substantial loan" if necessary. 
(D.R.C. March 1966). It was really with the formation of the 
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Walbrook Housing Association in January 1967 that Housing 
Associations started to come into their own in Derby. This 
Association was formed to purchase existing houses, renovate them 
and accommodate families living in overcrowded conditions. It was 
not until 1970 though that the Walbrook Housing Association received 
substantial support from the local authority. (D.H.C. July 1970). 
It is significant that the major housing association in the Derby 
area, the Derwent Housing Association, operates on a co-ownership 
basis. The association builds new properties for young people, 
mainly in the South Derbyshire District, beyond the city boundaries. 
In Derby, in more recent years, housing associations have been joint 
promoters of ventures with the city council in projects catering 
for specific needs, particularly schemes for housing the elderly, 
and the disabled. 
It is interesting to contrast the reactions in Portsmouth and Derby 
to housing associations with that of Bradford. There in November 
1968 the City Housing Committee decided not to build any more council 
houses. (Minutes of Bradford City Housing Committee November 1968). 
It might be suggested that they were placing political ideology above 
the "needs" of the many people on the waiting list for accommodation. 
They firmly believed however that sufficient accommodation could 
be provided by the re-Ietting of corporation dwellings as they became 
vacant, by the letting of corporation dwellings under construction 
at that time, and by dwellings to be erected by housing associations 
as private developers. _The Bradford Housing Committee claimed that 
the housing waiting list was misleading since people were often 
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registered as an "insurance policy". Such people intended to find 
accommodation elsewhere - ie. buy their own house, but wanted a 
council house waiting listing "just in case". 
Housing Associations were encouraged to develop "small dwellings" 
(Minute of Bradford Housing Committee December 1969). A scheme, 
which had been suspended by the city council was taken over by the 
North British Housing Society. The council also sold a 8.56 acres 
of land to the society for £20,000 and made a loan to them of 
£690,000, so that 181 dwellings in two and three storey buildings 
could be erected. Although the council was becoming dependent on 
the housing associations for building low cost accommodation, the 
housing associations in turn were dependent upon the council for 
the necessary finance to carry out the schemes which they proposed. 
The Minister of Housing and Local Government Mr R.H.S. Crossman, 
in a letter to the chairman of the housing committee expressed his 
concern at the housing policy in Bradford. Arguably to encourage 
housing associations to take on the role of provider of housing, 
for rental is too heavy a mantle for such organisations, and one 
which was never intended for them. It is their traditional purpose 
to supplement provision rather than be the main provider. 
In Derby and Portsmouth this was the principle followed. In 
Portsmouth there was an underlying aim of releasing council houses 
and of encouraging self-build groups, but not at the expense of the 
council's own building programme. In Derby, once the initial 
suspicion had been overcome, housing associations were found to be 
219 
useful in catering for the needs of minority groups such as aged 
persons, the disabled, and unmarried mothers. 
iv) Key Workers Become Essential Workers 
In Chapters 4 and 5 reference was made to the key worker policy of 
Portsmouth City Council, and its obvious absence in Derby. This 
divergence in housing policy continued throughout the period covered 
by this chapter despite considerable pressure being put on Portsmouth 
City Council by both individuals, trade unions - notably the A.E.U. 
and by the Portsmouth Trades Council. Derby Town Council on the 
other hand, saw no need to follow such a policy. Throughout the 
period, local industry prospered and the council felt there was no 
need to attract new industries. Even after the collapse of Rolls 
Royce Limited in 1971, the town council still saw no necessity to 
adopt a key worker housing scheme. 
Regular allocations were made of accommodation for essential workers 
by Portsmouth Rousing Committee. In June 1965, for instance, 29 
houses were allocated for essential workers. (P.R.C. June 1965). 
As we saw earlier in this chapter, the housing committee in 
Portsmouth made a provision of 100 dwellings per annum for essential 
workers. The majority of the companies availing themselves of the 
facility were large companies moving to the Portsmouth area and 
included such companies as Allen and Ranburys Ltd. (surgical 
instrument manufacturers), Plessey & Company Ltd., John Wyeth Ltd. 
and The Metal Box Company Ltd. (P.R.C. September 1965). Companies 
did not always receive the number of dwellings they requested though. 
For instance, in October 1965 Plessey and Company Ltd were allocated 
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10 dwellings, although they had requested 15 dwellings and the Metal 
Box Company were allocated a further 2 dwellings, having requested 
4 additional dwellings. (P.R.C. October 1965). 
In March 1966 the local branch of the A.E.U. sent a letter to 
Portsmouth City Housing Committee stating that they would like the 
committee to meet a deputation to discuss the authority's key worker 
policy. The A.E.U. had three aspects of policy which they wished 
to discuss:-
i) The strong feeling amongst essential workers that they were 
being discriminated against in that they had no chance, whatever 
their financial circumstances, of obtaining a rent rebate. 
ii) Many of the essential workers were not earning any more than 
their fellow workers recruited locally. 
iii) That if additional charges were required that the management 
of the firms concerned should be required to pay them. 
(Letter from the Branch Secretary of the A.E.U. to Portsmouth 
City Housing Committee, dated 2nd March 1966). 
The Director of Rousing stated that the third point was not practical 
and although essential workers were excluded from rebates, special 
consideration could be given to individual cases. (P.H.C. March 
1966). 
In January 1968, the Portsmouth policy of including 100 dwellings 
for allocation to essential workers was reaffirmed and it was also 
d ~ c i d e d d to allocate 12 dwellings per annum to small employers. 
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(P.R.C. January 1968). The policy was again reviewed in April 1970. 
A report was made by the Director of Rousing for Portsmouth 
(Mr J.D. Dant) on housing policy towards essential workers. The 
report was submitted to the Portsmouth Rousing Committee on 2nd March 
1970. It stated that since 1st January 1959, 1,479 houses had been 
let to essential workers, of whom 528 were still in occupation. 
Essential workers were informed of the council's mortgage scheme 
upon taking up their tenancy. The report stated that the annual 
demand averaged 123 dwellings (provision 100 dwellings). The 
report had been written, because the city council, in order to 
attract the new Schedule E Inland Revenue Centre for the Southern 
Region to Portsmouth, had promised 100 dwellings per annum to the 
Board of the Inland Revenue. The Board had submitted their first 
request for 100 dwellings. The new office complex being developed 
for the Inland Revenue was likely to create a demand for 350 
dwellings per annum over the following five years. The Housing 
Director believed that there was a need for "a more flexible approach 
to the housing of essential workers". He believed that, because 
Leigh Park was nearing completion it was becoming easier to let 
properties on the Leigh Park Estate - the estate on which essential 
workers were usually offered accommodation. The Housing Director 
believed that a more "flexible" approach to essential workers' 
housing should be taken and that individual applications from 
employers should be carefully monitored. Employers of essential 
workers, it will be recalled from Chapter Five were required to 
guarantee the rents of their employees for two years. The Inland 
Revenue applied for, and was granted, an exemption from this normal 
condition of allocation of such a tenancy. (P.R.C. June 1970). 
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It is interesting to note that within two years of an "essential 
worker" being housed by the city council over 50% of such tenants 
had in fact proceeded to purchase a house of their own. The 
essential worker housing programme was and still is an attractive 
scheme to companies seeking to relocate themselves and it must have 
been a prime consideration of many of the companies who have moved 
into the Portsmouth area since 1945. The policy represented a desire 
by the local authority to widen the industrial and commercial base 
of employment structure of the city, and so reduce its dependence 
on the Admiralty as the major employer. In view of current 
uncertainties about the future of the Portsmouth Naval base, it was a 
very far-sighted policy, even if as explained previously a criticised 
one. Should one of the major employers in Derby suffer a severe 
recession in its industry, then possibly the city council there will 
wish it had had similar foresight. 
v) Fair Rents For All 
As will be recalled from Chapters 4 and 5, the policies of the two 
authorities towards rents were somewhat at variance. In Portsmouth, 
the general policy was that those tenants able to pay an economic 
rent - which Portsmouth referred to as the "standard rent" should 
do so and that assistance should be given only to low income families 
and/or large families. Since their belief was that the Housing 
Revenue Account should be self balancing and that no contribution 
should be made from the General Rates, this policy led to problems 
with the Tenant's Association on Rents Policy. The tenants housed 
under the essential worker programme were charged the full rent, 
irrespective of financial means. 
223 
In Derby, the council's policy was to run the Housing Revenue Account 
at a small deficit; this being cleared by transferring funds from 
the General Rates. 
As we saw in Chapter 4 a Rent Rebate scheme was introduced in Derby 
in 1955 and this was funded from the General Rates, not from within 
the Housing Revenue Account as was the case in Portsmouth. In 
Portsmouth a minimum rent of half the gross value of the rental was 
charged; in Derby such a scale did not operate within the rebate 
scheme. (P.R.C. July 1964). The normal rent was fixed at 1.4 times 
the gross value and was to be paid by a married couple with no 
children with an income over £15 per week, with one child if income 
over £17 per week, and over £19 per week if two children are 
dependent. The rebate scheme in Portsmouth was modified in June 
1965 and the rent year was reduced to 50 payments. (P.R.C. June 
1965). Local Authorities had been encouraged to increase their rents 
by the Ministry of Housing and Local Government which in a letter to 
Local Authorities had stated:-
"In a world of rapid technological change and of rapidly 
expanding economies, there must be a continuous growth of 
wages, of prices and of profits, and if we try to freeze 
rents when the cost of everyghing else is rising the result 
is to create more problems than we solve". 
(Letter from Minister of Housing and Local Government to 
all Local Authorities May 1965). 
The 1965 Rent Rises in Portsmouth provoked a strong reaction from 
the Tenants Association. The rises had averaged 20%. The Tenants 
Association organised two protest marches through Portsmouth, an 
estimated 5,000 taking part in the first one, and 20,000 in the 
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second. (Tenants Association report to P.H.C. June 1965). Here 
we can see pressure being exerted on the city housing committee by 
the Tenants Association, although to little avail. 
In October 1965, Portsmouth City Council decided that there should 
be an independent inquiry into the whole operation of the Housing 
Revenue Account, and that the Organisation and Methods department 
should investigate the administration of the housing department. 
As a result of the decision further rent -increases were deferred 
pending the outcome of the investigations. It was anticipated that 
the Housing Revenue account for 1966/7 would show a deficit and that 
there would be nothing to carry forward from 1965/6. It was 
suggested that the deficit could be carried forward. However, this 
would have been contrary to Section 5 of the 5th Schedule of the 
Housing (Financial Provisions) Act, 1958 which states:-
"where in any financial year a deficit is shown in the 
account, the local authority shall carry to the credit of 
the account for that financial year a contribution of an 
amount equal to the deficit". 
This of course, meant that a contribution would have to be made from 
the General Rate Fund if rents were not increased. (P.R.C. October 
1965) • 
In November 1965, new maximum and minimum rent levels were fixed 
for subsidised dwellings and it was agreed that they would be applied 
from 6th April 1966. The Director of Housing stated that he believed 
that the rent rebate scheme was not functioning properly since he 
believed that under the existing scheme the contributions from wives' 
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earnings were excessive. (p R C N b 196) 
. • • ovem er 5. New scales of 
rebate were therefore introduced alongside the new charges with the 
net effect of a 13\% rent increase at the time of a wage freeze. 
(P.R.C. November 1965). The report on the Rousing Revenue Account 
indicated that if no change had been made, a deficit of £2.93m would 
have been incurred during 1966/67 instead of the anticipated 
£246,000. The 13\% increase would arrive at "reasonable" rents -
less than the principles of the Rent Act. (P.R.C. November 1965). 
In June 1966 the District Auditor issued his report following his 
investigation into the Portsmouth Housing Department. The District 
Auditor made a comparison between Portsmouth and 19 other housing 
authorities in the South East of England. In Portsmouth the average 
rent charged was £2.58p; elsewhere the average ranged from £1.14p 
to £2.37p, when the national average was £2.05p (District Auditors 
Report on Rousing in Portsmouth 1966). The rents were therefore 
high, only exceeded by Greater London according to the C.I.P.F.A. 
housing statistics for 1966. (C.I.P.F.A. Housing Statistics 1966). 
The committee, as a justification for their high rents policy stated 
that they were one of the authorities which had adopted the thorough 
going rent rebate schemes. The number of rebates granted in 1964/65 
was 2,373 - 12% of tenancies, the average rebate being approximately 
70p per week. Only 21 other county boroughs had granted a rebate 
to more than 10% of their tenants. (P.R.C. June 1966). The District 
Auditor stated that the Housing Account had not shown a deficit since 
1957/58, and that the deficit then incurred was met from the general 
rate fund and later recouped. Apart from that, surpluses had been 
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carried forward from year to year, and the surplus at March 31st 
1965 was £46,356 or £2.40p per dwelling - quite small in comparison 
to the turnover. (District Auditor's Report June 1966). It is 
clearly to be inferred that in fixing rents the council, while no 
doubt having regard to the market level of rents for comparable 
properties and to the economic circumstances of their tenants, had 
also an eye to balancing the Housing Revenue Account from year to 
year. The District Auditor thought such a policy was the correct 
way of proceeding, since the Rate Fund contribution was and is at 
the council's discretion. 
In Derby, the council exercises such a discretion annually, ensuring 
that the Housing Revenue Account balances, the deficits being made 
up from a contribution from the General Rate Fund. The two 
approaches to the Housing Revenue Account indicate clearly the two 
ideologies, Conservative versus Labour. The only deviation towards 
the Portsmouth model came in the period 1968-72 when Derby Town 
Council was controlled by the Conservative group. In those years, 
the Housing Revenue Account was not balanced from the General Rate 
Fund. 
The return of the Conservatives to National Government in June 1970 
brought with it a reaffirmation of the economic rent principle under 
the guise of the "Fair Rents" first proposed in the White Paper 'Fair 
Deal for Housing'. (H.M.S.O. 1970). The White Paper was not enacted 
until 1974, and in fact formed the basis of the Housing Finance Act 
1972. 
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In May 1972, Labour regained power in Derby, shortly before the 
Housing Act 1972 was due to be implemented. The new Labour Council, 
under the leadership of John Dilks had pledged itself at the May 
elections to a vigorous housing programme, to removing the slums 
from the inner urban areas of the town, and greatly increasing the 
number of council houses built. John Dilks was an extremely 
ambitious local politician. Indeed he subsequently stood as a 
Parliamentary candidate unsuccessfully on four occasions, including 
the famous Lincoln by-election of March 1973 which Mr Dick Taverne 
won. John Dilks is considered to be to "the left" within the Labour 
Party and is employed by the East Midlands Co-op at their head office 
in Derby as their Public Relations Manager. 
Both Derby Town Council and the Housing Committee were totally 
opposed to the implementation of the Housing Finance Act. As late 
as February 1973 the Housing Committee rejected advice from the Town 
Clerk that the rents of council properties should be raised in 
accordance with the Fair Rents legislation by 50 pence per dwelling, 
the proposition being opposed by the Labour group and supported and 
proposed by the Conservative group. (D.H.C. February 1973). A 
fierce debate arose over this issue, and at one stage it looked as 
though Derby Town Council was going to stand firm again the 
Government policy, as the Council had done at Clay Cross. However, a 
deputation of councillors went to London to meet Mr Peter Walker, 
the then Secretary of State for the Environment and he was adamant 
about his position. 
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Subsequently on 18th June 1973, 50 pence was added to the rents. 
Thus the Derby Town Council belatedly implemented the Housing Finance 
Act 1972. 
In Portsmouth, as one might expect, the Conservative controlled 
authority had implemented the Housing Finance Act 1972 on the correct 
date for implementation - 1st April 1973. Some debate had taken 
place on the implications of the act, but very little opposition 
was put up against its implementation. It is interesting to question 
why Derby was one of the last authorities to implement the Housing 
Finance Act - only Greenock and Clay Cross remained to implement 
the Act after Derby. A possible explanation may be due to the fact 
that after the overwhelming defeat of the Labour group at the 1968 
elections many of the 'old guard' councillors were 'retired' and 
new, younger men came forward, and it was these men who took control 
of the council for the Labour Party in 1972. Some of these new 
councillors had high ambitions of concerns in national politics and 
they held relatively left wing views compared to the 'old guard' 
councillors who were archetypal Labour councillors. Thus one could 
suggest that the ideals of the new Derby councillors were not 
atypical of Labour councillors in general, and further, they could 
draw attention to themselves by refusing to implement legislation 
which the Conservative Government considered to be key legislation. 
In making a comparison then between the two cities, it is clear that 
Portsmouth throughout the period believed in economic rents being 
charged, and that rebates should be given to tenants, thus fostering 
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the Conservative ideology of subsidising people not property. In 
Derby, the belief was in maintaining a low rents policy, balanced 
from the General Rate Fund, something which was avoided in 
Portsmouth. 
vi) Let's Sell The Council Houses 
The sale of council houses in Portsmouth was considered as early 
as 1948, when, as we saw in Chapter Four of this thesis, councillors 
were anxious to ensure that properties built for letting should be 
of a standard capable of being sold at some future date. The sale 
of council houses in Portsmouth started as early as 1954, but was 
abandoned in 1961 because it was felt that such sales discriminated 
against tenants of flats, since only houses were sold. (P.R.C. 
January 1964). Additionally, the cost of replacement houses for 
those sold in order to rehouse families from redevelopment areas 
also served to dissuade Portsmouth City Council from continuing with 
housing sales. (P.H.C. January 1964). 
The Director of Housing, Mr J. Dant in January 1964 published a 
report advocating the re-introduction of council house sales on the 
I 
following basis:-
i) Large estates consisting of tenanted houses only not favoured 
on social grounds, small groups of owner-occupied dwellings 
providing a better social mix. 
ii) Owner occupiers being dispersed by redevelopment. 
iii) The lack of sites for private development within the city tended 
to drive purchasers of new houses outside the city boundaries. 
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iv) Owner occupiers were not subsidised directly and therefore sales 
would relieve pressure on public money. 
v) The sale of houses to applicants would reduce the waiting list 
and sales to tenants would release other houses for letting. 
Mr Dant balanced his report with some of the more familiar objections 
to sales:-
i) A large number of applicants were not in a position to purchase 
a house. 
ii) There is little reason to believe that houses built by the 
council will be any cheaper than those built by private 
companies. 
iii) Many people displaced by redevelopment programmes were quite 
content to become council tenants. 
iv) Sales would widen the choice of those who can afford to buy 
but limit the opportunities of tenants and they might have to 
take tenancies outside the city. 
v) Properties available for sale was controlled by the 
operation of the Rent Act, which at the same time increased 
the pressure on houses to let. To set aside a proportion of 
the councils building programme for sale would have accentuate 
this trend. 
vi) High density of houses would not be attractive to private 
buyers. 
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After a long discussion of Mr Dant's report, the city council decided 
not to restart the sale of council houses to tenants and to those 
on the waiting list for housing. (p R C J 1964) . • • anuary . In February 
1965, further consideration was given to the subject of selling 
council houses to tenants. The council then decided to continue 
their policy of not selling houses to tenants, but that the officers 
concerned should be requested to consider the possibility of 
providing groups of properties in redevelopment areas, either by 
private development or council development, which could be made 
available to persons being disturbed by redevelopment proposals 
or to tenants of existing property. (P.R.C. February 1965). In 
March 1967, against the advice of Mr Dant the housing committee 
decided to re-introduce the sale of council houses. Mr Dant opposed 
the decision stating that it would lead to depletion of housing 
stocks, a loss of the best sites and affect the rents of flats since 
there was a gross subsidy to flats. Re stated that there was no 
overwhelming reason to justify the sale of houses, and that such 
sales were depleting the housing stock. (P.R.C. March 1967). It 
is clear that Mr Dant had misjudged the political climate of his 
committee and of the Tenant's Association who were also in favour of 
such sales on the proviso that the levels of rent were not affected. 
(P.R.C. April 1967). The sales were to be negotiated on the basis 
of the open market price with vacant possession as determined by the 
City Estates Officer. The City Treasurer advised that a substantial 
deposit should be sought, but his advice was ignored and the Rousing 
Committee decided to offer the houses for sale with the benefit of 
100% mortgages and a 25 years repayment period. (P.R.C. April 
1967). 
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In Derby, on 1st April 1968 the County Borough's boundaries were 
extended to take in areas previously in the county. The ruling group 
on the Town Council changed from Labour to Conservative when an 
entirely new council was elected. Only seven Labour councillors 
were returned, out of forty-eight seats, the other forty-one going 
to the Conservatives. The landslide occurred partly because of the 
strong feeling against the Government of the day (Labour) and also 
because some very middle class areas had been absorbed into the 
enlarged borough. The newly elected council in Derby decided to 
offer for sale council houses to their tenants at sitting tenant 
prices. In addition the new council also decided to offer for sale 
newly erected 2 and 3 bedroomed houses to applicants who were on 
the housing list (a measure which has been furthered by the Labour 
group more recently) the sale price for the new houses being their 
current market value. (D.H.C. October 1968). If the purchaser 
wished to sell his house, then the council retained the right to 
buy back the dwelling at the sale price, the mortgages being provided 
by the corporation at 7 ~ % % and the deposit being £25. During the 
first twelve months in which council houses were for sale in Derby, 
57 were sold. 
The sale of council houses in Derby between 1968 and 1972 is a clear 
indication of local political ideology determining policy. The local 
Conservatives had not been in power prior to 1968 for 37 years and 
they gave priority to certain controversial policies, one of which 
was the sale of council houses. Their attitudes vary quite sharply 
from their counterparts, in Portsmouth, who were used to being the 
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majority party in the council chamber, and who took more time to 
implement the policy. Quite clearly they appreciated that they had 
the time, whereas the Derby councillors no doubt realised that time 
in power for them was limited and change had to be rapid. 
vii) Don't Clear Them All Away 
In 1964, the accession to power of the Labour Party at Westminster 
witnessed a notable move in the attitudes .. towards the Inner Cities, 
the new policy being embodied within the Housing Act 1964. This 
Act led to the creation of Improvement Areas in districts where 
properties had a useful life of at least fifteen years. (Housing 
Act 1964). In both Derby and Portsmouth the local authorities 
decided that the new Act should be implemented and administered by 
their Housing Committees. The problem of implementation of the Act 
of course arose from the fact that owner-occupiers could not be 
compelled to carry out the improvement work even though much of the 
work qualified for grant aid. Many of the owner occupiers were in 
fact elderly and were not interested in change, or could not afford 
it. Derby Town Council was relatively slow to implement the new 
legislation, despite the fact that it had areas which qualified for 
such aid from Central Government. The Town Council preferred to 
continue with its clearance programmes in the Inner City Areas rather 
than their rehabilitation. (D.H.C. February 1965). 
In Portsmouth, by way of contrast, an initial survey of two areas was 
immediately announced. It was decided that one area - Twyford Road -
was not suitable since insufficient properties were affected. It 
S 
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was felt by the Housing Section of the Public Health department that 
at least 50 properties should be affected in order to make such 
schemes viable. (P.R.C. February 1965). 
A further indication of Central Government policy changes came with 
the introduction of Rousing Circular 11/65 which required local 
authorities to take a fresh look at their slum clearance programmes 
over the ten years to 1974. In Portsmouth it was estimated that 
5,500 could be classified as unfit, although a total of 14,000 
dwellings were over 100 years old. (P.H.C. February 1965). The 
council decided not to lend on either type of property. In Derby 
the position was that 3,200 dwellings could be classified as unfit, 
although a total of 8,600 dwellings were over 100 years old (D.H.C. 
March 1965). 
In Portsmouth, possibly because of the pressure on land, considerable 
useage was made of areas cleared; redevelopment occurring almost 
immediately. This contrasted sharply with the policy in Derby of 
leaving sites derelict and developing greenfield sites on the 
periphery of the town. This is evidenced by the report dated 28 
June 1965 on House Clearing presented to Portsmouth City Council 
on 14th July 1965, in which it was stated that site redevelopment 
should occur with "all haste". The policy divergences may of course 
be due to the relative abundance of suitable land for development 
in the Derby area when compared with the Portsmouth area. 
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In January 1966 Portsmouth City Council published a further report 
on "Future Clearance and Redevlopment". The report recommended that 
between 1966 and 1972, some 3,500 houses should be cleared at an 
annual rate of demolition of 600. The new programme included 4,169 
houses of the 6,100 in the Green Line area" (1,300 being in the 
current programme and 2,869 in the proposed programme). At the time 
of the publication of the report, the remaining 1931 houses in the 
Green Line area had not been surveyed. The report indicated that 
some houses were obsolescent rather than unfit. The chairman 
expressed the view that "every co-ordinative effort should be made to 
achieve the maximum use of land for the benefit of the city and that 
a contracting process of forward planning was, therefore, essential. 
There is a need to improve the machinery of planning." (Report 
January 1966). The report also indicated that there was a need to 
strengthen public relations in Portsmouth. (Report January 1966). 
In September 1966 a confidential report was circulated amongst 
council members. This report recommended that the "Green Line area" 
- the area of 6,000 houses, 2,869 of which had been included in the 
Medical Officer of Health's proposed clearance programme under Part 
III of the Housing Act 1957 - should be dealt with as a whole, but 
in doing so, hardship would be caused. (Confidential Report on Slum 
Clearance P.ij..G. 14th September 1966). At the time the report was 
compiled, there were some 14,000 dwellings over 100 years old within 
Portsmouth, and a further 9,000 over 60 years old. There was a 
general feeling within the committee that the city must continue to 
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increase the extent to which houses are being improved, but that 
at the same time, the redevelopment of the obsolescent areas must 
continue. At the time of the report being written, 30% of 
Portsmouth's housing stock was without a bathroom, and 37% without 
exclusive use of hot and cold water supplies. (Confidential Report 
14th September 1966). 
In October 1966 the Portsmouth Rousing Committee agreed to a 
programme of Improvement Areas being devised. A report presented 
to the housing committee had recommended that the programme should 
include 1,100 houses between 1966 and 1971 at 200 houses per annum. 
Approval was given for a programme of 600 per annum within the 
provision of the Rousing Act 1964 - the programme being subject to 
review in the light of experience. (P.R.C. October 1966). 
Commenting upon the Buckland redevelopment scheme, the Ministry of 
Housing and Local Government stated that there was a need for higher 
densities within the central redevelopment areas in order to comply 
with new cost levels which were about to be introduced. (P.R.C. 
February 1967). The proposed density was revised in July 1967, so 
that the 72 acre site would accommodate 10,500 people - a density 
of 140/150 per acre, compared with an average suburban density of 
approximately 30 per acre. 
In February 1969, Portsmouth City Council agreed to the creation 
of three areas as General Improvement Areas. It was decided that 
no further areas would be declared under the Rousing Act 1964, but 
that, instead, informal preliminary action would be taken as soon 
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as a procedure had been agreed along the lines suggested in the 
Housing Bill so that the areas would be declared G I A ' as . • . s as soon 
as the Bill became law. (P.H.C. February 1969). 
This is an excellent example of a local authority anticipating 
changes in government policy and delaying further programmes until 
more advantageous circumstances had been legislated for. The Chief 
Health Inspector, at the same meeting in February 1969 sensed an 
opportune climate, and pointed out that the current housing 
programme expired in 1971 and suggested that in order that the 
committee could have sufficient information to be able to formulate 
new policy, a pilot project should be undertaken in order to 
determine how best to deal with future clearance programmes ie:-
1. Part II and III under 1957 Housing Act - demolition and 
clearance. 
2. Public Health Acts 1936 and 1961 - dwellings unfit for 
habitation. 
3. Housing Act 1964 - declaration of Housing Improvement areas. 
4. 1961 Housing Act Part II - Multiple Occupation/Overcrowding. 
In November the Medical Officer of Health reported to the Housing 
Committee on aspects of Housing Clearance. He stated that there 
should be an adequate supply of houses for all citizens of Portsmouth 
and that although most of the worst slums had been cleared a shortage 
of suitable accommodation for the elderly still persisted. He 
suggested that a fitness for habitation test should be applied to 
all dwellings in clearance areas and that a programme for the 
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clearance of unfit houses at the rate of 600 per annum - mainly in 
the Buckland redevelopment areas - should be maintained. The house 
building programme should be maintained at the then existing level 
of approximately 900 dwellings per annum, although an increase in 
the building rate should be aimed for. Many of those on the waiting 
list were old people with special needs which should be taken into 
account. 
The most pressing problem, certainly in the view of the Medical 
Officer, was the need to deal with those in mUltiple occupation. 
He estimated that approximately 20,000 houses would be affected by 
the 1969 Housing Act within the city. (P.H.C. November 1979). This 
figure was substantiated in June 1972, when the city council 
published a Home Improvement Report in which it was estimated that 
20,000 dwellings in the city lacked one or more of the standard 
amenities, and that approximately 10,000 were seriously deficient, 
most of them having no bathroom and only an outside toilet. 
In May 1973, the Housing Director prepared a report for the housing 
committee on the future of General Improvement Areas in Portsmouth, 
and the implementation of Section 23 of the 1969 Housing Act. Under 
the provisions of Section 28 of the 1969 Act, 6 areas had been 
designated as G.I.A.'s involving some 11,000 houses within these 
areas. This was in addition to the 2,000 already within the 
authorities' previously declared improvement areas under the 
provisions of the 1964 Housing Act. 
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The City Architect felt too much emphasis was being placed upon the 
G.I.A. programme and believed that some redevelopment should take 
place. He was supported in his views by the City Development Officer 
who commented that even though current opinion was in favour of 
G.I.A.'s such a large programme would be against the interests of 
Portsmouth, since Portsmouth at that time contained the greatest 
concentration of sub-standard housing in Hampshire. He felt that 
there should be changes for the better in general living conditions 
as well as improvements in environmental .and housing standards. 
The long term effect would be to curtail redevelopment plans for 
the older housing areas and would lead to the recurrence of enormous 
rebuilding problems some 30-50 years later. The G.I.A.'s should 
not be looked at in isolation. 
The G.I.A. programmes really brought to the fore a clash of 
professional interests between the Housing Director who was in favour 
of large G.I.A. programmes and the City Architect who was basically 
opposed to them, and preferred to create large clearance schemes, 
using the land for high rise developments. Between these two views 
was the City Development Officer. The problems of Improvement Areas 
and the misuse of government grants were subsequently reported in 
a feature on Housing in Portsmouth in the "News of the World" in 
February 1974. 
The aim of Portsmouth City Housing Committee in the period 1964 to 
1974 was to maximise the grants available and to improve the general 
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housing stock by taking full advantage of the provisions granted 
to them under Section 28 of the 1969 Housing Act. Thus the city 
council created huge General Improvement Areas, each covering 
approximately 2,000 houses. 
The eagerness of Portsmouth contrasts sharply with the slow and 
lethargic attitude of Derby Town Council, where G.I.A.'s were not 
created on such a large scale until the creation of St Lukes G.I.A. 
in 1977. The quality of housing stock in Portsmouth was however 
worse in terms of lacking basic facilities. In Derby, the council 
preferred what they considered to be a slower, but more permanent 
solution of clearing old houses away and rehousing those displaced, 
in the main in new properties built on greenfield sites. Derby was 
fortunate in having the land available. Portsmouth was not in such a 
position. This was a contributory factor in differences in policy, 
although political belief also played its part. 
viii) Apply a Little Pressure 
As we saw in previous chapters, a Joint Housing Consultative Body 
was formed in Portsmouth in the 1950's and by 1964 this body had 
become firmly established. The body acted in much the same way as 
the consultation committee in Derby, where representatives of the 
Tenant's Associations would meet members and officials of the housing 
committee. In-Portsmouth, however the tenants' representatives have 
always been vociferous about the councils' rent policy, whereas in 
t have been more concerned with housing standards Derby they appear 0 
and amenities. This is possibly because of the difference in 
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attitudes to rent calculation between the two authorities, discussed 
earlier in this chapter, but possibly also because of the leadership 
of the Tenants Association by its President the then Vicar of Leigh 
Park, the Rev. W.C.D. Todd, and the Councillor for Leigh Park on 
Havant U.D.C. in Mr G. Bell. 
In September 1964 at a meeting of the Housing Joint Consultative 
Body a heated argument developed, and a major disagreement arose over 
rents. (P.H.C. September 1964). The tenants' representatives 
questioned the need for the large planned increases in rent and 
claimed that the 10% increase in rents in April 1964 had cleared 
deficiencies and indeed would lead to a surplus. Councillor Flagg 
stated that the two sides were "clearly miles apart" and he was not 
swayed by their representations. (P.H.C. September 1964). However 
in February 1965 further representations were made by the tenants 
representatives at a meeting of the Housing Joint Consultative Body 
and Councillor Flagg and the other housing committee representatives 
agreed to a £45,000 rate subsidy being made during the financial 
year 1965/66. (P.H.C. February 1965). This action however was only 
taken after two demonstration marches had taken place through the 
streets of portsmouth, one of 5,000 people, a second of 20,000 people 
protesting against the city housing committee's rent policy. The 
rents had been increased by 20%, the aim being to remove a £160,000 
deficit and to create a £70,000 surplus. The Tenants' Association 
believed that the Housing Director should not compare council housing 
with Private Sector costs, since there was a profit element in the 
private sector, and the Local Authority was a social service. The 
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Housing Director was however following the policy determined by the 
council members. The tenants also believed that the council should 
build above Parker-Morris standards - rather than to Parker-Morris 
standards. In fact, the council was simultaneously being taken to 
task by the Ministry of Housing and Local Government for building 
to too high a standard and being pressed to reduce the level of 
specification and consequently building costs. The tenants did 
however point out that other local authorities built to the same 
standards and charged much lower rents. -The tenants claimed that 
only 1,200 units on Leigh Park out of 8,000 units built were to 
Parker-Morris standards. The proportionate figure for the city and 
Paulsgrove, at best, they claimed, would be only equal to the 
proportion on Leigh Park. They claimed that the rent was based on 
Parker-Morris standards and yet the dwellings were below that 
standard. However, as further contradiction, they stated that the 
council should not build to standards which could not be afforded 
by the tenants. (Tenants Association Report presented to Joint 
Consultative Body of P.H.C. 8 September 1965). 
The members agreed that there was a need to stengthen the 
consultation proceedure and modifications were included in the new 
committee structure being determined at that time. Hence the 
activity amongst the tenants. In October 1966 the housing committee 
decided to appoint a public relations officer and publish a newsheet 
in order to help tenants to be informed of policy changes. (P.H.C. 
October 1966). The disregard given to the Joint Consultative Body 
by Portsmouth City Housing Committee is indicated by the fact that 
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although it should have met every three months, its meetings were 
not regular and in January 1968 it met after a ten month interval. 
Many complaints were raised which the Housing Director was unable 
to deal with. The Housing Director was upset at the criticism 
leveled at his staff and himself in the local press by the tenants 
representatives, and stated that it was affecting staff morale. 
(Meeting of Joint Consultative Committee P.H.C. 31st January 1968). 
In September 1971 a deputation from the Leigh Park Tenants' 
Association - the most vociferous of the tenants' organisations 
attempted to obtain co-opted membership for their representatives 
on the housing committee. This was rejected by the housing committee 
members. (P.H.C. September 1971). 
Political pressure of an alternative kind was placed upon the 
Portsmouth City Housing Committee when the Lord Mayor and 
Mr Frank Judd M.P. visited the Portsea area and inspected the 
conditions under which the tenants of the local authority were 
living. Mr Judd had received numerous letters from tenants 
complaining that repairs were not being carried out, and he was 
particularly concerned about the continued use of a "totter stores" 
at the rear of a block of flats. The Lord Mayor and Mr Judd 
considered that the problems at Portsea were so serious that they 
should be investigated by a special committee, not necessarily 
composed of representatives of the Housing Committee, with a view 
to immediate action being taken to alleviate the conditions and to 
deal with the numerous complaints. (Report of Director of Housing 
P.H.C. November 1969). The Housing Director stated that many 
... 
244 
improvements had taken place since 1960 and he could not understand 
such phrases as "cynical neglect" and "tolerated". He said the 
environment had changed, but a need of change of attitudes was called 
for. "Totters" were a nuisance, but were "traditional" in Portsea. 
Complaints of vermin infestation were attributed by the Housing 
Director to the tenants' "habits". 
A comparison can be made between the problems in Portsea, and 
problems which arose at Exeter House in Derby. Exeter House was 
built by the river in the town centre in the mid 1930's. For many 
years it was neglected by the council, to the extent that all of 
the tenants had to be rehoused and then the housing committee was 
faced with the choice of either gutting the building or demolishing 
it. They chose to gut the building and let the flats only to young 
married couples without children. The raising of the quality of 
the accommodation combined with a revised letting policy improved 
not only the flats themselves but also the vicinity in which they 
were located. 
Pressure of a economic kind was also experienced by Portsmouth 
Housing Committee and this was reflected in a memorandum sent to 
Portsmouth City Housing Committee from the Portsmouth Builders' 
Association which stated that they felt that official pressure was 
being exerted for high rise flats, and they felt that high rise flats 
were not the only way to achieve high densities. (Memorandum from 
Portsmouth Builder's Association to P.H.C. dated 10th January 1966). 
This pressure was renewed in 1968 when representatives of the 
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National Federation of Building Trade Employers and Portsmouth 
Builders' Association formed a deputation and addressed the council 
campaigning for building contracts to be let to local builders where 
practical rather than national contractors. In giving contracts 
to national contractors, the council had been following Ministry 
guidance, since more competitive prices could be negotiated, the 
Ministry felt. The council decided to consider tenders therefore 
from local contractors for the Buckland redevelopment scheme, 
provided that they were prepared to t e n d ~ r r on exactly the same basis 
as the national contractors. Such economic pressures did not arise 
in Derby, since the council throughout the period maintained a policy 
of construction being undertaken by a mixture of direct works (a 
policy not followed in Portsmouth for actual construction) national 
contractors and local building companies all competing on a tender 
basis, rather than the negotiated contract basis undertaken in 
Portsmouth. 
ix) Still Different 
The period 1964-1974 is an important one in post-war housing policy 
in England, because it was during this period that the Central 
Government turned its attention to the retention and improvement 
of the late 19th century properties and away from mass clearance 
programmes. The housing problems of the immediate post-war years 
had to varying- degrees been .. sol ved" and some slum clearance 
programmes could proceed. The sites when cleared, allowed for the 
of high rise buildings in Portsmouth and it was in this development 
d h Central Government via the Regional Officials of the perio t at 
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Ministry of Housing and Local Government actively encouraged local 
authorities to build upwards. In Portsmouth, despite its creation 
of large General Improvement Areas rather than clearance areas, the 
City Architect advocated high rise developments. His advocacy was 
accepted by the city council. By contrast in Derby, clearance 
programmes were carried out and it was not until 1977 that the first 
large Geneal Improvement Area was created (St Lukes) - although 
smaller pilot schemes had been carried out previously. The new 
housing was built on greenfield sites, and the cleared areas were 
left desolate for a number of years. The housing committee in Derby 
only had one attempt at high rise building - Rivermead House - this 
proved unpopular with tenants and the housing committee, never very 
enthusiastic about high rise developments, nor the planning committee 
even less enthusiastic about high rise development, either 
residential or commercial, proceeded no further. Derby was however 
in the fortunate position of having suitable land made available 
in a neighbouring authorities' area, and did not have the pressure 
to have to build high. Neither though did it have professional 
advisers extrolling the virtues of high rise development in their 
reports. 
The period witnessed a move away from catering simply for families 
towards a recognition of the needs of the elderly by building one 
bedroom dwellings - even if it was brought about by a desire to 
release the large dwellings for others who could make better use 
of the accommodation. The role of housing associations was enhanced 
and recognition given by both authorities in their ability to cater 
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for special needs, but neither authority followed Bradford's example 
in relying on housing associations to be the sole provider of low 
cost housing. In Portsmouth the needs of "key-workers" continued 
to be recognised and this, as we have seen, resulted in resentment 
among the local population since they considered it to be an unfair 
policy. Divergence between Derby and Portsmouth occurred therefore 
even when both authorities were controlled by the same party, 
(Conservatives 1968-72) divergence in terms of policy outcomes -
slum clearance, general improvement areas, high rise development, 
key workers and the role of housing associations. 
248 
CHAPTER SEVEN COMMON GOALS - DIFFERENT OUTPUTS 
i) Assumptions and Approaches 
ii) Environmental Factors:-
a) Population Structure 
b) Land 
c) Employment Base 
d) Housing Needs 
e) Financial Resources 
f) Central Government 
iii) Internal Factors:-
a) Party Situation and Ideology 
b) Leading Personalities on the Councils 
c) Influential Officials 
d) Pressure Points 
iv) Goals and Outputs of Housing Policy:-
a) Policy Divergences 
b) High Rise - Low Rise 
c) Urban Renewal 
d) Keyworkers 
e) The Sale of Council Houses 
f) Rent Policy 
v) Conclusions 
249 
CHAPTER SEVEN COMMON GOAL - DIFFERENT OUTPUTS 
i) Assumptions and Approaches 
The objective of this thesis has been to try to determine the extent 
to which party political factors, personal factors and professional 
factors have interacted with "needs" and "resources" to affect 
housing policy in Britain since 1945. The research problem has been 
one of attempting to determine whether party political activity and 
ideology influence the level and character of public housing in 
British cities - particularly Derby and Portsmouth. Also an attempt 
has been made to assess the relative impact of the actors involved 
at both the Central and Local government levels. The question posed 
is - are the policy outcomes purely the response to needs and 
resources available? 
In the concluding chapter of this thesis we shall be examining 
whether or not party politics were relevant, whether or not in other 
words, political factors determined the policy outcomes. Do personal 
factors influence the policy outcomes through professional ambition 
or does the desire to establish a political career motivate a local 
politician in the pursuit of specific goals? Environmental factors 
such as population trends, land, and finance may likewise effect the 
policy outcomes. It might be suggested that the policy outcomes are a 
result of the interaction of the three factors rather than the action 
of just one. 
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Local government studies of the policy process and of policy outcomes 
are still few in number. There are some policy studies such as 
Hampton's study of Sheffield (1970), Dearlove's study of Kensington 
and Chelsea (1973) and Newton's study of Birmingham (1976). These 
studies have tended to concentrate on the policy process, whereas 
Newton and Sharpe (1984) question whether politics really matter in 
their study. Studies of policy outcomes have also been undertaken by 
social administrators such as J B Cullingworth and D V Donnison. 
The school of British Local Government writing which has concentrated 
most on policy outcomes has been the quantitative studies. Such 
studies are undertaken by political scientists who have accepted 
the value of expenditure analysis as a method of policy analysis, 
learning no doubt from American studies such as those reviewed in 
Chapter One (Key et al) of this thesis. 
Studies such as D Easton (1965) employ systems analysis (the model 
of environment, inputs, throughputs, outputs and feedback). 
Easton's notion is that aspects of the political process are a 
consequence of the environment and serve to translate factors of 
that environment into policy outputs. If, as suggested in Chapter 
One, Key and Lockard are re-examined then it may be possible to find 
grounds upon which to re-assess the relevance of political variables. 
From Key's analysis one would expect that party competition like 
other political variables would serve as an important explanatory 
factor for public policy outputs. Whilst this statement may seem 
. it leads to an important question "what kinds of trivially true, 
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policy would party competition be important for?", The answer 
depends on what we believe to be politically significant questions 
- questions of the sort which appear to have been forgotten often 
in recent literature - who benefits from political organisation or 
lack of it? who benefits from policy outcomes? or perhaps more to 
the point who does not benefit? The answers to these questions, 
or suggested answers, combined with the influence on policy outcomes 
will form the basis of this chapter. The influences are both 
external and internal. I will also examine the effect of these 
influences on determining policy goals, 
In a thesis based principally on case studies no universal "answers" 
are arrived at, but evidence may be gathered to support theories. 
In this concluding chapter therefore I shall comment on why, despite 
the differing political complexions of Portsmouth and Derby, their 
policies had some marked similarities, and yet in other respects 
marked divergences, 
ii) Environmental Factors 
The environmental factors respresent the input into the policy making 
process. They include housing need, the amount of suitable land 
available for development, the financial resources available to pay 
for any policy goals set, the employment base of the area, the 
demographic profile for the area and the relationship between the 
local authority and central government. These factors combine to 
give the background from which the actors involved determine the 
I I i hat could be described as the conversion process po icy goa s n w 
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ie. the internal factors such as party, characteristics and 
personalities of councillors and th b h e e aviour of pressure groups. 
The combination of the external and internal factors leads to the 
setting of policy goals and policy outputs. 
a) Population Structure 
Both cities have throughout the period had levels of population 
change, brought about by movements in the population away from the 
inner city areas to the periphery of their respective cities. 
Significant changes have occurred throughout the period (see Table 
7.1). The movement in population to the peripheral areas has in both 
instances been brought about by the insufficient supply of suitable 
land for development within the boundaries of the two cities. Both 
local authorities through their own housing policies, that of 
building in neighbouring areas, contributed to the decline of their 
own populations - although in reality they had little alternative. 
Slum clearance programmes also contributed to movements in the 
populations of the two cities. Derby Town Council waited until slum 
clearance became a national policy in 1956, before restarting the 
slum clearance programmes in 1956 which had been left off at the 
beginning of World War Two. Those displaced by the slum clearance 
schemes were in the main rehoused in new housing estates on the 
periphery of the town. In Portsmouth, as we shall see later in this 
chapter, the city council maximised the use of land vacated by slum 
clearance programmes and this stemmed to a large extent the "council 
induced" drift in the population into the neighbouring parts of South 
Hampshire. 
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Table 7.1 POEulations of Derby and Portsmouth 
Year Derby Portsmouth 
1945 N/A N/A 
1946 132,760 155,860 
1947 132,520 179,240 
1948 136,480 197,680 
1949 140,950 213,430 
1950 141,800 216,200 
1951 143,520 240,550 
1952 143,430 240,020 
1953 138,700 242,600 
1954 139,000 243,100 
1955 139,600 243,600 
1956 139,300 238,700 
1957 137,500 231,100 
1958 135,500 226,900 
1959 133,900 222,800 
1960 132,500 220,500 
1961 131,700 220,400 
1962 131,500 220,300 
1963 131,910 226,670 
1964 131,630 224,900 
1965 130,030 221,470 
1966 129,190 216,280 
1967 128,400 217,800 
1968 *216,400 219,100 
1969 221,300 218,800 
1970 221,200 214,800 
1971 219,300 204,300 
1972 219,900 207,000 
1973 217,900 200,400 
1974 217,900 200,400 
Source: Office of Census of population Statistics (HMSO) 
Notes: * Extension of County Borough boundaries occurred on 
1 April 1968 
population figures for 1945 not published 
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The population "trends" in Portsmouth were disturbed in the early 
part of the period under review by the number of naval personnel 
from other parts of Britain meeting and marrying local girls and 
deciding to settle in Portsmouth thus adding to the pressure for 
housing. In Derby, a significant number of families moved into the 
town in order to take up employment with one of the main employers, 
particularly Rolls Royce Ltd and British Rail. The majority of those 
moving into the town however were in a position to be able to 
purchase their own home and superficially at least did not add to 
the demand for local authority accommodation in the way in which 
the former naval personnel in Portsmouth did, since they were in 
higher income brackets. However, there was a feeling in Derby, when 
British Rail opened their research facilities and moved their 
research scientists to Derby from Eastleigh and Marylebone in 1967, 
that house prices escalated as a result of the influx of individuals 
who were used to the high costs of housing in the Home Counties of 
Hampshire. The properties they bought tended to be in the middle to 
upper price ranges, and it was the developers of the then new estates 
of 4 bedroomed detached houses who met the demand and not the local 
authority. Indirectly though such an infux of higher income groups 
would and did have a spillover effect on the whole of the local 
property market. 
Movements in the population have clearly affected the housing 
policies of the two authorities, albeit in different ways. A further 
demographic trend which the local authorities have had to take into 
account is the fact that Britain has an ageing population. The age 
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structure of the population will, or should at least, help to 
determine the "mix" of properties being developed and this 
reflected, as we shall see later in this chapter, and as we have 
seen in the case study, in policy outcomes, in the move away from 
building traditional three bedroomed properties to building one 
bedroomed accommodation for elderly people. The needs of the 
elderly, as has been highlighted in the case study tended to be 
ignored; this may have been because of the natural desire to house 
families first. 
b) Land 
There has always been a wide disparity in the availability of 
building land between Derby and Portsmouth. The geography of the 
two cities has much to do with this. Derby is a town surrounded 
by open countryside, which is easy to develop, and which the 
neighbouring local authorities were pleased to see developed. Many 
large private estates as well as local authority estates such as 
Breadsall, were developed on the outskirts of Derby (in what until 
April 1968 was part of the County of Derbyshire) especially from 
the late 1950's onwards. The price of building land and the cost 
of new houses was comparatively modest when compared with many of 
the neighbouring conurbations such as Birmingham, Nottingham and 
Wolverhampton. 
In Portsmouth, development land was in less plentiful supply. The 
original part of the city and its suburbs were built on Portsea 
Island. A natural physical constraint therefore existed. The 
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housing authority had to build up to nine miles from the city centre 
in order to obtain land. Property prices were much higher, and this 
placed a greater pressure on the local authority, since fewer people 
were able to buy their own house. Private estates have been 
developed inland from Portsmouth in areas such as Horndean and 
Cowp1ain, some 6 or 7 miles from the city centre. Local Authority 
houses were also built at similar distances from Portsmouth City 
Centre in South Hampshire at Leigh Park and Wecock Farm. The 
shortage of suitable land for new housing schemes created a pressure 
on the policy-makers in Portsmouth and as we have seen in the case 
study, they moved away from traditional housing to high rise 
accommodation. Portsmouth City Council also adopted a policy which 
allowed for the maximisation of land use which had become vacant as a 
result of urban renewal programmes. Even though objectively high 
rise development does not save land, it was assumed to do so at the 
time. The policy was undertaken in two ways. Firstly, the land 
which became vacant was redeveloped as soon as it became vacant, the 
clearance programmes being part of the total redevelopment and 
rehousing programme. Secondly, much of the land cleared was used for 
high density housing schemes, not just tower blocks, but also low and 
medium rise units of accommodation. The mix of styles of accommoda-
tion was very much in line with the desires of Central Government in 
the late 1950's and the 1 9 6 ~ ' s s and can be witnessed in the public 
sector housing programmes of many authorities in Britain. In this 
sense, Derby was the diverging authority with its wish to continue 
providing traditional styles of housing. The environmental factor of 
land had thus a differential impact between Portsmouth and Derby. 
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c) Employment Base 
Both Derby and Portsmouth have industries which during World War 
Two were of strategic importance. In Derby, Rolls Royce Ltd were 
and still are the major employers. They are manufacturers of not 
just aero engines, but also marine engines and generators. The 
industrial base of Derby though is widely spread and for this reason 
the town has never felt the pressures of economic cycles to the 
extent of say the West Midlands or the North of England. The town 
is not overdependent upon Rolls Royce Ltd. Derby has become an 
important railway centre, being the headquarters of the former 
Midland Railway, a town with significant textile and chemical 
industries such as Courtaulds PLC; and a town of light engineering 
companies and foundaries such as Birmid-Qualcart PLC and Leys PLC. 
The town was transformed between 1840 and 1900 from being a market 
town to an industrial centre. The slums of Derby were basically 
the product of this rapid expansion. 
The employment base of Portsmouth at the beginning of the period 
reviewed by this thesis - 1945, was not diversified to the extent 
that it was in Derby. Portsmouth City Council, and in particular 
the Reconstruction Sub-Committee set up in 1942 to prepare for the 
immediate post war years believed that the industrial base was too 
narrow. The city was heavily dependent upon the Naval Dockyards 
and allied firms such as ship repairers and electronics companies 
specialising in navagational aids. The city council therefore 
decided to introduce a policy which would lead to the broadening 
of the industrial base of the city. In order to further this aim 
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the city council decided to introduce a policy of housing keyworkers 
as a way of inducing employers to move into the area, as well as 
making land (a very scarce resource in Portsmouth) available for 
industrial purposes. Thus the environmental factor of employment 
was different in its impact on the two cities. 
d) Rousing Needs 
It may be contended that the major concern both nationally and at 
the local level in such towns as Portsmouth and Derby in post war 
years has been to provide inexpensive accommodation of an acceptable 
standard for families. With the "baby booms" of 1946-48 the need 
nationally was for accommodation for families. The question which 
needs to be put is whether housing need was of the same order to 
both Derby and Portsmouth? The answer must be fundamentally yes; 
they both experienced the damage to their existing housing stock 
during World War Two. Both cities were of strategic importance. 
Portsmouth being an important naval base facing the English Channel, 
Derby a centre of aircraft manufacture. Enemy action left both 
authorities with serious housing problems to face in 1945. Moreover, 
there was of course a standstill in house construction during the 
war. In both cities the serious accommodation shortages soon became 
apparent as citizens applied to have their names entered on the 
waiting list. There were 11,000 families registered on the list 
in Portsmouth (PRC December 1945) and 2,814 in Derby (DHC December 
1945). It is worth noting that the waiting list increased 
significantly in Derby, but in Portsmouth, because of a decision 
taken in June 1946, by the Portsmouth City Council, to exclude from 
259 
the housing waiting list naval personnel who had married local girls, 
and to apply strict conditions regarding residential status, to the 
extent that living in a naval garrison excluded applicants from the 
housing register, the waiting list numbers started to decline. It 
might be suggested that the needs in both cities were similar. 
Both authorities saw the basic need as being one of housing families, 
and this need was met initially by both authorities in a similar 
manner; that of building traditional t h r e ~ ~ bedroomed accommodation. 
Further reference to this similarity of policy will be made later 
in this chapter. 
Up to the late 1950's little attention was paid to the needs of the 
elderly. The building of accommodation suitable for the old can 
release housing stock which is probably not used to its fullest 
advantage. Likewise the building of accommodation for single persons 
has been neglected. Derby, at the end of the period covered by this 
thesis - March 1974 had 929 persons over the age of 67 registered 
as in need of single accommodation or one bedroomed accommodation. 
In addition there were 930 persons under the age of 67 registered 
as benefitting from such accommodation and of course an unknown 
number unregistered. 
By March 1974, Derby possessed a total of 1,938 single/one bedroom 
dwellings, which means that there were approximately two applicants 
for each dwelling. The situation was a little easier in Portsmouth, 
since many of the high rise developments incorporated bedsit and/or 
one bedroom flats within their design. 
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Urban renewal added a further dimension to housing need for the 
policy makers in both cities. Urban Renewal programmes in post war 
Britain did not really gather momentum until the mid 1950's when in 
1956 a White Paper was published indicating that the Conservative 
Government was becoming concerned about the removal of slums from 
provincial towns. 
In Derby, the majority of those requiring to be rehoused as a result 
of the slum clearance programmes, were rehoused on the new estates 
on the periphery of the town. Derby Town· Council as we saw in 
Chapter 5 of this thesis prempted national policy, restarting the 
planning and evaluation of the housing stock before slum clearance 
became a national policy again, having been discontinued at the 
beginning of World War Two. 
The impetus to recommence slum clearance came from Central Government 
in the form of the White Paper of 1956 mentioned above. By that time, 
the town council had already identified the fact that Derby had some 
of the worst slums in the Midlands. A need for slum clearance 
existed and yet it was not quickly satisfied - plans had to await 
Central Government approval. Of course a need also existed for 
houses for people living in overcrowded conditions and the attitude 
of both the Council and Central Government was that any home was 
better than none. A pent up housing need existed. In September 
1955, the Medical Officer of Health for Derby (as opposed to the 
City Development Officer in Portsmouth) produced a slum clearance 
report. This report indicated that 1,500 houses were unfit for human 
habitation. Under section 9 of the 1954 Act, 150 dwellings could 
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be patch repaired, and retained for five years and 750 were in areas 
still to be declared slum clearance areas. Derby Town Council 
decided that 600 houses should be demolished over the next five years 
and a report was submitted to the Ministry of Housing and Local 
Government together with an application to extend the housing 
programme for the year. In 1956 the Ministry requested that the 
slum clearance period should be reduced to five years in view of 
the ending of the system of housing allocations - here we see Central 
Government influencing a local authority to speed up the 
implementation of a policy. 
In Portsmouth too, many of the slums had been cleared. Isolated 
areas of slum properties were cleared as early as 1948 as part of the 
redevelopment programme for Commercial Road. As we shall see later 
in this chapter, the incorporation of slum clearance and 
redevelopment in Portsmouth became a major feature of the City 
Council's policy. 
A modest start was made to the slum clearance programme for 
Portsmouth in April 1954. In November 1954, the City Development 
Officer produced a report on slum clearance stating that the City's 
housing list had in excess of 15,000 applicants. Of this figure, he 
estimated 1/3rd could be thought to be in real need of housing, and 
that it was desired to deal with this need over five years, then 
1,000 houses a year just for this purpose would be required, leaving 
very little margin for rehousing families from slum areas. The City 
Architect estimated 1800 completions in 1954, 1500 in 1955 and 1200 
per annum thereafter. A further need was generated by the urgency 
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of rehousing 159 families still in "temporary" accommodation at 
Bedhampton. These families were living in converted army hutments 
and their living conditions were described in an internal report 
in November 1954 as "squalid". The City Development Officer stated 
that it would not be possible to embark upon a large scale slum 
clearance programme at that time unless the number of dwellings 
allocated to applicants was reduced. He suggested a demolition rate 
of 100 during 1956, 200 in 1957, 300 in 1958 and thereafter 400 a 
year, giving a target of 7,000 houses to be demolished - a much more 
ambitious programme than Derby's. 
It is difficult to assess whether the full housing need is known, 
whether it be for single person accommodation or family 
accommodation. Analysis of the waiting lists for accommodation may 
give some answers, but invariably it cannot give them all, for not 
all will have registered. For instance, many of the people 
registered for accommodation in the immediate post-war years were 
not ultimately accommodated within the public sector. Today many 
young couples use the housing authority waiting lists as an insurance 
policy; that is they register for local authority accommodation until 
they have purchased their first home. The waiting list figures may 
also be inaccurate because people have not registered for 
accommodation and yet live in overcrowded conditions. 
Many similarities existed between the housing needs of both Derby 
and Portsmouth. Both experienced enemy action during World War Two; 
this brought about damage to the housing stock and this led to 
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overcrowding in the remaining houses and to the construction of 
"temporary" accommodation. Both cities had similar sized 
populations, both cities experienced the "baby bulge" of 1946-48, 
and the return of servicemen to civilian life in the same period. 
These similar needs, combined with government policy, brought about a 
policy of housing families, and building family accommodation by 
both authorities, since this was the most urgent need identified 
not only by both authorities, but also nationally. A preoccupation 
developed with the housing of families at the expense of adequate 
infra-structure, and also at the expense of other groups - families 
had been identified as the target group in most need. It was not 
until the early 1960's that groups such as the elderly and the single 
were identified as in need also. 
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Table 7.2 Housing Stock in Derby and Portsmouth 
Units of Accommodation Completed as at 31 March 
Year Derby Portsmouth 
1945 6,852 3,259 
1946 7,340 4,049 
1947 7,921 5,181 
1948 8,358 6,953 
1949 8,771 7,234 
1950 9,274 7,581 
1951 9,348 7,993 
1952 9,976 8,346 
1953 10,696 8,916 
1954 11,420 10,120 
1955 12,489 11,619 
1956 12,948 13,347 
1957 13,692 14,550 
1958 14,397 15,303 
1959 14,968 16,338 
1960 15,645 16,774 
1961 15,901 17,104 
1962 16,140 17,420 
1963 16,358 17,753 
1964 16,558 18,441 
1965 16,913 19,367 
1966 17,146 20,599 
1967 17,230 21,700 
1968 17,774 22,586 
1969 18,288 23,251 
1970 18,469 23,367 
1971 18,654 23,570 
1972 18,865 23,793 
1973 19,139 24,488 
1974 19,219 24,738 
Source: 1945-1968 Housing Statistics (IMTA) 
1969-1974 Local Housing Statistics (HMSO) 
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e) Financial Resources 
The financing of new housing was discussed in Chapter Three of this 
thesis. The properties built by both authorities with the approval 
of the Ministry of Housing and Local Government automatically 
qualified for loan sanction approval and the repayment of the loan 
over a period of 60 years. Neither authority in the period under 
review resorted to other forms of financing developments. Both 
authorities had policies which could be best described as grant 
maximisation and designed their housing schemes so as to maximise 
the grant available. This has been reflected in the policy outcomes 
of both authorities. 
Table 7.3 
*1946 
1950 
1955 
1960 
1965 
1970 
1974 
Gross Rateable Values and Rateable Value per Capita 
for Derby and Portsmouth 1946-1974 
RV per 
capita 
£ 
8.33 
7.13 
7.22 
15.95 
50.96 
46.84 
123.62 
DERBY PORTSMOUTH 
Gross Rateable 
Value 
£ 
1,106,256 
1,023,536 
1,083,538 
2,112,505 
6,626,156 
10,352,123 
26,949,663 
RV per 
capita 
£ 
10.76 
8.54 
8.07 
19.05 
41.69 
47.57 
118.48 
Gross Rateable 
Value 
£ 
1,679,067 
1,845,158 
1,960,523 
4,191,635 
9,215,016 
10,181,719 
23,792,779 
Source: Annual Local Government Rating Returns 
* Data not available for 1945 
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The specifications of each particular type of property were such 
as to attract maximum grants. Nevertheless, Derby could have 
obtained more grant aid by high rise buildings. 
f) Central Government 
Central Government's inital post war housing policy was for high 
quality family houses to be built by local authorities. The first 
cutbacks came however in 1948 because of a shortage of building 
materials; and from then on, questionably the concern became more 
for quantity rather than quality. In 1951, the Conservative party in 
their election manifesto set the policy objective of building 300,000 
dwellings a year, and in 1952 this target was achieved by expanding 
the level of local authority house building. As we have already 
seen, it was not until 1955 that Central Government gave the 
initiative for slum clearance to recommence in earnest. This was 
possibly because of the intense overcrowding which existed in the 
immediate post war years, and the belief that a roof over one's head 
of any kind was better than none. In 1957 the private rented sector 
was decontrolled by the 1957 Rent Act. This had the effect of 
driving some people who could not afford higher rents from the 
private sector, and put a greater burden on the local authorities for 
the provision of rented accommodation. This increased demand was to 
a great extent met by the development of high rise accommodation in 
the 1960's, a ~ d d by the retention of older properties and 
rehabilitation of inner city areas as Housing Action Areas and 
General Improvement Areas, rather than by wholesale clearance of such 
areas. In the 1960's the needs of groups other than families started 
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to be recognised, and Central Government started to encourage local 
authorities and housing associations to build purpose built 
accommodation for the elderly, single parent families and single 
people. 
Both local authorities, like all other authorities were subject to 
the same overall objectives of Central Government policy. The 
question may be fairly put though - were both authorities treated 
the same by Central Government? This is a difficult but important 
question to answer. From the case-study, it is apparent that 
initially both authorities were treated in the same way. The Central 
Government priority was the housing of those in need as quickly as 
possible. Both authorities built "temporary" accommodation and they 
were both actively encouraged by Central Government. It is however 
apparent from the case-study that with the change to a Conservative 
government in 1951, Conservative controlled Portsmouth was favoured 
with a disproportionate allocation of housing finance for new units 
of accommodation in the boost to public sector housing in 1952/54. 
Likewise, because Portsmouth City Council was willing to build high 
rise accommodation, it appears again that the authority was treated 
more favourably than authorities such as Derby which decided not to 
follow a policy of high rise developments. Possibly the two 
authorities were treated differently because of the differing 
availability of land. John Stewart (Local Government: The 
Conditions of Local Choice 1983) believes that Central Government is 
a boundary institution, which influences all local authorities; 
however the infuence need not necessarily be in accordance with the 
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intentions of Central Government. Neither need the relationship 
between authorities be identical, and this is apparent within the 
case-study section of this thesis. 
iii) Internal Factors 
The internal factors represent the conversion process within a 
systems model. The internal factors include such issues as the party 
situation, the nature of the councillors in terms of age and 
occupational background, their personalities, and that of the 
officers, the relationship between the councillors and officers and 
the role of pressure groups. These factors combine to convert the 
imputs into the outputs - in the case of this research, housing 
policy. 
a) Party Situation and Ideology 
In the period 1945-74 the political control of both Derby and 
Portsmouth was remarkably stable. The council in Derby was 
controlled throughout the period by the Labour group, with the 
exception of the period May 1968 to May 1972. The Conservative group 
took control, for these four years after elections had been held 
for an entirely new council following the extension of the county 
borough's boundaries resulting from a Boundary Commission report 
in 1965. In Portsmouth, control of the authority remained with the 
Conservatives throughout the period covered by this thesis. 
At the Central Government level, the Labour party formed the first 
post war government and remained in office until 1951. From 1951 
to 1964 the Conservative party were in power. In 1964 the Labour 
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party returned to office, remaining until 1970, when the 
Conservatives regained control until February 1974, and effectively 
the end of the period covered by this thesis. 
The political ideologies of the two authorities were at variance 
with one another, even in the immediate post-war years. As we have 
witnessed in the case-study, early as March 1948 Portsmouth Housing 
Committee had decided to build properties to a standard, such that 
they could be sold off at some future date. This was at a time of 
acute shortage of accommodation and building materials. The 
standards they built to were such that they exceeded the Ministry's 
housing cost yardstick. Their policy reflects the underlying 
Conservative ideology of home ownership. At the same time moves 
were made to commence the keyworker policy and this policy also 
reflects a differing attitude to housing, since the authority saw 
new housing as a way of generating economic activity and attracting 
new industries to the Portsmouth area. 
In Derby, the Labour controlled authority saw their remit as being 
one of providing roofs over heads. The councillors saw housing as 
an essential service, an extension of their social service 
provision. 
Both authorities followed the Central Government's desire to house 
families first, and hence the extensive programmes in both cities 
to build traditional three bedroomed houses. As the housing 
situation eased in post war Britain, so the ideologies became more 
apparent. 
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b) Leading Personalities on the Councils 
Naturally the personalities and values of the councillors and senior 
officers influenced the policy outputs in both Derby and Portsmouth. 
As early as March 1948 some members of Portsmouth Housing Committee 
were expressing views that council houses should be built to such a 
standard that they could be sold. The City Council in Portsmouth has 
throughout the period under review been dominated by the proprietors 
of small businesses with the values of such people being reflected in 
policies like the sale of council houses .and economic rents. They 
also had a strong belief in self help, hence the City Council has 
always viewed favourably assistance to self build groups and housing 
associations. The two most influential councillors on Portsmouth's 
housing policy were Councillors Miles (a dairy farmer) and Day (a 
builder). They were respectively Chairman and Vice Chairman of the 
City Housing Committee and formed a "partnership" which spanned the 
period 1946-1963. They were both amenable to new ideas, and were 
both keen to see Portsmouth established as a major city on the South 
Coast. They took particular note of the City Architect's comments 
(Mr Mellor) and he in turn had a good working relationship with the 
government's Regional Director. In a recent interview Mr Miles, who 
is now aged 83, said that he thought he had been too receptive to new 
ideas and regretted the style of development of the Paulsgrove 
estate, and the building of Portsdown Hill, but he was of course 
using hindsight and the pressures at the time for housing were 
extreme. 
In Derby, by contrast, the Town Council was made up primarily of 
councillors with an industrial or engineering background. The 
majority of the Labour councillors were employed by either Rolls 
Royce Ltd or British Railways as one might expect, since they are 
the dominant employers in the town. There were a few Labour 
councillors who had a professional background. As far as housing 
policy in Derby is concerned, the town was fortunate to have a highly 
articulate solicitor as Housing Committee chairman, Alderman Flint, 
now deceased. He could put forward good reasons as to why his town 
should be allowed to develop rapidly when resources were scarce, and 
was chairman of the Housing Committee from 1945 to 1968. The Housing 
Committee pursued a policy of traditional housing, the majority of 
the councillors do not appear to have been receptive to new housing 
ideas, but believed in traditional 3 bedroomed semis using tradi-
tional methods of construction, rather than for instance system 
building methods. With hindsight, it would appear that their caution 
was sensible. 
c) Influential Officials 
The interpersonal skills of officials should not be underestimated 
in the policy making process. The relationships between officials 
and members are of utmost importance, but of equal importance is 
the relationship between local officials and regional officials. 
Portsmouth benefitted from the excellent working relationship which 
existed between the City Architect and the Regional Director for 
Housing employed by the Ministry of Housing and Local Government. 
This relationship appears to have smoothed the path for some of the 
more adventurous housing schemes, particularly the development of 
high rise accommodation in the 1950!s and 1960's. The Regional 
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Director appears to have been keen to promote high rise developments, 
the City Architect was equally keen to see "his city" at the 
forefront of what was then considered modern architecture and the 
Councillors appeared to be keen on "status symbol architecture" to 
prove themselves as leading a major city on the South Coast. Their 
rivalry with Southampton may have "jelled" these factors together. 
The City Treasurer (A R Thompson) was initially an influential figure 
on housing in Portsmouth. The Housing Department was in the immediate 
post war period a sub division of the City Treasurer's department. 
The City Treasurer, as one might expect, was in fact more cost 
conscious than the City Architect and intense rivalry developed 
between the two officials. This rivalry culminated in the creation 
of a separate Housing Department in 1957. Even when the Housing 
Director was appointed, the City Treasurer still exercised 
considerable influence over the council's rent policy. He was a firm 
believer in the principle of Economic Rents, and such rents have 
always been charged by Portsmouth City Council. The City Treasurer 
was also a firm believer in the sale of council houses, but took a 
I 
more cautious view than the councillors would have wished when 
granting mortgages. The Housing Director had less influence on 
actual policy than his position might have justified. The Housing 
Director (Mr Dant) appears to have been more keen to introduce 
fortnightly payments of rents and create distinct housing offices 
than to have become concerned with the issues of Economic Rent and 
the sale of council houses. 
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The working relationship between the City Architect and the Regional 
Director defused the professional jealousies between the City 
Architect, the Housing Director, the City Treasurer and the City 
Development Officer. They tended to defer to his rulings. The City 
Architect was able to win council support on more occasions than 
the other three senior officials. 
In Derby, the rivalry was between the Borough Architect 
(Mr Richardson) and the Borough Surveyor (Mr Penny) - the Borough 
Surveyor being responsible for the road layouts on the Housing 
Estates rather than the Architect. The Borough Surveyor's powers 
in Derby seemed to go beyond what one would have expected to 
encompass suggestions in housing schemes. Much of the layout of 
the Mackworth Estate was his department's work, rather than the 
Borough Architect's. In both authorities the Housing Directors 
appear to have been very much the poor relation of the other chief 
officers. This however has changed in Derby in recent years, as 
the present City Secretary, is a former Housing Director. This 
change has occurred since 1974. Mr Fludd was appointed Housing 
Director in 1974, and City Secretary in 1980. The other influential 
officials in Derby both held the position of City Development 
Officer: Mr W Thompson - who left to set up a thriving estate 
agency, and Mr J Brass, who is still in post, and had had 
considerable impact on the towns development. Both however, have 
always been more concerned with commercial developments than housing, 
although the designation of land use has always been within the 
remit of the post of City Development Officer. In Derby, the City 
Architect has always been of less importance than in Portsmouth. 
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It would appear that in the ~ m m e d i a t e e post war period the ability and 
outlook of the chief officers and their respective chairmen and their 
working relationships were the principal determinants of the local 
authority housing policies rather than local party political 
ideology. In this period local authorities were catering for urgent 
needs which had to be met expeditously and ideology was often a 
secondary consideration. The Central Government provided much of the 
finance and the policy guidelines, the local authorities kept within 
them, only making adjustments to cater for local needs. The 
officials gave their advice from their professional standpoint and 
the councillors tended to accept it. Both cities are examples of the 
Joint Elite model, that is leading councillors and leading officials 
joining together to form policy. Wilson and Greenwood (1984) believe 
that it is necessary to take into account inter and intra department 
relations, and their effect on the policy making process. In Derby, 
the relationship between the Architect's department and the 
Surveyor's department was at times strained. The documentary 
evidence confirms that the Borough Surveyor was the more influential 
official. In Portsmouth, the rivalry was, as discussed above between 
the Architect's department and the Treasurer's department initially. 
The intra department relationships are much more difficult to 
determine, since they depend on the personalities of the individuals 
concerned and their inter personal skills. However, tensions 
clearly existed on an intra departmental plane, when Housing was a 
section within the City Treasurer's department and this was one of 
the reasons for the creation of a separate Housing department in 
1957, and for the appointment of a Housing Director. 
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Wilson and Greenwood pose an interesting view in stating that they 
feel local politics needs to be seen as a series of shifting 
alliances, varying over time and from issue to issue. To distinguish 
too sharply between officers and councillors is frequently to distort 
reality. There is the belief that senior elected and non-elected 
personnel might be dominant in some authorities on some issues but , 
as they state, this is only one possible alliance; second tier 
officers and party activists might combine effectively in other 
policy areas - the permutations are infinite. 
Laffin and Young (1985) in their paper on the Changing Roles and 
Responsibilities of Local Authority Chief Officers take the analysis 
one stage further. They state that structural and organisational 
changes in local government have also contributed to growing member 
assertiveness and political polarization. Certainly officers at both 
junior and senior levels, are finding it increasingly difficult to 
gain the professional satisfactions for which they originally entered 
local government. Tensions in the member-officer relationship were 
eased as long as there was growth. Continuing growth reduced the 
necessity of facing up to the opportunity costs. This is clearly the 
case in the period covered by this thesis. However since the onset 
of economic restraints on local government tensions have developed in 
a number of local authorities between chief officers, and also 
between chief officers and members. Changes in the economic climate 
are not the sole reason for changes in the relationship between 
member and officers, and between officers. The new generation of 
elected members are more highly estimated than earlier generations, 
less differential and likely to be more sceptical of professional 
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advice. At the same time Laffin and Young suggest, the management 
aspects of the chief officer's job have changed. Staff have become 
more difficult to handle, as the new generation of officers joining 
local government is also better educated and more assertive, like 
their member counterparts, and as financial restraint has affected 
their jobs. The educational level of younger officers is now very 
high following the increased graduate entry into local government and 
one could go further than Laffin and Young and suggest that 
managerial style will have to adapt to the frustrations of young 
professionals feeling frustrated at seeing their career prospect 
evaporate through economic circumstances, or being thwarted by less 
qualified, but older and more senior staff, who see the young staff 
as a threat, and react accordingly. Clearly, a part of this growing 
discontent among young professional staff, is the increase in trade 
unionism and the trade unions have become more assertive. They have 
come to challenge and demand participation in decisions that were 
formerly the prerogative of management. Laffin and Young suggest 
that this has raised particular problems for chief officers in those 
authorities, usually Labour-controlled, where the unions have a close 
informal relationship with the elected members. 
In some local authorities Laffin and Young suggest that junior 
officers sometimes hold quite prominent positions in a local 
political party, and they cite the example of a senior housing 
official in one housing department who was also the secretary of the 
Constituency Labour Party. This means that some officers can exercise 
considerable influence behind the scenes, pursuing an internal 
bureaucratic battle or pushing for a favoured policy: Laffin and 
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Young believe that such situations are more likely in Labour 
controlled authorities than Conservative controlled authorities. 
Little evidence was found in Derby or Portsmouth to substantiate 
their claims, although if the researched period had covered the onset 
of the cutbacks in local government programme, supporting evidence 
may have become apparent. 
In recent years there has been a growing trend towards full-time 
council leaders, this is discussed in t h i ~ ~ thesis, it is likely to 
lead to a conflict between the professional official and the 
chairmen, since the chairmen may overstep the boundaries of their 
roles as chairmen and become too involved in the administration of 
the department and gain regular access to members of staff below 
chief officer level. 
Malpass and Murie (1982) make the point that there are opportunities 
for lower-level officials to assert their views. Clearly, chief 
officers are dependent upon the flow of information upwards through 
the department hierarchy. This would be especially true in large 
authorities such as Derby and Portsmouth where the chief housing 
officer, was in both instances responsible for in excess of 20,000 
dwellings and each had a staff in excess of 400. In both cities, the 
chief officer would and does have to rely on his subordinates to keep 
him briefed on the current situation. The development in more recent 
years of research and policy units by both authorities has institu-
tionalised a policy role for certain officers below the top levels. 
This thesis reinforces Malpass's (1979) view that each occupational 
group has its view of the world, usually based on a fairly coherent 
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professional value system, and so the lines of conflict and co-
operation are quite clearly drawn and known in advance. In order 
to preserve its ability to cope with everyday problems which it faces 
~ ~
and to pursue its longer term objectives each group promotes its 
preferred versions of the facts. 
Recent research has attempted to evaluate not just the role of chief 
officers but also the influence of junior officers on policy 
implementation through the information network, through trade 
unionism, through political contacts and through professionalism. 
Networks and alliances vary enormously, but one conclusion is clear: 
there is far more to local authority decision-making than simply the 
officer-councillor dimension. The detailed analysis of this thesis I 
feel illustrates this factor well and confirms the conclusions of 
Wilson and Greenwood; Laffin and Young; and Malpass and Murie. 
d) Pressure Points 
Tenant's Associations in both Derby and Portsmouth have proved to 
be vocal at times over firstly overcrowding and secondly rent 
policy. 
Both Derby and Portsmouth acquired "temporary housing" in the period 
1946-47 in order to alleviate their acute housing problems. 
Temporary housing was provided in Derby at Markeaton Park and within 
Markeaton Hall. The accommodation was in former army buildings, 
and was extremely basic; the dividing partitions between units of 
accommodation not being constructed to the ceiling. This led to 
279 
a lack of privacy, to many complaints from tenants, and to a very 
active pressure group being founded. The site lacked basic 
facilities and the tenants petitioned the Council House in Derby 
regarding the living conditions. The pressure they brought to bear, 
particularly in the summer of 1951 led to improvements being made 
to the communal areas and a temporary shop being opened by the Derby 
Co-operative Society. However further pressure was applied via a 
public meeting in 1953 and through the local press and the site was 
abandoned in 1953. Some tenants had been there for six years and 
felt they had been forgotten. Pressure by the tenants' association 
embarassed the City Housing Committee into rehousing the tenants 
sooner than had been originally planned. 
Portsmouth City Housing Committee had a similar experience with their 
tenants with regard to the Bedhampton Camp. This camp, as we saw 
in Chapter Four of this thesis, was prone to flooding and the tenants 
objected to the isolated location of the camp, and the lack of 
private basic facilities. The Housing Committee, under pressure from 
the Residents Association made a special visit to the camp to see the 
conditions for themselves, in March 1954. Some members of the 
Housing Committee were appalled at the living conditions the tenants 
had to endure. As a result of the visit some of the temporary 
dwellings were demolished. 
The Tenants' Associations were throughout the period reviewed in this 
thesis active as far as rent policy was concerned. Certainly the 
tenants had strong views on the level of rents in both Derby and 
Portsmouth. 
In Derby the rents on similar sized properties were identical ie. 
3 bedroomed semis were let out at the same rental irrespective of 
age or location. This led to bitterness amongst the tenants of pre-
war properties who felt they were subsidising the tenants of post 
war properties. The council changed their rental policy in 1955 
to reflect the different levels of specification of houses but not 
the location. 
In Portsmouth the tenants' association became vocal on the issues of 
economic rents and keyworkers (discussed ~ b o v e ) . . Under the chair-
manship of the Rev Todd the tenants association made life difficult 
for the Portsmouth Housing Commitee at times. They complained 
fiercely about two main issues, firstly the level of economic rents 
charged, and the procedure for obtaining rebate, and secondly the 
remoteness of some of the housing estates, particularly Leigh Park, 
where the Rev. Todd was a Church of England Minister. The Tenant's 
Association organised protests against the Portsmouth City Council's 
Housing programme particularly in the late 1960's and the 1970's and 
indeed up to the present day. The protests relate to the level of 
rents and the standard of maintenance. A joint consultative commitee 
was set up in order to allow the Tenant's Association to air their 
views; this should have met at six monthly intervals, but as we saw 
in Chapter Six, the meeting pattern was not maintained and little 
regard was paid to the discussions. Certainly, Mr Dant, the Housing 
Director in the period covered by the case study, had little time for 
either the Tenant's Association or the Rev. Todd, whom he saw as a 
troublemaker and meddler. 
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The Tenants' Associations in both Derby and Portsmouth were at times 
, 
forces to be reckoned with. Like all successful pressure groups they 
knew how to organise the media - in both instances the local evening 
newspapers. Both publications appear to favour anti-local authority 
news and gave maximum coverage to issues raised by the Tenants' 
Association. In October 1970, Portsmouth City Council decided to 
increase rents by 15%, the Tenants' Associations in Portsmouth 
organised a series of protest marches, culminating in a march of some 
20,000 tenants on 3 February 1971. This march was headed by 
Councillor Kelly (a Labour councillor on Portsmouth City Council) and 
Councillor G Bell (Labour leader of Havant UDC, and a tenant of 
Portsmouth City Council). The Rents rally turned into a party 
political platform and led to a split within the Tenants' 
Association, since the Rev. Todd decided to disassociate himself from 
the rally. The Rev. Todd believed that the way to influence 
Portsmouth City Council was by lobbying, and arranged a visit to see 
Mr R Mellish, the then Minister of Housing and Local Government. In a 
letter to the Portsmouth Evening News dated 9 February 1971, and also 
during a recent interview with the writer of this thesis, the Rev. 
Todd stated that he felt that the Tenant Association should have 
remained outside the political arena, but that only fools seek change 
outside the political arena, housing policy being determined by those 
in power. The "own goals" scored by the Tenants' Association weakened 
their position, although it led to considerable coverage of their 
views in the Portsmouth Evening News. 
The Rev. Todd, when interviewed recently said that he felt that the 
Tenants Association was initially successful at Leigh Park because 
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there were many problems to be dealt with on the estate. These 
ranged from the lack of infra structure to the terminology of 
leaflets and letters sent out by the Housing Department, which he 
says were in a bureaucratic style not understood by most tenants. 
The main interest of most members of the Tenants Association was 
in keeping rent increases down. When the local authority wished 
to notify tenants of an increase it was always posted to them to 
arrive on a Saturday morning together with an eviction notice and 
a new tenancy agreement for the tenant to sign. The Rev. Todd said 
that such notifications upset tenants, who in the main were hard 
working people, who paid their rent when due. The Tenants' 
Association was formed to counter such bureaucracy. This view was 
countered by Mr Anthony Quail, a senior housing official, who when 
interviewed by the writer regarding Tenants' Associations gave a 
guarded answer stating that whilst the authority recognises them, the 
initiative to form them rests with the tenants, and that the 
infrequency of meetings of the joint consultative committee reflects 
the fact that there was little to discuss. This he believed is 
indicative that Portsmouth is a good landlord. Certainly Portsmouth 
has an impressive record in the upgrading of older properties and 
now (1985) has 25 declared General Improvement Areas within its 
boundaries. In addition considerable remedial structural work has 
been carried ~ u t t on the High Rise developments and Deck Access 
developments discussed in this thesis. The opportunity has been 
taken when undertaking the structural work, to remodel and maximise 
the units of accommodation and also to improve them cosmetically. 
Considerable criticism has been made of the High Rise developments 
and the Portsdown development in recent years and Portsmouth Housing 
department is clearly sensitive to comment, and has attempted to 
remedy the problems of the High Rise properties. Certainly local 
authorities - Derby and Portsmouth being no exception - react to 
adverse publicity quickly. 
Pressure groups such as Trade Associations appear to have had more 
impact in Portsmouth than Derby, particularly the local Master 
Builders Federation, which managed to secure small parcels of land 
for development in the late 1940's when building materials were 
scarce and also managed to secure contacts for infill sites for the 
local authority. This contrasts sharply with the policy in Derby, 
where all such work was directed to the local authorities' own direct 
works labour force. Trade Union views had little impact on 
Portsmouth City Council. They totally ignored the AUEW opposition to 
the keyworker scheme, and the local trades council view that only 
companies employing apprentices as well as skilled tradesmen should 
be allowed to tender for building work. In Derby, failure to employ 
apprentice labour, and offer an apprentice training scheme 
automatically excluded a company from the list of approved 
contractors for tender. Whilst the pressure groups were sometimes 
noisy, they were not usually very influential. 
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iv) Goals and Outputs of Housing Policy 
a) Policy Divergencies 
Besides the differences we have noted in Chapters 5 and 6 of this 
thesis relating to high rise, low rise and traditional housing -
in other words the obvious physical differences in housing policy, 
other more subtle differences have occurred in the outputs of the 
two authorities. In this section I wish to turn our attention to 
the main areas of policy divergence - namely high rise developments, 
slum clearance, keyworkers, the sale of council houses and rents 
policy. Patrick Dunleavy (1980) believes that local policy-making 
seems to be primarily explicable in terms of quite general local 
government ideologies, reflecting general organisational interests 
rather than a process of implicit policy adjustment to the area or 
community served. He further argues that oligarchic local authority 
decision-making co-exists with extensive structured links between 
council leaderships and local interests and elite groups. These 
assertions of Dunleavy are not entirely borne out by the research 
within this thesis. 
b) High Rise - Low Rise 
We have seen in Chapters 5 and 6 the divergence in the policies of 
the two authorities with regard to high rise and low rise 
developments. This most obvious divergence in policy outcome between 
Derby and Portsmouth came with the move in Portsmouth away from a 
reliance upon traditional housing, for a variety of _reasons. The 
Housing Committee in the mid 1950's was on the one hand faced with 
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an acute shortage of suitable land for development, and on the other 
with an acute housing problem. This confirms Dunleavy's assertion 
that the authorities with the most acute problems of slum clearance , 
dereliction and housing stress were forced to develop at high 
densities and to try to tackle their problems in situ. However, 
as we have seen in the text of this thesis, the relationship between 
Portsmouth City Council and its neighbouring authorities, 
particularly Havant and Waterlooville UDC were not all that they 
might have been, especially if compared with the relationship between 
Derby Town Council and its neighbouring authorities. Derby was 
encouraged by its neighbours to develop greenfield sites; Portsmouth 
was impeded from such developments. Additionally, both the Regional 
Housing Director and the City Architect for Portsmouth Housing 
Director and the City Architect for Portsmouth were keen to see high 
rise developments take place, mainly on land cleared of slums. 
Arguably, because the City Architect partly saw it as an interesting 
challenge, and partly because Central Government was keen to see 
a move away from traditional housing, in order to end what was 
becoming known as "urban sprawl". 
In the 1960's sub-regional planning became the vogue. The sub-
regional plans were in a way the forerunners to the county structure 
plans prepared in the 1970's. The major theme of the sub-regional 
plans for both the Derbyshire and Nottinghamshire, and the South 
Hampshire sub-regions was the prevention of urban-sprawl. 
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Certainly the Central Government planners feared that a new 
conurbation would be developed if both Portsmouth and Southampton 
were allowed to develop "spillover" estates in South Hampshire. 
The resistance of both Hampshire County Council and Havant and 
Waterlooville UDC is easy to understand; they did not want to be 
swamped by their large neighbours. It may be suggested therefore 
that the pressure on land, combined with the advice given by the 
Regional Director and the City Architect to the city council brought 
about the instigation of a policy of non-traditional housing. The 
City Architect's views usually prevailed, and the local authority 
was encouraged by ready provision of government finance for non-
traditional schemes as we have seen in the text. In Derby, the 
shortage of land was not so acute and it was therefore easier for 
the local authority to resist the pressures exerted by Central 
Government, and to keep to a policy of traditional housing. Also 
the City Engineer was less enthusiastic about non-traditional 
housing. However, fears of urban growth also existed in the East 
Midlands in the late 1960's, when it was felt that a large 
conurbation of Nottingham/Derby/Leicester might ultimately emerge. 
Certainly, the areas was undergoing rapid change at that time, with 
the building of the M1 motorway, Ratcliffe-on-Soar power station and 
the East Midlands Airport; all major projects in their own right, 
but projects which were all under construction simultaneously. In 
an attempt to prevent development of a Nottigham/Derby corridor 
Cowling and Steeley (1973) suggest that the Alfreton/Mansfie1d 
development zone was created astride the M1 motorway, to draw both 
industrial and domestic developments away from the two major centres 
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of industrial activity. Large industrial estates were created such 
as Clover Nook and Coates Park, with large private estates of low 
cost houses built nearby. 
The Derby Planning Committee generally resisted proposals for high 
rise developments whether commercial or residential and, where it was 
permitted, set a limit of nine storeys on high rise developments. 
Derby's only experiment with high rise residential developments was 
the building of the Bath Street flats in 1965. This development was 
not particularly successful. The choice of site was rather bizarre -
on the West Bank of the River Derwent near the town centre. This 
stretch of the river is prone to flooding, and the land had never 
been used for residential purposes before. Soon after the first 
tenants had taken up residence, the River Derwent burst its banks at 
a point near to the appropriately named Rivermead House, and flooded 
the ground floor flats. This needless to say led to resistance 
amongst prospective tenants, and the flats in the development became 
difficult to let. In 1967, the problem of letting flats in Rivermead 
House became so acute that the Housing Committee decided that if 
applicants for housing rejected the offer of accommodation in 
Rivermead House without just cause, they would be placed at the end 
of the waiting list. The Housing Committee became so disillusioned 
with the outcome of this development, that they decided to abandon 
plans for similar developments in the town, and the council's works 
department sold off the tower crane which they had used in the 
construction of the Bath Street flats. There had been as ~ e n t i o n e d d
in Chapter 6 prior to the construction of the flats, vigorous debates 
between the housing and planning departments. 
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One might put the question "why was Portsmouth so willing to accept 
high rise developments?" Mr Quail feels that it was because it was 
"fashionable". But the research indicates that the reasons are much 
more complex than this. Pressure for land, as discussed above, must 
have been an important factor. The divergence however also reflects 
a differing attitude towards building methods which existed between 
the two authorities throughout the period reviewed by this thesis. 
In the immediate post war years Portsmouth willingly used "system 
buil t" housing methods and prefabrication methods, whereas in Derby 
such methods were viewed with suspicion. In the late 1950's 
Portsmouth was one of the authorities willing to pioneer high rise 
developments. The City Architect was keen to establish his city 
at the forefront of public sector housing, and presumably add Kudos 
to his professional reputation. The councillors in Portsmouth were 
full of civic pride and keen to see Portsmouth portrayed as a "modern 
city". They appear to have equated high rise developments with 
"progressiveness". The Portsdown Hill project reviewed in Chapters 5 
and 6 of this thesis is possibly the clearest example. As we saw 
in the text, Portsmouth City Council was keen to build a landmark 
and develop the full potential of the site. To run a competition 
for a design may however have been a little risky. Portsmouth City 
Council at times seemed to be obsessed with its rivalry with its 
near neighbour - Southampton, and possibly the councillors felt they 
lived in the shadow of Southampton and needed to make a mark. 
Derby lives in the shadow of Nottingham, and rivalry exists. Derby's 
focus of attention in the late 1950's and 1960's was the East 
Midlands Airport. Originally Derby envisaged it as an upstaging 
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of Nottingham but ultimately it was developed on a joint basis with 
Nottingham City and County authorities, Leicester City and County 
authorities and Derbyshire County Council. The airport, and not 
housing was Derby's status project of the era. Derby Town Council 
was happy to pursue a "roofs over heads policy" and to build along 
traditional lines. In Derby only one tower block of flats was built 
- Bath Street (1965). This is probably due to the traditional views 
held by the councillors and their belief in building three bedroomed 
semi-detached houses on greenfield sites ~ r o u n d d the periphery of 
the town. In addition the Borough Architect was not the most 
influential official; instead it was the Borough Surveyor, W.G. 
Penny, a man of traditional ideas. Possibly the need was not so 
pressing, and so the traditional approach was demmed to be 
appropriate. 
All the tower block developments were financed from central funds. 
Indeed one of the complaints of the present (1984) Portsmouth City 
Council is that it is exceeding the government imposed financial 
targets and therefore one of the eighteen authorities which are going 
to be "rate capped", because of the interest payments it is having 
to make on debts incurred in order to build the high rise apartment 
blocks, which it had been encouraged to build by central government. 
c) Urban Renewal 
Since the Central Government took the initiative in slum clearance, 
it could be suggested that local authorities have acted largely as 
an agent for the Central Government. 
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d) Keyworkers 
The keyworkers policy followed in Portsmouth in post war years 
represents a major divergence in policy when compared with the policy 
of housing individuals and families moving to Derby from other areas. 
In Derby, newcomers moving to the town had for most of the period 
covered by this thesis to be resident in the town for twelve months 
before they even became eligible to be registered on the housing 
waiting list. This contrasts sharply with the policy in Portsmouth. 
The Portsmouth City Council in its desire to attract new industry 
decided in 1948 to offer accommodation to those employees of incoming 
companies who could be identified as being essential to the starting 
up of the new enterprise in Portsmouth. The houses were allocated 
to the companies and not to individuals. The companies had to 
guarantee that the rental would be paid. If the tenant left the 
employment of the company, then he was required to relinquish the 
tenancy. The tenant was required to pay the full economic rent of 
the property, irrespective of his personal income. This latter 
aspect led to some cases of severe hardship, even in the early years 
of the policy, when the general housing situation in Britain was 
at its most acute, some families moved to Portsmouth in order to 
be rehoused. The keyworker housing policy also created resentment 
amongst those residents of Portsmouth who had registered their 
housing needs on the waiting list. Many of them felt the keyworkers 
were queue-jumping, and objected to families with no connections 
with the city being housed, whilst they lived in overcrowded and/or 
insanitary housing. This situation was further a g g r a v a t ~ d d by the 
fact that the Housing Director believed that keyworkers should be 
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allocated the better plots on new developments, and that they should 
be offered brand new dwellings, since he argued that they paid the 
full economic rent and should therefore be offered the best 
accommodation available at the time their requirement needed 
fulfilling. This attitude prevailed until 1958, when, because of 
difficulties in letting properties on the more distant Leigh Park 
estate, houses on that estate were allocated to keyworkers. The 
Housing Director felt the keyworkers had little option but to accept 
what was offered. Thus a change in demand for housing allowed a 
change in policy towards keyworkers. The keyworker policy was a 
major departure from Central Government housing policy and is 
indicative of the scope of local discretion which has existed in 
local authority housing policy. As mentioned earlier, the reason 
for Portsmouth City Council developing its keyworker housing policy 
was to broaden and strengthen the industrial base of the city. With 
the current run down of the naval dockyards (1985) it would appear 
that the City Council were very far sighted in their innovative 
policy. The Portsmouth area has become a centre for the "new 
technology" industries. Companies such as IBM Ltd and Marconi PLC 
have moved to the area. The majority of the new industries attracted 
have been related to electronics and pharmaceuticals - both "clean" 
industries and both growth industries. The policy is not used so 
much now (1985) and the council prefers to use the National Mobility 
Scheme. 
The Town Council in Derby saw no need to use its housing policy as 
a "bait" to new industry and indeed until 1971, there was probably 
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no need. In 1971, however Rolls Royce Ltd went into liquidation, 
and 4,000 employees were made redundant. Since 1971, Derby Town 
Council has been more keen to generate employment in the town b 
, y 
encouraging companies to come to the town and they have, as part 
of the package of inducements, offered a form of keyworker housing. 
Prior to 1971, they were complacent. 
e) The Sale of Council Houses 
Derby and Portsmouth have differed strongly on the sale of council 
houses. As we saw in Chapter 4 of this thesis, some members of 
Portsmouth City Council were advocating that council houses being 
planned and built, should be developed to a standard which would 
allow them to be sold off at some future date. This was a view being 
put forward in the council chamber in 1948 - at a time of shortage 
of building materials. Quite clearly an ideological point was being 
made in the council chamber. From 1952 onwards council houses became 
available for purchase by existing tenants, the price being charged 
to the tenant being the market price less a percentage dependent 
upon the period of tenancy. In order to encourage sales, the 
majority of councillors wanted the sales to be financed by 100% 
mortgages from the City Council, and for a time, this was the policy 
pursued, against the advice of the City Treasurer. The City 
Treasurer was against 100% mortgages because he believed - and his 
belief was substantiated - that purchasers with nothing to lose were 
more likely to incur bad debts and mortgage arrears, although tenants 
with a prior history of rent arrears were usually refused mortgage 
facilities. The City Treasurer believed that purchasers should make 
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a deposit. Ultimately all Portsmouth's council houses (not flats) 
became available for sale on payment of an initial deposit of £10 
with the application to purchase (non-refundable if an offer of sale 
made and declined) and a further £15 on sale - £25 in other words. 
This was lower than the Treasurer wished. The sale of council houses 
in Portsmouth was initially quite slow, but as the council started 
to introduce its economic rent policy, 50 sales started to gather 
momentum, the sales increasing at times of rent reviews and then 
falling back to an average of 12 dwellings per month. 
In contrast, in Derby, it was not until after 1 April 1968, when 
the County Borough boundaries had been extended and a Conservative 
Council had been elected that a change in policy occurred. They 
decided to offer for sale council houses to their tenants at sitting 
tenant prices. The council in Derby also decided to offer for sale 
newly erected 2 and 3 bedroomed houses to applicants who were on 
the housing list. This represents a contrast with most local 
authorities, and more recently the Labour group has furthered this 
by building houses specifically for sale. The sale price for the 
new houses being their current market value. If the purchaser wished 
to sell his house, then the council retained the right to buy back 
the dwelling at the sale price, the Mortgages being provided by the 
Corporation at a fixed interest rate of 7 % and the deposit being 
£25. During the first twelve months in which council houses were 
for sale 57 were sold. It is worth noting that despite a change 
of ruling group back to Labour in 1972, and inspite of Derby Town 
Council's resistance to the Housing Finance Act 1972 reviewed below, 
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the council continued to sell council houses to those tenants wishing 
to purchase. They also continued the policy started by the 
Conservatives during their brief spell in office, of building some 
75 houses for sale to people on the waiting list and providing them 
with 100% mortgages. It might be suggested that the Conservative 
group acted as policy initiators, and once the policy had been 
started, it was easy for Labour to continue it. As mentioned in 
Chapter 6 and as we shall see in the next section of this chapter, 
some of the Derby councillors had high ambitions of careers in 
national politics and they held relatively left wing views compared 
with the "old guard" councillors who were architypal Labour 
councillors. After the overwhelming defeat of the Labour group at 
the 1968 elections many of the "old guard" councillors "retired" 
and the younger men came forward and it was they who decided to 
continue the sale of council houses, and as we shall see below, 
resist the 1972 Housing Finance Act. It could be suggested that 
the younger councillors were not typical of Labour councillors in 
general, and further, they could draw attention to themselves by 
refusing to implement legislation which the Conservative Government 
considered to be key legislation. They were out to make a political 
mark for themselves. 
f) Rent Policy 
Derby and Portsmouth have also differed in their respective rent 
policies. In Portsmouth, since 1952, the Housing Revenue Account 
has been required to be self-balancing. The policy has been one 
of charging tenants an economic rent, providing that they could 
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afford to pay an economic rent. The th d d f me 0 s use or assessing total 
income were considered by the tenants association too draconian. 
This may have been with some justificaion since the income assessment 
took into account childs' earnings. The onus was upon the tenant 
to make a claim for rebate rather than upon the City Housing 
Committee to take into account the ability to pay. Both the City 
Treasurer and the Housing Director took a hard line with those 
tenants who failed to either claim a rent rebate and then fell into 
arrears of rent, or those who failed to declare their full income 
when claiming a rebate, those in the latter category being invariably 
evicted. Throughout the period covered by this thesis, the policy 
in Portsmouth towards rents was to change economic rents to those 
tenants who could afford to pay them, and to those tenants housed 
under the keyworker policy. 
In marked contrast, in Derby, the Town Council adopted a policy in 
the post war years of making up the deficit on the Housing Revenue 
Account from the General Rate Fund. This policy remained in being 
until 1968. In 1968, after the change in ruling group, furtherance 
of Conservative ideology became evident in the announcement that 
preference would be given to those people on the housing list capable 
of paying the "standard" (economic) rent. This measure was 
introduced in conjunction with a rent rebate scheme for existing 
tenants. It might be argued therefore that the Council in Derby 
adopted a policy of housing in local authority accommodation those 
1 b off than those who were in "need". who were financial yetter 
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In May 1972 the Conservative group on Derby Town Council lost control 
to the Labour group. The Labour council was bitterly opposed to 
a policy of high council rents. In October 1972 the Housing Finance 
Act was passed. The resistance to this act was so marked that as 
late as February 1973 the Housing Committee in Derby was still 
rejecting advice from the Town Clerk that rents of council properties 
should be raised in accordance with the Fair Rents legislation by 
50 pence per dwelling. The legislation had been implemented smoothly 
in Portsmouth. A fierce debate between the parties arose over this 
issue, and at one stage it looked as though Derby Town Council was 
going to stand firm against the Government Policy, as had happened 
with Clay Cross Urban District Council. A deputation of Councillors 
went to London to meet Mr Peter Walker, the then Secretary of State 
for the Evironment, but he was adamant about his position and so 
on 18 June 1973, 50 pence was added to the rents. Derby Town Council 
belatedly implemented the Housing Finance Act 1972. 
It is interesting to contrast the reactions of the two authorities. 
Portsmouth, being Conservative controlled, followed to the letter, 
without question the Housing Finance Act 1972. However, the Tenants' 
Association was extremely vocal about the policy. Their protests 
were set aside in a series of press releases which said it was 
"government policy". The policy however was the one which the City 
Council had themselves pursued for a considerable length of time. 
In Derby, the reason for their stance was more than ideological 
hostility. Older Labour councillors might have swallowed their 
hostility but were inhabited by the more doctrinal approach of some 
younger ones. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT CONCLUSIONS 
The evidence of research in Derby and Portsmouth set out in earlier 
chapters produces clear indication of policy differences on high 
rise buildings, the sale of council houses, rents policy and the 
housing of key workers. In this concluding chapter I will seek 
explanations for such differences in policy. The scholars have put 
forward a host of explanatory models and theories of local government 
behaviour (as discussed in Chapters One and TWo). In what follows 
the research findings will be related to the more significant of 
them. 
i) Determinators of Policy 
a) Output Studies 
Policy output studies based on quantitative methodology fall into 
two main categories. The first undertakes a statistical analysis 
of the effects of party competition on policy outputs usually 
measured by expenditure. As was discussed in Chapter One this type 
includes works by Kay, Dawson, Dye et ale The results are often 
satisfactory in a statistical sense. Correlation coefficients are 
sometimes large. The problem with such studies is that they are 
too narrowly focused. To seek to find explanatory variables only 
in the field of party competition is too restricted. 
The second kind of quantitative output study is that which employs 
a much wider range of. variables in the analysis - for instance needs, 
resources, national policies as well as party factors. This approach 
is exemplified by the work of Boaden, Davies, Alt, Stanyer and 
Ashford. 
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Although their approach is more satisfactory in terms of under-
standing the social, economic, and political basis of local 
government activity, often the results are less satisfying in 
statistical terms. The correlation coefficients are often low, even 
though statistically significant, or regression formulae leave a 
large proportion of the variance unexplained. 
In the large part the poor explanatory power of any single 
independent variable or group of variables, reflects the enormous 
complexity of performance and expenditure patterns, the possibility 
of non-linear relationships and the fairly substantial degree of 
multicollinearity among groups of independent variables. These 
complications in turn, stem from the fact that output research is 
dealing with the totality of social, economic and political 
relationships in whole political systems. The relationship is both 
complex and closely interwoven. Too often social research is 
concerned with a narrower range of relationships where both dependent 
and independent variables are conveniently abstracted from their 
environment. 
Even the broader kind of quantitative output analysis is 
insufficiently comprehensive. In particular it fails to take account 
of the influences of personal and of personality brought out in this 
thesis. Statistically based research provides useful indicators, but 
falls short of a convincing explanatory model. This thesis is an 
example of the kind of local policy making study which attempts ~ o o be 
comprehensive. Thus it is more akin to works such as Hampton on 
Sheffield and Dearlove on Kensington and Chelsea. 
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b) Central-Local Relations Revisited 
In Chapter Two of this thesis the doubts which have developed 
regarding the traditional models of local-central relationships, 
central dominance or partnership, were examined. This research 
reinforces these doubts. It confirms the greater explanatory value 
of Rhodes's alternative approach of "local discretion" and 
"interdependence" discussed on page 43 above. The research 
undertaken in both Derby and Portsmouth reveals evidence to support 
the theories put forward by Rhodes on a l ~ ~ his five counts. However, 
again one can go further. The research illustrates the importance 
of personalities for the central-local relationship, and this factor 
is underplayed, even by the most recent literature. 
c) Corporatist Models 
As indicated in Chapter One J.J. Richardson and G.Jordan believe 
that the style of policy making today has blurred the distinction 
between central administration and bodies outside that perimeter, 
including local authorities. They believe that account must be taken, 
for instance, of the "government contract sector" and the influence 
which companies specialising in supplying the public sector can have 
upon policy-making. This belief is similar to the view held by 
Patrick Dunleavy with regard to the influence of the construction 
industry upon the provision of mass housing. 
The ideas of Richardson and Jordan are to a certain extent substan-
tiated by the research in this thesis. The Southern Electricity 
Board was very successful in promoting underfloor heating to the 
Portsmouth City Council for use in high rise buildings, and regional 
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and national builders promoted system building methods for high rise 
developments. Richardson and Jordan would suggest that they form 
part of their notion of "policy community". This concept can be 
applied to local policy making viz a "local policy community". There 
is some evidence from the findings to support this, but insufficient 
for a total explanation. As we shall see in the final section of 
this chapter it was not the "policy community" which necessarily 
determined the policy. 
It will be recalled that in Chapter Two of this thesis I discussed 
the work of J.K.Friend et al (1974) and his study of the decision 
making process leading to the expansion of Droitwich. J.K.Friend 
argues that the gradual shift of emphasis from public towards private 
sector housing, has left the government with less direct power to 
channel the movement of population. The increase in car-ownership 
has increased the mobility of a large sector of the working 
population, making it more difficult to integrate government controls 
over housing, employment, transportation and other services. As 
previously indicated J.K.Friend believes that Central Government is 
no longer necessarily the dominant actor within the planning process. 
The approach of J.K. Friend is similar to that of Richardson and 
Jordan, that is essentially one of corporatism. The evidence 
obtained in my research does not entirely substantiate J.K.Friend's 
conclusions with regard to public sector housing, since in the 
majority of programmes, the capital finance is obtained from central 
government resources. Clearly in the private sector, people are 
likely to vote with their cheque books and this will influence 
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the location of private sector developments, and therefore the 
detailed planning process. A degree of corporatism does exist within 
housing policy, but the evidence suggests it is not dominant. 
d) The Dunleavy Thesis Revisited 
As I indicated in Chapter One Patrick Dunleavy believes that the 
"public housing apparatus" at a national level exerts a considerable 
influence over the setting of housing construction policy. He 
believes that the two main production interests, the design 
profession and the construction industry operate in close contact 
with each other and Central Government in shaping production policy 
on public housing. He believes that mass housing policy is in 
substantial measure determined by the influence of the construction 
industry. My research indicates that he has overestimated the 
influence of the building industry; his model cannot account for 
the differences between Derby and Portsmouth. He is only concerned 
with high rise developments, which whilst a major source of public 
sector housing provision in the 1950's and 1960's were not the sole 
source of public sector housing provision even during that period. 
In addition he has paid little regard to overspill policies, which 
were significant in the 1960's. He argues that "containment" by 
the middle classes of surburbia and the rural upper class, organised 
in the Conservative party had succeeded in orientating the planning 
system towards the containment of cities. My research has produced 
evidence to show the reverse to be the case in Derby, where both 
the Belper R.D.C. and the South East Derbyshire R.D.C. offered little 
or no resistance to Derby Town Council's request for building land in 
their areas. Dunleavy believes that the financial policy of Central 
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Government played an important part in the policy making process. My 
research shows that Derby chose not to build high despite the finan-
cial incentives to do so, and that Portsmouth chose types of high 
rise buildings designed by its own architectural staff, which did not 
qualify for maximum grant aid. This finding casts further doubt on 
Dunleavy's assertions, for he states that the architectural 
profession had less influence on local authorities' policies than the 
construction industry. On the contrary the evidence from my research 
in Portsmouth indicates that the City Architect pushed his own ideas 
in pursuit of professional recognition. The overall thrust of 
Dunleavy's thesis is twofold: first to suggest that housing policy 
is essentially nationally determined allowing little real scope for 
local discretion; second, to suggest that the policy process is 
essentially corporatist. The evidence of housing policy in Derby 
and Portsmouth for the period investigated casts doubt on both of 
Dunleavy's propositions. 
ii) Explaining Policy Differences 
Throughout this thesis, the underlying aim has been to try to 
discover the main factors influencing and answer the question - what 
determines housing policy? The contrasts between Portsmouth and 
Derby give some leads. 
a) External Pressures 
The policy of high rise development in Portsmouth was not one which 
was popular with tenants. The tenants appear to have had little 
say in the discussions concerning their rehousing during the post-war 
period. Tenants Associations had little or no impact on the actual 
style or type of housing provided. Clearly, pressure for land must 
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have had some bearing and, to an extent, Dunleavy's findings on 
overspill problems are supported by the research undertaken in 
Portsmouth. Hampshire County Council as we saw in the case study, 
resisted overspill, but it was over-ruled on appeal by Portsmouth 
City Council to the Ministry of Housing and Local Government; the 
land was forthcoming, albeit delayed. Some other factor must 
therefore have played a part. 
My research indicates that in Portsmouth it was the influence of 
the City Architect and the desire by councillors to make their city 
the leading city on the South Coast. This "civic pride syndrome" 
appears to have had more influence on the policy formulation process 
than central government grants or lobbying by the construction 
industry. 
In Derby there was no vociferous tenants' association but the Housing 
Committee and the Borough Surveyor were opposed to High Rise 
Developments. They did not wish to see the skyline of the town 
penetrated by such developments. On a more practical level, much 
of the housing being constructed in the public sector in Derby was 
built by direct labour, although national contractors were also used. 
The direct labour force would not have had the necessary skills to be 
able to undertake high rise work. The dependence on direct labour 
reflects a local as well as party ideology. 
The research undertaken in Derby and Portsmouth regarding high rise 
, 
developments tends to support the Elite model of local power - that 
is policy formulation by an elite of local politicians and local 
306 
professionals. The evidence gathered in Portsmouth relating to the 
attitudes of the City Architect confirms the belief of Malpass and 
Murie - that professionals seek peer group acclaim. The City 
Architect, Mr Mellor became a frequent delegate to professional 
conferences and delivered a number of papers on planning matters. 
He saw this as a way of putting Portsmouth to the forefront of town 
planning in Britain. 
In the instances of financial policy relating to housing cited in 
this thesis, we have seen that local party ideology over-ruled the 
professional model of local government policy making. Professional 
advice was sometimes ignored. Moreover, national policies were not 
easily imposed. For instance, it was not until the senior local 
politicians in Derby had visited Mr Peter Walker in London in 1982, 
tha they agreed to implement the Housing Finance Act 1972. Thus the 
only significant external influence on the leading Derby councillors 
was the intervention of the Minister and his intervention was excep-
tional. For policies other than rent policy national government 
pressures were not overwhelming. In portsmouth the City Treasurer's 
influence waned as the period researched passed by. Initially the 
Housing Department was a section within the City Treasury, but with 
the appointment of a Housing Director (Mr Dant) the Treasurer's 
influence declined. His policy for financing the sale of council 
houses, and his advice against 100% mortgages were rejected by the 
Portsmouth Housing Committee. He feared that mortgage arrears would 
be incurred. Events were to prove him correct. In both these 
instances we have examples of local ideology over-ruling the 
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professional advice of a chief officer. In these instances the 
Elite Model must be modified to embrace only local politicians. 
The Conservative period of control 1968-72 in Derby acted as a 
focusing point for policy changes which have remained under 
successive Labour administrations. The electoral defeat of Labour 
in 1968 also led to changes of councillors whilst the group was in 
opposition. Most significantly it led to a change of leadership from 
Alderman Flint to Councillor Dilks. Alderman Flint guided Derby's 
housing policy from 1945 to 1968 - a considerable period of time. He 
was a middle class lawyer with traditional socialist values. He saw 
local authority housing as a social service and believed that those 
tenants who wished to purchase a house should buy one in the private 
sector. Derby Town Council had encouraged the development of private 
estates by national contractors such as Wimpey. Derby is an area 
of traditionally low cost housing, Portsmouth an area of more 
expensive housing. This factor may have influenced the attitudes 
to council house sales, although not enormously. 
The research indicates that in both the sale of council houses, and 
in the implementation of the 1972 Housing Finance Act, local politics 
made a significant difference to the policy outcomes. It is clear 
from the research that on both these issues local ideology rode 
supreme over professional advice. 
The research also shows that ideology became more important as the 
needs for housing became less pressing. This is best illustrated 
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by reference to the sale of council houses. In Portsmouth sales 
were discussed in 1948, but the policy was not implemented until 
1952. 
b) Local Discretion 
The research indicates that there are high levels of discretion at 
the local level within the overall policy boundaries set by central 
government, and the research goes a considerable way to confirm John 
Stewart's policy boundaries theories. This level of discretion 
allows local politicians to add their own ideological interpretation 
to policy, should they so wish. It is apparent therefore from the 
research that on policies such as housing, local politicial change 
is more significant than national political change. The overall 
national boundaries are likely to change less than the boundaries 
of discretion. As previously mentioned, in Bradford, the boundaries 
of discretion changed to no public sector house building at all after 
the change of ruling group to the Conservatives in 1968, and the 
reliance upon housing associations for the provision of low cost 
housing for rental. 
Local party ideology would appear to have become more apparent in 
recent years, with the filling of such "policy gaps" as the sale 
of council houses in Derby in 1968. Both authorities appear to have 
"used" Housing Associations as "dustbin" providers, not exactly the 
aims of the enabling legislation. In Derby, Housing Associations have 
been used to provide low cost accommodation for one parent families, 
the elderly whom the Council cannot provide with suitable accommoda-
tion and families referred to the Housing Committee by the Social 
, 
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Services departments, families politely known as "problem families". 
The use of housing associations in these ways reflected decisions 
taken by local politicians rather than officers. 
Housing policy as we have seen in this thesis is used by governments 
as an economic regulator of the economy. This is again a political 
act of Central Government to which local politicians have to respond 
whilst at the same time monitoring local needs and local opinions. 
Tenant participation had been legally p o ~ s i b l e e since 1936, in the 
form of tenant management. However, my research indicates that very 
little tenant participation or management has occurred in either 
Derby or Portsmouth. It will be recalled that the Rev. Todd led a 
very vociferous Tenant's Association on the Leigh Park estate in 
Portsmouth. The evidence and my interview with the Rev. Todd, both 
indicate that the Tenant's Association rise was due as much as 
anything to the autocratic style of management adopted by firstly 
the City Treasurer (Mr Thompson) and then by Mr Dant, the Housing 
Director. Joint Liaison Committees were formed in both cities, but 
in both cities they appear to have met infrequently. This form of 
participation is not available to those in need since they still 
have to become local authority tenants, and I would contend that 
it is they who are most likely to air their views with regard to 
the types of accommodation required. The tenants are likely to be 
more concerned about infra-structure and day to day administrative 
affairs - which is possibly why they become apathetic about 
participation, rather than as Mr Qualye, of Portsmouth City Council 
implied, because the tenants have nothing to discuss. 
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c) Local Personalities 
A successful political leader in local government does not just lead 
the local authority, but can bargain with Central Government. Both 
Alderman Flint and Councillor Miles had negotiating skills which 
are of paramount importance. Alan Alexander (1982) suggests that 
there is evidence of the arrival in some authorities of councillors 
who are full-time, or effectively full-time, in their commitment 
to local government. This is leading to the development of a kind 
of de facto political executive and a consequent alteration in the 
position of the chief executive as the head of the council's paid 
service. Whilst there is not evidence in either Derby or Portsmouth 
wholly to support Alexander's ideas, in both cities new council 
leaders emerged in the early 1970's, who were effectively full-time 
local politicians. In Derby, John Dilks, who was, and still is 
employed.by the Central Midlands Co-operative Society Ltd took on 
this role. He was succeeded by Mick Walker, who is employed by Rolls 
Royce Ltd and who in addition to being Council Leader, is a senior 
official of the trade union A.S.T.M.S. 
In Portsmouth, John Marshall, a manager of a branch of the National 
Westminster Bank pIc emerged as a full-time local politician - he 
had at one time been a Labour Councillor in Portsmouth, but crossed 
the party l i n ~ . . The emergence of full-time councillors is as Laffin 
and Young (1985) suggest likely to change the relationship between 
professional officers and members. 
Portsmouth City Council did not change politicially throughout the 
period covered by this thesis and remained a Conservative controlled 
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council. This fact, combined with the fact that there were thirteen 
years of uninterrupted Conservative controlled central government, 
must have assisted the Portsmouth Council in its consistency in 
policy making and in its harmonious relationship with Central 
Government in relation to housing policy. The changes in personnel 
in Portsmouth were due to the retirements and death, rather than the 
ballot box. Therefore changes in political ideology did not come to 
theltfore to the same extent as in Derby, although clearly the 
Conservative ideology dominated throughout the period researched, 
starting with the suggestions of the sale of council houses in 1948 -
at a time of great need. Arguably in Portsmouth the ideology 
remained the same, but the goals changed as the Second World War 
receded into the past. The move was from "roofs over heads" to owner 
occupation - a pattern which seems to accord with public preferences 
throughout Britain. 
Different governments and different policies may have only a marginal 
effect on the national or "macro" policy outcome, but in the "micro" 
or local policy outcome then a change of council may have a 
significant effect, and this factor is borne out by the research in 
this thesis. However, when there was a pressing job to be done, 
such as in the immediate post-war years, the local political hatchet 
appears to have been buried, but once the urgent perceived need had 
been met, then party ideology came to the fore as we have seen. 
d) Local Policy Making 
Policy making at the local level is a complex process with as I have 
tried to illustrate many variables - resources, finance, personnel, 
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local-central relations and the influence of the individual actors 
involved. One may however put the question - are all the policy 
goals being achieved? Clearly there are still needs to be catered 
for, such as the needs of the elderly, the needs of the single and 
the need for adequate infrastructure. Infrastructure delays were in 
the main due to cost limitations. William Dunn (1981) formulated 
criteria for the evaluation of policies. In Dunn's terms a level of 
"effectiveness" has been achieved but not "adequacy". This is because 
the policy shortfalls occurred not in the sense that the two towns 
set out to fulfil their needs and failed, but in the sense that they 
were not providing adequately for their citizens. In this sense 
feedback from resident's associations, internal monitoring and 
through the media would indicate that not all the needs have been 
tackled. 
The differences in the policies of 'the two authorities from the 
1950's onwards are due to a combination of environmental factor and 
internal factors. The former includes the shortage of land in 
Portsmouth and the City Council's failure to reach agreement with 
neighbouring authorities. This resulted in Portsmouth City Council 
being acutely short of building land. The latter covers the City 
Architect's desire to further his reputation in his profession, 
resulting in tower blocks being constructed as the mainstream of 
housing provision in the public sector in Portsmouth in the 1960's. 
My research indicates, in contrast to Dunleavy, that it was a 
combination of internal factors which determined output - the-desire 
of the City Architect to make a name for himself with his profession 
combined with the desire of the City Councillors to see Portsmouth 
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as a leading city on the South Coast. It was a combination of 
personality, personal goals and ideological aims but essentially an 
Elite Model - with the external factors playing a secondary part. 
In Derby, by contrast, a traditional style of housing was 
constructed, but the environmental factors were conducive to this 
policy; land was available, and the internal factors, ie. the 
councillors and chief officers also favoured this approach. Local 
choice existed within their spheres; much of the housing programmes 
were constructed using direct labour. This eliminated to a great 
extent the influence of the construction industry, and therefore 
again negates Dunleavy's thesis. Local choice existed in both Derby 
and Portsmouth regarding rent policy; here local politics or internal 
factors were of prime importance, just as they were regarding key 
workers in Portsmouth. 
From the research for this thesis it is apparent that local 
. ~ ~
authorities ae able to exercise a high degree of discretion within 
! 
the policy boundaries set by Central Government. The policy outcomes 
are the result of the interaction of factors - both internal and 
external - rather than the result of a single factor such as is 
suggested by Dunleavy. However, it would appear that in both 
authorities it was internal factors which primarily determined the 
policy outcomes rather than simply needs and resources. 
In Portsmouth the single most important factor in determining the 
policy outcomes was the professionalism of the City Architect and 
the City Development Officer and their ability to persuade the City 
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Housing Committee to their standpoint at the expense of the Housing 
Director and the City Treasurer. In addition the senior members of 
the Council were sympathetic to housing. 
In Derby, it was initially professionalism of the Borough Surveyor 
and his desire to use traditional layouts for post-war estates, and 
his ability to eclipse the Borough Architect which influenced the 
policy outcomes and in later years it b ~ c a m e e the political ambitions 
of, the younger councillors which had the greatest effect. Neither 
city fits Dunleavy's model of allowing the influence of national 
policy and of the construction industry to influence mass housing 
policy. 
In both cities local party ideology provided the backcloth against 
which policy was determined, and as we saw earler in this chapter, 
local politics and local ideology makes a difference to policy 
outcomes. Policy outcomes have therefore been the result of a 
compote of internal and environmental factors combined with needs 
and available resources. 
iii) An Explanatory Model 
The model which most effectively resembles this policy process one 
could term the Insulated Political Elite model - not very different 
from that put forward by Dearlove. 
The research indicates that local politicians essentially decided 
policy. It was a product of their skills, personalities and beliefs. 
Sometimes they allied themselves with professionals and used their 
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advice, sometimes they chose to respond to requests from Central 
Government, but essentially in this period it was a small group of 
local politicians that decided housing policy. Further research 
is required to determine whether such a situation still exists in 
the two cities. The research clearly indicates that it takes 
~ ~
d r a c o n i ~ n n Central measures to change local politicians behaviour 
This supports Dearlove's thesis, but he believes that such 
circumstances only arise in one party councils, yet this research 
showed it occurring in Derby, which experienced changes of party 
control, as well as in Portsmouth which did not. Nevertheless in 
both cities one party was dominant for long periods. 
This case study clearly highlights the degree of local discretion 
available to local authorities, the importance of local politics 
and local ideology and the importance of personality in determining 
policies to cater for local needs. We need only to look at the 
skylines of the two cities to see the difference in policy outcomes. 
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APPENDIX 1 
In April 1952 the City Architect of Portsmouth presented a Housing 
Plan to the Housing Committee for the years 1953-1973. 
1. Critical shortage of housing as per waiting list 
(12,500 families on waiting list). 
Estimate 2/3rds living in rooms (10,300 x 2/3 = 
6,866) of these small proportions find own home 
say 
2. Natural increase in population - 24,000 by 1973 
requiring at least 6,000 dwellings - suggest 
council will have to supply half. 
3. Housing clearance under Housing Acts. In view 
of housing shortage clearance unlikely before 
1960 - M.H.O. say 7,000 would be a reasonable 
programme. 
4. Demolition of occupied dwellings (ie. isolated 
dwellings to make way for housing schemes etc). 
5. Replacement of Temporary Accommodation. 
Targets at: 
1st April 1953 500 
. ~ ~ 800 1st April 1954 
1st April 1955 1,100 
1st April 1956 1,500 
1st April 1957 1,500 
1st April 1958 1,500 
6,900 
6,500 
3,000 
7,000 
1,000 
500 
18,000 
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